

# A Cross-Section of Tibetan Translations of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti IV:

A Note on Kanakavarman's Translation

OKAZAKI Yasuhiro

## 1. Introduction

The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti [PSV] was translated into Chinese once and into Tibetan three times. Among those translations, only two Tibetan translations exist in the Tanjur. The preserved Tibetan translations are that of Kanakavarman/Dad pa'i shes rab [K], and that of Vasudhararakṣita/Seng ge rgyal mtshan [V]. Both translations were executed from the late 11th century up to the early 12th century.<sup>1)</sup> There are many discrepancies between the two translations. Some of these discrepancies seem to be an obstacle to our clearer understanding of PSV. From a PSV reconstruction perspective, Horst Lasic has been examining such discrepancies with a focus on Chapter 2.<sup>2)</sup> In this essay, I will focus on a discrepancy in Chapter 4 and examine its background.

In Chapter 4, there are several cases in which certain paragraphs or sentences are translated into either one of the two translations only. Those cases are listed in the following table.

	K-tr.	V-tr.	Contents	Position in PSV
<b>A</b>	P149a1-b1	(D60b5, P64b2)	A Discussion about the logical equivalence between the similar example and the dissimilar example.	Between k. 4 and k. 5
<b>B</b>	(P152a1)	D62b6-7 P66b4-5	A refusal of the comparison ( <i>upamāna</i> ) in the function of exemplification	Between k. 11 and k. 12
<b>C</b>	P152b1-2	(D63a6, P67a3)	The Examples of the reverse relation of the reason and what is to be proven in the exemplifications	Between k. 13 and k. 14
<b>D</b>	(153a2)	D63b5 P67b2-3	A counter-objection of Vādaśāstrī's definition of exemplification	After k. 15
<b>E</b>	P153a8-b1	(D64a3, P68a1)	A counter-objection of Vādaśāstrī's definition of exemplification	After k. 17

Of these cases, **B** and **C** are believed to be missing from the other translation. In the case **B**, the phrase of the translation V is quoted in Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PST), and in the

case **C** the examples of the pseudo-example preserved in the translation **K** are necessary for the explanation of PS 4.13. The cases **D** and **E** are caused by the misplacement of phrases in the translation **K**.

On the other hand, I feel a hesitation to say that the case **A** is missing from the translation **V**, because the translation **K** of **A** has unique characteristics. Let us focus on the case **A** and examine it.

## 2. Some Paragraphs of PSV Reserved Only in K-Translation

### 2.1. Textual Characteristics of the Case A

In the case **A**, the assumed Sanskrit original of the translation **K** would contain about 160 Sanskrit words.

**A-1:** rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa nyid yin la mi rtag pa yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid  
2yin no zhes gal te de ltar nges par gzung na skyon 'dir 'gyur ba yin na/ gang gi tshe rtsol ba las  
byung ba ma yin pa nyid ni rtag ces nges par gzung ba yi gyi/ rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes ma yin  
pa de'i tshe 3nyes pa med pa yin te/ de ltar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba la med par brjod pa  
yin no// de bzhin du mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba las zhes bya ba 'dir/ gal te yang gtan  
tshigs nges par gzung 4ba'i phyir don gzhan med par 'gyur ba (Kita em: gtan tshigs gzhan med par  
'gyur ro zhe na) de lta na brjod pa po'i gsam pa'i dbang gyis nges par bzung ba'i phyir rtsol ba las  
byung ba nyid la rtag pa nyid med par brjod do zhe na (Kita omits zhe na)/

**A-2:** mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te/ 5de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byung ba med pa'i phyir  
mi rtag pa nyid rjes su dpog pa de bzhin du rtsol ba las byung ba (Kita inserts la) rtag pa nyid med  
pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' 6ba bsgrub pa de nyid yin  
no// de'i phyir gtan tshigs kho na bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o//

**A-3:** 'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na/ mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las  
byung ba'o zhes bya 7ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na/ dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba  
yin te/ mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs su 'gyur  
ro// gal te nyes pa 'di med de dper 8na mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes bya ba 'dir  
shugs kyis bsgrub bya (Kita inserts mi) rtag pa la sgrub pa rnyed pa nyid yin pa de ltar rtag pa nyid  
ni mnyan par bya'o zhes rtag pa la mnyan par bya ba nyid bstan par ni nus 9pa ma yin no zhe na/

**A-4:** gal te shugs kyis gnyi ga rnyed pa yin na de kho bo can mngon par 'dod pa nyid yin te shugs  
kyis sam gang yang rung bas gnyi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro//<sup>3)</sup>

The underlined Tibetan words and sentences are traceable to PST. These words and phrases, however, are not explicitly quoted in PST except for the last double-underlined sentence. In addition, PST does not seem to explain the words or phrases in **A**. Let us

compare **A-2** with PST on it as an example. The letters in boldface are references to the phrases of PSV.

**PST on A-2: viṣama upanyāsaḥ.** yato vipa-ryayoye 'py avadhāraṇabhedasamāśrayād anīṣṭāpattiḥ parijihīṣatā sa ca kriyamāṇe 'pi tathāvadadhāraṇe prāpnoty eva. **tathā hi yathā nitye prayatnānantarīyakatvābhāvād anityatvānumānam evaṃ prayatnānantarīyake nityatvasyābhāvād aprayatnānantarīyakatvānumānam,** yathā hi sādharmyeṇa (lacuna: *anityam eva*) prayatnānantarīyakam na nityam iti nitye prayatnānantarīyakatvābhāvād (Ms. anityatvād: em. *prayatnānantarīyakatvād*?) anityatvānumānam, evaṃ vaidharmyeṇāprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityam na prayatnānantarīyakam iti prayatnānantarīyake nityatvasyābhāvān nitya-stvād aprayatnānantarīyakatvānumānam iti, **tad evāpratiṣṭhātārthasādhanaṃ.** tasmād dhetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāva upadarśyaḥ, nārtho 'vadhāraṇena.<sup>4)</sup>

As is shown in the example above, the PSV paragraph **A-2** is not explained or mentioned by PST, but seems to be extracted from it. This characteristic is common to **A-1** and **A-3**.

In addition, there is only one evidence that the last sentence of **A-4** is quoted in PST and it is the ending word, "*iti* (*zhes pa*).". It is shown below.

**PST on A-4: yadi tarhy arthāpattyobhayaṃ labdhaṃ tad asmābhir anujñātam evānyatareṇa ubhayapradarśanād iti.** 'iha sādhyenānugamo hetor ity (PS 4.2a) atrānugamaśabdasya vyāptir artho 'bhipreteḥ sarvatra gamo 'nugama iti (PSV on PS 4.2) vacanāt.<sup>5)</sup>

In this case PST does not seem to comment on **A-4**. Even though the sentence beginning with "*iha*" is indirectly relevant to **A-4**, this sentence would not be an explanation of **A-4**. This sentence insists that the word "*anugama*" in PS 4.2a implies the pervasion (*vyāpti*). From this it shows that the second characteristic of the reason implies its third characteristic, that is, the non-existence of the reason in the domain of dissimilar instances. However, it does not mean that the third characteristic implies the second one. In contrast, **A-4** insists that both second and third characteristics of the reason are logically equivalent. Thus, PST does not completely explain **A-4**. Rather, it seems to be an introduction to the next paragraph. In addition, the ending word "*iti*" might only be the termination mark.

To sum up, we cannot say that the PST on **A** is a commentary on the paragraphs **A**, even though the PST on **A** is parallel to the paragraphs **A**. What does the unique characteristic of the paragraphs **A** present? Next, we must examine the discussion and the context of **A**.<sup>6)</sup>

## 2.2. The Discussion in the Paragraphs **A**

The paragraphs **A** are placed after PS 4.4, which presents the problems in the case where

the relation between the reason and what is to be proven is biconditional (*samenvaya*).<sup>7)</sup> The paragraph of PSV that follows PS 4.4 illustrates the four fallacious exemplifications.<sup>8)</sup>

	Exemplification	Basis	Conclusion
<b>FE1</b>	<i>yad akṛtakam tan nityam</i>	sādharmya	<i>nityam</i>
<b>FE2</b>	<i>yad anityam tat kṛtakam</i>	vaidharmya	<i>kṛtakam</i>
<b>FE3</b>	( <i>yad aprayātnānantarīyakam tan nityam</i> )	sādharmya	<i>vidyudāder nityatvam</i>
<b>FE4</b>	( <i>yad anityam tat prayātnānantarīyakam</i> )	vaidharmya	<i>vidyudādeḥ prayātnāntarīkatvam</i>

In the above table, **FE1** and **FE2** are cases of co-extension, and **FE3** and **FE4** are cases where the reason does not pervade what is to be proven. In the cases of **FE1** and **FE2**, the propositions that are not intended could be proven. In the cases of **FE3** and **FE4**, the unacceptable propositions could be concluded. The paragraphs **A** follow it.

In the paragraph **A-1**, the opponent formulates the following exemplifications in order to avoid the above defects.

**FE3')** *aprayātnānantarīyakam eva nityam*. **FE4')** *anityam eva prayātnānantarīyakam*.

These formulations, however, have the defect that **A-2** points out. **FE3'** and **FE4'** assert not only that what is not produced immediately after effort does not exist in any eternal entity, but also that any eternal entity does not exist in what is produced immediately after effort. In the latter case, it could be inferred that something is not produced immediately from effort. This is the same case as **FE1** or **FE2**. Finally, **A-2** concludes that what does not exist within the non-existence of what is to be proven should be restricted to its reason. (*hetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāvaḥ*)

Furthermore, **A-3** discusses the exclusive and inconclusive reasons (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*), that is, the formula **FE5**, "*nityam eva śrāvaṇam*" is questioned. The proponent argues: The opponent's formula, **FE5** expresses that the audibility does not exist in the situation where the eternity to be proven does not exist. So, it could be concluded from **FE5** that the sound is eternal because of its audibility. In response, the opponent insists that **FE4'** semantically implies that the reason exists in what is impermanent (*anitya*), but **FE5** does not show that the audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*) exists in the domain of what is eternal. The opponent seems to indicate that a reason is valid only when the similar and dissimilar examples are logically equivalent. That would be the reason why **A-4** seems to accept the discussion of the opponent without any counter-objection. What role does the discussion in the paragraphs **A** play in PSV? As mentioned earlier, **A** is incidental to PS 4.4.

### 2.3. The Context of the Paragraphs A

PS 4.4 points out the problems that are caused by a biconditional relation. Why does a biconditional relation (*samenvaya*) become a subject of discussion in PS 4.4? A synopsis around the PS 4.4 and the paragraphs A is shown as below.

	Position	Content
4.1-Q	V: D60a7-b1, P64a4-6	The reason ( <i>hetu</i> ) is said as “ <i>sādhyaenānugama</i> (PS 4.2a),” and “ <i>sādhyābhāve nāstitā</i> (PS 4.2b).” Then why are we unable to say “ <i>hetvabhāve sādhyābhāva</i> ”?
4.1-A	K: P148b3-4	The reason exists only in the similar instances.
4.2-Q	V: D60b1-b3, P64a6-7	In the case of pot, the relation, “ <i>hetoḥ sādhyena anugama</i> ” as well as the relation, “ <i>sādhyaṃ hetunānugama</i> ” are true together.
4.2-A	K: P148b4-6	(1) Only the first relation is intended in the example. (2) In the example (or exemplification) the external object must be shown.
4.3-A	V: D60b3, P64a7-8 K: 148b6-7	(PS 4.4) (1) In the case of biconditional relation ( <i>samenvaya</i> ), the unmentioned object would be inferred. (2) In the case of non-pervading ( <i>avyāpin</i> or non-coextensional), the undesired proposition would be inferred.
4.4-A	V: D60b3-5, P64a7-b2 K: 148b7-149a1	The examples of (1) and (2) are illustrated and explained.
A (or V: ci ste skyon de yod du chug mod/ :D 60b5, P64b2)		
4.5-Q	V: D60b5-6, P64b2-3 K: 149b1-3	(1) If the definition of similar example (PS 4.2a <i>sādhyaenānugamo hetoḥ</i> ) implies the pervasion ( <i>vyāpti</i> ) then the definition of dissimilar example (PS 4.2b <i>sādhyābhāve nāstitā</i> ) is not necessary to be mentioned (2) If the definition of similar example means the very existence, then the concrete instance is needless.
4.5-A	V: D60b6-61a1, P64b3-5 K: 149b3-5	(1) The definition of similar example refers the pervasion ( <i>vyāpti</i> ). In this situation, the definition of dissimilar example is obtained through logical assumption ( <i>arthāpatti</i> ), and the formulation of dissimilar example is not needed. (2) If both formulae are formulated, then the similar example refers the existence of the reason and the dissimilar example refers the pervasion.
4.6-Q	V: D61a1, P64b5-6 K: 149b5-6	In the case where the similar example refers the existence of the reason alone, the definition of similar example must not be mentioned.
4.6-A	V: D61a1-2, P64b6-7 K: 149b6-7	(1) The definition of similar example serves the purpose to negate the converse relation between the reason and what is to be proven ( <i>hetunā sādhyānugamaḥ</i> ). (2) The negation must be made because there are both cases of the existence and non-existence of the reason in similar instances (PS 3.22).
4.7-Q	V: D61a2-3, P64b7-8	In the case of 4.6-A, the existence of the reason must be restricted to the domain of similar instances. ( <i>sajātīya eva san</i> )
4.7-A	K: 149b7-150a1	Corresponding to this restriction ( <i>sajātīya eva san</i> ), the definition of similar example ( <i>sādhyaenānugamo hetoḥ</i> ) must be restricted. Through this restriction, the negation of existence in the domain of dissimilar instances is obtained.

The discussion concerning the biconditional relation (*samenvaya*) begins with 4.1-Q. 4.1-Q questions the reason why the form, “*hetvabhāve sādhyābhāva*” is impossible in the definition of dissimilar example. If the form, “*hetvabhāve sādhyābhāva*” were also true, then the definition of dissimilar example would mean biconditional relation. The answer to this question (4.1-A) seems to be tautological. In contrast, 4.2-Q insists that both forms “*hetoḥ sādhyenānugama* (PS 4.2a)” and “*sādhyam hetunānugatam*” are true in the case of a pot, which is an affirmative concrete instance in the inference. This objection seems to be persuasive. The answer in 4.2-A would not be sufficient. For this reason, Dignāga shows in 4.3-A and 4.4-A that the opponent’s insistence in 4.2-Q can be reduced to absurdity. PS 4.4 and 4.4-A, however, do not show Dignāga’s interpretation of the definition of similar example. Without the clearer concept of similar example, Dignāga could not give his solution to the problem raised in 4.2-Q. Dignāga’s interpretation of the definition of similar example is given in the paragraphs following 4.5-Q. He insists that the definition of similar example implies the pervasion (4.5-A), and that it negates the converse relation between the reason and what is to be proven (4.6-A).

Judging from the context, the paragraphs A seem to be a supplementary discussion added to 4.3-A (PS 4.4) and 4.4-A. Are the paragraphs A necessary for the discussion from 4.2-Q up to 4.7-A? As I have already shown, the paragraphs A discuss the way to avoid the defects mentioned in 4.3-A (PS 4.4) and 4.4-A. However, if the similar example is defined as the pervasion (*vyāpti*), those defects will disappear because the pervasion is not biconditional relation. As a matter of fact, the definition of the similar example is interpreted as the pervasion in 4.5-Q and 4.5-A, where the concept of pervasion is first mentioned in Chapter 4 of PSV. The objection in 4.5-Q presupposes that the definition of the similar example in PS 4.2a implies the pervasion. Can this presupposition in 4.5-Q be deduced from A-4?

The opponent in 4.5-Q insists that PS 4.2a implies the pervasion as well as the definition of dissimilar example. In contrast, he does not accept that the dissimilar example implies the similar example. In addition, 4.5-A mentions the role of the similar exemplification in the case where both exemplifications are used, while also saying that the pervasion is obtained from the dissimilar exemplification. On the other hand, A-4 explicitly accepts the logical equivalence of the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus, the presupposition in 4.5-Q could not be deduced from A-4. If PS 4.2a, “*sādhyenānugamo*

*hetoh*” implies the pervasion from the beginning, then 4.5-Q naturally follows 4.4-A. Alternatively, instead of the paragraph A the translation V, “*ci ste skyon de yod du chug mod* (Let this defect exist)” could be inserted between 4.4-A and 4.5-Q. That is because 4.3-A and 4.4-A point out the problem in the case where PS 4.2a is interpreted in another way. This situation is possible. Jinedrabuddhi manages to interpret the word, “*anugama*” in PS 4.2a as the pervasion.<sup>9)</sup> Dignāga’s phrase, “*sarvatra gamo ’nugamaḥ*” in PSV on PS 4.2<sup>10)</sup> seems to support Jinendra’s interpretation.

### 3. Conclusion

Throughout the above consideration, I can make the hypothesis that paragraphs A, that is from A-1 to A-4 are interpolated from PST or any similar commentary on PSV. This hypothesis would explain the unique characteristics of the paragraphs A from the textual viewpoints, even though the meaning of the ending word, “*iti*” in PST is somewhat ambiguous. In addition, even if it were not for the paragraphs A, the discussions from 4.1-Q up to 4.7-A would make sense. At least for now, I could not find another way how to explain the unique characteristics of the paragraphs A.

If my hypothesis is true, Dignāga would not explicitly accept the logical equivalence of the similar and dissimilar examples<sup>11)</sup> and the exemplifications with restrictions. We might need to re-consider Dignāga’s logic under this hypothesis.

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### Notes

- 1) See Major 1989, 175–179. 2) Lasic 2020a, 2020b. 3) P149a1–b1. 4) Ms 173a1–5, D 216a6–b3, P 245b6–246a3. 5) Ms 173b2–3, D 216b7–217a1, P 246a8–b2. 6) Modern Translations including the paragraphs A. Kita 243ff, Harada 1999. In addition, Katsura made a survey of Dignāga’s theory of examples. Katsura 2004. 7) *nityatākṛtakatvena nāśitvād vātra kāryatā/ syād anukṛtā kṛtāvīpiny anīṣṭam ca samenvaye//* PS 4.4. 8) V: D60b3–5, P64a8–b2. K: D148b7–149a1. 9) ex. Ms 170a6, D 213a7–b1, P 242b2–3. 10) V: D60a4, P63b8–64a1. K: 148a7. 11) In PSV the sentence similar to A-4 is found. (V: D 61b4–5, P 65b2–3. K: 150b4–5.) However, the *arthāpatti* in this sentence seems to be used in weaker sense from logical viewpoints. It must be examined.

### Abbreviations

- D Derge Edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.  
 P Peking Edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.  
 Ms Manuscript of Pramāṇasamuccayaṛtikā IV, Script B 169b3–191a7.  
 Kita Kitagawa Hidenori 北川秀則. 1973. *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū* インド古典論理学の研究. Revised ed. Tokyo: Suzuki Gakujutu Zaidan.  
 K PSV translation of Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab [P 5702].  
 V PSV translation of Vasudhararakṣita and Seng ge rgyal mtshan [P 5701; D 4204].

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**Key words** Pramāṇasamuccayaṛtti Kanakavarman, *drṣṭānta*, Pramāṇasamuccayaṛtikā

(Instructor of Hiroshima Prefectural Mukaihara High School, Ph. D)