On the Relationship between Dharmakīrti and Two Kinds of Negation

Hatano Kishō

1. Introduction

I will examine the relationship between the *apoha* of Dharmakīrti（600-660）[1] and two kinds of negation: absolute negation（*prasajyapratiṣedha*）and implicative negation（*paryudāsa*）.

There are only a few passages in which Dharmakīrti mentions two kinds of negation in his texts.[2] Moreover, there is no direct reference to the connection between *apoha* and two kinds of negation. Dharmakīrti's *apoha* may be considered absolute negation,[3] but it is mainly based on the understanding of his commentator Dharmottara（740-800）, and from this point of view it should be examined whether Dharmakīrti's *apoha* is actually unrelated to the implicative negation.

Śākyabuddhi（ca. 660-720）, disciple of Dharmakīrti's disciple, classifies *apoha* into three categories in his work, *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*（PVṬ）, which is the commentary on Dharmakīrti's main work, *Pramāṇavārttika*（PV）. In later years, Śāntarakṣita（725-788）also mentions three categories of *apoha* in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*（TS）. Śāntarakṣita's three classifications are based on the above two kinds of negation, and three classifications of Śāntarakṣita approximately correspond to Śākyabuddhi's three classifications.[4]

In Hatano 2022 I have pointed out the possibility that same as above was derived from Dharmakīrti's own text PV 1.169 by referring to the commentary of the Tibetan commentator Dar ma rin chen（1364-1432）. Thus, the connection between *apoha* and two kinds of negation seen in Śāntarakṣita's text can be seen in Dharmakīrti's text, and not just in Śākyabuddhi's text.

In this paper I will organize the views of Dharmottara and the perspectives of three categories of *apoha*, and discuss the relationship between Dharmakīrti and two kinds of negation.

2. The interpretation of Dharmottara

As noted above, the view that *apoha* of Dharmakīrti is absolute negation is mainly based on Dharmottara's interpretation. I investigate two examples here. First, I examine the example found in *Apohaprakaraṇa* (AP).

AP 251,3–12:

gang gi tshe rnam par rtog pa gzhan las ldog par sgro ʼdogs pa na phyi rol gyi gzhan las bzlog par rtogs par byed pa deʼi tshe dngos po gzhan <u>*med par bkag pa*</u> *nyid kyis dngos po la reg pas dngos po rtogs pa yin paʼi phyir sgra dang rnam par rtog pa* <u>*med par dgag pa*</u> *la phyogs pa yin gyi /* <u>*ma yin par dgag pa*</u> *la ʼjug pa ni ma yin no //*

deʼi phyir <u>*med par dgag pa*</u> *sgro ʼdogs par rtogs pa na tha mi dad par zhen pas phyi rol gyi* <u>*med par dgag pa*</u> *nges pa yin no // des na phyi rol gyi cig shos kyis stong pa ni rnam par rtog pas nges par byas pa yin la / sgro btags paʼi cig shos kyis stong pa ni gzung bar bya ba yin no // de nyid kyi phyir na slob dpon chos kyi grags pa yang* <u>*med par dgag pa*</u> *nyid bzhed par gdon mi zaʼo //*

When conceptual awareness fictionalizes[5] exclusion from others and makes the external [object's] exclusion from others understandable, [conceptual awareness] understands the exsistence by coming into contact with exsistence only through <u>absolute negation</u>（med par bkag pa, *prasajyapratiṣedha*）of other exsistence, so that the word and conceptual awareness go toward <u>absolute negation</u>, and don't work on <u>implicative negation</u>（ma yin par dgag pa, *paryudāsa*）. Therefore, when [conceptual awareness] fictionalizes and comprehends <u>absolute negation</u>, <u>absolute negation</u> of external [object] is decided by assuming that [fictionalized thing and external object] are the same. Therefore, other lack of external [object] is determined by conceptual awareness, [while] other lack of fictionalized object is grasped. For this reason, there is no doubt that master Dharmakīrti also accepts only <u>absolute negation</u>.[6]

'Fictionalized thing' and 'external object' are essentially on completely different levels. For Dharmottara, however, *apoha*（exclusion from others）in both is nothing but 'absolute negation,' and 'implicative negation,' which is negation with a positive element, is not imcluded at all. Dharmottara also states that although two *apoha* have absolute negation as their essence, *apoha* in 'fictionalized thing' is 'what is grasped,' while *apoha* in 'external object' is 'what is determined.'

Thus, although two *apoha* are not completely the same in nature, Dharmottara states that the process from 'grasping' to 'detemination,' i.e., the deteminaion of *apoha* in external object, is established through 'assuming'（*zhen pa, adhyavasāya*）that 'fictionalized thing' and 'external object' are the same. Dharmakīrti uses the term *adhyavasāya* in the context of

'assuming the appearance on conceptual awareness to be an external object.'[7] In other words, the structure of *adhyavasāya*, 'assuming non-external object to be external object,' is shared by both Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Therefore, one of the reasons why Dharmottara considers his own view that '*apoha* is absolute negation' to be the view of Dharmakīrti is the commonality of this usage of *adhyavasāya*. However, Dharmakīrti never actually uses the word *adhyavasāya* to describe *apoha* itself. This suggests that the idea that *apoha* is absolute negation is based on Dharmottara's own theory, and it is difficult to conclude that Dharmakīrti's *apoha* is absolute negation.

Next, I will investigate the example found in Dharmottara's commentary (*Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*) on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.[8]

> PVinṬ 195a4–5:
> _med par dgag pa'i gzhan sel ba don gyi shugs kyis rnam par rtog pa'i yul du 'gyur ba de nye bar bzung nas ni / ldog pa'i ngo bo nyid med phyir // gnas dang mi gnas rtogs pa med //_ PV 1.169ab _ces bshad la / sgro btags pa'i gzhan sel ba dngos su rnam par rtog pa'i don nye bar bzung nas ni //_ spyi yi blo yang bslad pa yin // des na sun dbyung ba yang med // _PV 1.169cd ces gsungs so // de nas rnam par rtog pa ni gzhan sel ba'i yul can yin no//_
> On the basis of that the exclusion of others, which is <u>absolute negation</u>, become object of conceptual awareness by the power of [external] object, [master Dharmakīrti] says **Because negation [that is exclusion of others] has no nature, there is no thought of continuation or non-continuation [in that negation].** (**PV 1.169ab**) And, on the basis of that other exclusions of what is fictionalized are indeed objects of conceptual awareness [he] says **Cognition of universal is also confused, and there is no criticism [of that cognition of universal] because of its being confused.** (**PV 1.169cd**) Thus, exclusion of others is object of conceptual awareness.

At the beginning of the passage above, Dharmottara indicates that *apoha* is absolute negation as in the example of AP, but it is important to note that PV 1.169 is quoted here. Śākyabuddhi mentions three kinds of *apoha* in his commentary on PV 1.169, and Dar ma rin chen notes that these three kinds of *apoha* are directly derived from explanation provided for PV 1.169.[9]

Dharmottara, on the other hand, takes a view that is very different from Śākyabuddhi and Dar ma rin chen, and comprehends PV 1.169 as a verse in which *apoha* is absolute negation. According to the AP's discussion of examples above, Dharmottara understands that PV 1.169ab is based on that exclusion of others which is absolute negation in external object is determined by conceptual awareness, while PV 1.169cd is based on that exclusion

of others which is absolute negation in what is fictionalized is grasped by conceptual awareness.

From PV 1.169, Śākyabuddhi and Dar ma rin chen derive three categories of *apoha*, while Dharmottara derives *apoha* which is absolute negation in external objects and fictionalized objects. Although their interpretations differ widely, it seems that they understand PV 1.169 to be a verse concerning the nature of *apoha*.

By examining the two examples above, it can be confirmed that Dharmottara considers Dharmakīrti's *apoha* to be absolute negation. However, the question remains as to whether Dharmakīrti's *apoha* is in fact absolute negation and has nothing to do with implicative negation at all.

3. The interpretation from three categories of *apoha*

In the following section, I will discuss the relationship between Dharmakīrti and two kinds of negation by relating them to three kinds of *apoha* summarized by Śāntarakṣita and Śākyabuddhi.

In PVṬ 200b3–6, Śākyabuddhi classifies *apoha* into （A1）excluded particular (*vyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa*),（A2）mere exclusion of others (*anvayavyavacchedamātra*), and（A3）appearance in conceptual awareness (*vikalpabuddhipratibhāsa*).[10] And in TS 16.1003[11] Śāntarakṣita classifies *apoha* into（B1）implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) whose essence is cognition (*buddhyātman*),（B2）implicative negation whose essence is object (*arthātman*), and（B3）absolute negation (*niṣedha*).

Of these,（A1）and（B2）, and（A3）and（B1）are similar in content, while（A2）and（B3）are considered to be slightly different in content.[12] The above correspondences can be summarized as follows.

Śākyabuddhi's *apoha*		Śāntarakṣita's *apoha*
（A1）excluded particular	=	（B2）implicative negation whose essence is object
（A2）mere exclusion of others	≈	（B3）absolute negation
（A3）appearance in conceptual awareness	=	（B1）implicative negation whose essence is cognition

Śākyabuddhi himself does not provide a detailed explanation of three kinds of *apoha*, including their relation to two kinds of negation. However, by compairing them to Śāntarakṣita's *apoha*, it is possible to discern the relationship between three kinds of *apoha* of Śākyabuddhi and implicative negation. Moreover by taking into account of Dar ma rin

chen's commentary that three *apoha* of Śākyabuddhi are directly derived from PV 1.169,[13] the connection between Dharmakīrti's *apoha* of and implicative negation becomes clearer.

　　Both Śākyabuddhi and Dar ma rin chen make no mention of the relationship between two kinds of negation and three kinds of *apoha*. However, if we integrate the views of Śākyabuddhi, Dar ma rin chen, and Śāntarakṣita, which are basically irreconcilable, it is possible to state that there is the relationship between Dharmakīrti's *apoha* and implicative negation.

4. Conclusion

In the pages above, I have examined the relationship between the Dharmakīrti's *apoha*, and absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) and definite negation (*paryudāsa*).

　　Dharmottara states that same as above is related only to absolute negation, but this is based on Dharmottara's own view including the usage of *adhyavasāya*. Dharmottara, Śākyabuddhi, and Dar ma rin chen refer to *apoha* from their commentary on PV 1.169, and PV 1.169 was understood to be a verse of the nature of *apoha*.

　　Moreover, integrating the views of Śākyabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Dar ma rin chen, who refer to three kinds of *apoha*, it can be considered that Dharmakīrti's *apoha* includes not only absolute negation, but also implicative negation.

Notes

　1) In this paper I depend on Frauwallner 1961 about the dates of Buddhists.

　2) In the extant Dharmakīrti's texts, the term *paryudāsa* (implicative negation) is used about 10 times, while the term *prasajyapratiṣedha* (absolute negation) is used only twice. Also, there is no use of both in PV 1.40-185, where theory of *apoha* is discussed. Cf. Ono, Takashima, and Oda 2020.

　3) Cf. Ishida (2020, 5-6).

　4) Cf. Ishida (2005, 94).

　5) Relying on the discussion in Kataoka 2017, I translate '*sgro 'dogs pa*' (*āropa*) into 'fiction.'

　6) See Frauwallner (1937, 274) and Ishida (2020, 4-5) for translations.

　7) Cf. Hatano 2016.

　8) This section seems to comment on PVin 2.21. See Steinkellner 1979 for a translation of PVin 2. This example (PVinṬ 195a4-5) is also mentioned in Nishizawa (2014, 233, n. 17).

　9) Cf. Hatano (2022, 121)

10) See Ishida 2005 for the Sanskrit of this part, and translation.

11) TS 16.1003: *tathāhi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ / dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmā-rthātmabhedataḥ //*

12) I rely on Ishida (2005, 94) for comparative discussion of three kinds of *apoha* indicated by Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita.

13）Cf. *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rnam bshad thar lam gsal byed* 214,9-14. See Hadano（2022, 121）for this translation.

Abbreviations

AP *Apohaprakaraṇa*. Dharmottara. See Frauwallner 1937.　　　**PV 1** *Pramāṇavārttika*. Dharmakīrti. In *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.　　　**PVin 2** *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 2. Dharmakīrti. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2*. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House; Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007. **PVinṬ** *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. Dharmottara. Derge ed. Tohoku No. 4229. Tshad ma, dze 1b1-289a7. Peking ed, Otani No. 5727. Tshad ma, dze 1b1-347a8.　　　**PVṬ** *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*（*thad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad*）. Śākyabuddhi. Derge ed. Tohoku No. 4220. Tshad ma, je 1b1-328a7, nye 1b1-282a7.　　　**TS** *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Śāntarakṣita. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. S. D. Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi: Bauddhabhāratī, 1968. Reprint, Varanasi, 1981.　　　**Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rnam bshad thar lam gsal byed** Dhar ma rin chen. *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad thar lam gsal byed*. dGa' ldan byang rtse thos bsam nor gling dpe mdzod khang, 2017.

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（Assistant Professor, Otani University）