

Hetvābhāsa Theory of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā in Bhāṭṭajayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*

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1. Introduction

This article focuses on the classification of unestablished reason (*asiddha*), a pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*) mentioned in Bhāṭṭajayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. In Indian logic, argumentative formulas of inference generally require reason (*hetu*) as an essential element. One of the typical conditions for reason is “being a property of the subject” (*pakṣadharmatā*), and the reason lacking it is called “unestablished.” This study first examines the characteristics of the classification critically mentioned by Jayanta and shows its correspondence with Kumāṛila's *Ślokavārttika* classification. This paper then identifies the interpretive problem concerning “unestablished reason based on the non-cognition” (*ajñānāsiddha*) in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and points out that Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* could contribute to the solution of the problem. Finally, we consider the development of *ajñānāsiddha* and explore its background circumstances.

2. Classification of *asiddha* in *Nyāyamañjarī*

Bhāṭṭajayanta (ca. 9–10c), a well-known Naiyāyika philosopher, mentions different subdivisions of *asiddha* in his *Nyāyakalikā* and *Nyāyamañjarī*, although his final position is that the subdivisions are not limited.¹⁾ Neither of the two classifications is found in the extant literature on the Nyāya school preceding Jayanta. Therefore, it can be expected that his critical references will be directed toward other schools. Of these two classifications, in *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta classifies the *asiddha* into 18 types ($= 3 \times 2 \times 3$) in terms of (A) concerning what: (A-i) a reason itself (*hetusvarūpa*), (A-ii) a fundamental subject of reason (**hetvāśrayadharmin*), and (A-iii) partial presence (*ekadeśavṛtti*), (B) for whom: (B-i) for one side (*anyatara*) and (B-ii) for both (*ubhaya*), and (C) due to what: (C-i) non-cognition (*ajñāna*), (C-ii) doubt (*sandeha*), and (C-iii) error

(*viparyaya*).²⁾ Although the classification partially corresponds to that described in *Nyāyakalikā*, the two classifications have completely different theoretical backgrounds in that *Nyāyamañjarī* introduces the C-type distinction, that is, *ajñāna*, *sandeha*, and *viparyaya*. However, *Nyāyamañjarī* lacks specific examples of each subcategory, and its contents are unclear.

3. Classification of *asiddha* in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā

The terms “*ajñāna*, *sandeha*, and *viparyaya*” recall the famous classification of invalidity (*prāmāṇya*), that is, *mithyātva*, *ajñāna*, and *saṁśaya*, by Kumāṛila Bhāṭṭa (ca. 600–650)³⁾ of the Mīmāṃsā school. In fact, Kumāṛila presents the three corresponding categories – *saṁśaya*, *adhī*, and *viparyaya* – as subdivisions of *asiddha* in his *Ślokavārttika*.⁴⁾ As indicated in previous studies, his framework of pseudo-reasons seems to have been influenced by the Buddhist Dignāga (ca. 480–540), but Kumāṛila’s originality lies in his incorporation of “non-cognition.”⁵⁾ Given this, the classification of *asiddha* in *Nyāyamañjarī* probably goes back to Kumāṛila. The words *adhī* and *saṁśaya* in *Ślokavārttika* appear as *ajñāna* and *sandeha* in *Nyāyamañjarī*, and a similar rendering is also given by Umbeka (ca. 730–790), the earliest commentator on *Ślokavārttika*.⁶⁾

However, both Kumāṛila and Umbeka lack definitional explanations and examples of *adhī* or *ajñāna*. In this regard, as Yamakami et al. (1985, 28–29; 31) noted, Sucaritaśrī (ca. 800–900), like Umbeka, paraphrases *adhī* as *ajñāna* and explains that the unestablished reason based on non-cognition is a fallacy in the case of “the use of words whose meaning is not well known” (*aprasiddhārthapadaprayoga*).⁷⁾ Pārthasārati Miśra (ca. 1000–1050) also follows his interpretation.⁸⁾ Nevertheless, since neither Kumāṛila nor Jayanta mentions specific examples of the fallacy due to non-cognition, it is unclear whether Sucaritaśrī’s understanding aligns with Kumāṛila’s intention.

4. Bhāṭṭa’s verses quoted by Cakradhara

The previous sections pointed out that the classification of “unestablished reason” (*asiddha*) mentioned by Jayanta in *Nyāyamañjarī* should be identified with Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā’s view because it includes subcategories based on non-cognition, which are unique to Kumāṛila. Interestingly, Cakradhara (ca. 11c?),⁹⁾ the author of *Granthibhaṅga*, a commentary on *Nyāyamañjarī*, quotes verses that relate “non-cognition, doubt, and error” to

the use of unfamiliar words (lit. *padāsiddha*) and attributes the verses to a person named Bhāṭṭa. Accordingly, *asiddha* is applied not only to logical fallacies, but also to the use of pseudo-words such as *vijñapti* and *paśyanā* for reasons. These words are peculiar to Buddhists and criticized by Kumāṛila in contrast to “correct language” (*sādhusabda*).¹⁰ Furthermore, according to the following verses attributed to Bhāṭṭa, the fallacies such as *padāsiddha* are further distinguished based on (B) for whom: proponent, opponent, or both, and (C) due to what: non-cognition (*ajñāna*), doubt (*sandeha*), and error (*viparyāsa*).¹¹ This framework is very similar to that in Kumāṛila Bhāṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*, but there are no corresponding verses in *Ślokavārttika*.

N. J. Shah, the editor of *Granthibhaṅga*, notes that the above verses quoted twice with the name Bhāṭṭa may be taken from *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, a lost work of Kumāṛila.¹² Cakradhara mentions the name Bhāṭṭa several times, and N. J. Shah identifies the other quotations as corresponding to Kumāṛila's *Ślokavārttika* or *Tantravārttika*.¹³ Considering the following points, the verses mentioned above are highly probably fragments of *Bṛhaṭṭikā*: (1) Kumāṛila himself neither defines nor illustrates an unestablished reason due to “non-cognition” in *Ślokavārttika*, (2) Sucaritamiśra and others associate “non-cognition” with “the use of words whose meaning is not well known,” (3) Cakradhara mentions the view that *padāsiddha* is one of the “unestablished reason” with the name Bhāṭṭa. Even so, it should be noted that *padāsiddha* is not associated with just “non-cognition” (*ajñāna*). In other words, neither *Ślokavārttika* nor Bhāṭṭa's verses clarify the characteristics of the fallacy of *ajñāna*. If we assume that Sucaritamiśra regarded *Bṛhaṭṭikā* as a complement to the defect of *Ślokavārttika*, i.e., the missing interpretation of *ajñāna*, it would be natural that he substituted “the use of words whose meaning is not well known” (*aprasiddhārtha-padaprayoga*) for *padāsiddha* in *Bṛhaṭṭikā* to explain *ajñāna*.

5. Examples of *asiddha* by Kumāṛila and Cakradhara

Prior to the citation of the Bhāṭṭa's verses above, Cakradhara gives some specific examples of “unestablished reason” not mentioned by Jayanta, and most of them coincide with the examples in *Ślokavārttika*.¹⁴ There is no doubt, therefore, that Cakradhara had in mind the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā's theory as the classification referred to in *Nyāyamañjarī*. However, Cakradhara keeps those related to the sublation, such as “fire is cold” or “voice is not heard,” in the “error” category and reassigns to “non-cognition” several examples, such as

“perceptibility” (*cākṣuṣatva*) of sound that Kumārila classifies as “error.” It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the meaning of common words such as *cākṣuṣatva* is unknown to any debater, and therefore Cakradhara’s understanding of *ajñāna* must be different from Sucaritamīśra’s view. In fact, Bhāṭṭa’s interpretation of *padāsiddha* is no more than an alternative in *Granthibhaṅga*. Thus, although Cakradhara does not clarify the reason for his manipulation in categorizing, we may infer that his intended concept of “non-cognition” is “what is not yet known” or “what is unknowable.”

6. Transition of *ajñānāsiddha*

The fallacy of the reason “unestablished reason due to non-cognition” (*ajñānāsiddha*) is rarely, to my knowledge, mentioned as the subdivision of *asiddha*. However, according to a few sources, an epistemological interpretation like Cakradhara’s seems to be the predominant one and not a semantic/pragmatic one like Sucaritamīśra’s. Varadarāja (ca. 1150), the successor of Udayana in Nyāya school, in his *Tārkikarākṣā* and *Sārasaṃgraha*, follows Udayana’s three categories of *asiddha*, i.e., *avidyamānapakṣa*, *pakṣe* ‘*vidyamāna*, and *avidyamānavyāptika*, and adds a fourth category of “non-cognition” concerning the three kinds of related to them, i.e., a subject (*pakṣa*), a reason (*hetu*), and a pervasion (*vyāpti*), not introducing here any discussion of the meaning of words.¹⁵⁾ In fact, as an example of *ajñānāsiddha*, Varadarāja mentions “because of being the substratum of the unseen/invisible cause for it” (*taddhetubhūtādṛṣṭāśrayatvāt*) as the reason for the statement “Devadatta will be wealthy.”¹⁶⁾ Nevertheless, he does not refer to the classification of “non-cognition, doubt, and error” by Kumārila, and the background of his adding *ajñāna* is open to investigation.

It is noteworthy that in *Mānameyodaya*, a well-known treatise of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā by Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa (ca. 17c), *ajñānāsiddha* is explained using the same example as Varadarāja. Nārāyaṇa also regards the same reason as *ajñānāsiddha* and bases this on the absence of the means of valid cognition.¹⁷⁾ As described above, in later views such as Varadarāja’s, the fallacy of *ajñānāsiddha* tends to be interpreted in an epistemological way rather than in a semantic/pragmatic way. As a background for this change in interpretation, it can be assumed that an attempt was made to eliminate the fallacies inherent in debates relying on speech acts. As an example, for the Nyāya school, when an unclear word is used in a debate, the fallacy should be pointed out as a condition of defeat, such as

“unintelligible” (*avijñātārtha*), without waiting for “pseudo-reason” (*hetvābhāsa*). Alternatively, it might be possible to situate this conceptual shift as having a similar tendency to Bhāsarvajña's view of the limited acceptance of the use of *incorrect* language in debates, which is influenced by Dharmakīrti's criticism of the “ungrammatical word” (*apaśabda*) exclusion theory.¹⁸⁾

7. Conclusion

This paper examines the characteristics and attributes of the classification of “unestablished reason” (*asiddha*) mentioned by Jayanta in *Nyāyamañjarī*. It discusses the transition of “unestablished reason based on non-cognition” (*ajñānāsiddha*), referring to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā's literature and Cakradhara's *Granthibhaṅga*. The classification of *asiddha* in *Nyāyamañjarī*, characterized by the categories of “non-cognition, doubt, and error,” is almost identical to Kumārila's description in *Ślokavārttika*. While Jayanta only presents the framework and does not refer to examples, Kumārila, relying on Dignāga, discusses the fallacy of *asiddha* by giving specific examples in doubt and error cases. However, both definitions and examples are lacking for non-cognition (*ajñāna*) peculiar to Kumārila. In this regard, Sucaritamiśra and others understand *ajñānāsiddha* as a fallacy in the case of “the use of words whose meaning is not well known” and take it as a semantic/pragmatic aspect. Additionally, as a reinforcement of the orthodoxy of their interpretation in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, this paper shows that there are several verses on *padāsiddha* quoted with the name Bhāṭṭa in the Cakradhara's commentary on *Nyāyamañjarī*. These verses may be fragments of Kumārila's lost work, *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, according to N. J. Shah, and through this examination, this article has indicated that the Bhāṭṭa's verses (= *Bṛhaṭṭikā*?) could be placed as a bridge between *Ślokavārttika*, which pays little attention to “non-cognition,” and Sucaritamiśra's interpretation, whose origin is unclear. Contrary to Sucaritamiśra's semantic/pragmatic interpretation, *ajñānāsiddha* seems to have been interpreted in an epistemological context later. However, this point will require a more detailed study of the literature in which pseudo-reasons are related to “non-cognition, doubt, and error.”

Notes

- 1) NM, p. 623. 2) *ibid.* 3) The dates of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors depend on Kataoka 2011, 276. 4) Yamakami et al. 1985, 28ff. 5) Katsura 1982; Yamakami et al. 1985, 27–28.
6) ŚVTṬ, p. 323. 7) ŚVK, pp. 55–56. 8) NR, p. 372. 9) Muroya 2010, 214–215.

- 10) NMGBh, p. 240. Cf. Harikai 1975. 11) *ibid.* 12) *ibid.*: “[Bṛhaṭṭikā ?].” Cf. Kataoka 2011, 78ff. 13) See also Muroya 2010, 240ff. 14) NMGBh, pp. 239–240; Yamakami et al. 1985, 29–30. 15) TR, p. 142; SS, p. 142. 16) SS, p. 143. 17) MMU, p. 74. 18) NBhū, pp. 366–368.

Abbreviations

MMU *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa*. Ed. C. Kunhan Raja, and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1975. **NBhū** *Nyāyabhūṣaṇam: Śrīmadācāryabhāsarvajña-praṇīṭasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam*. Ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānandaḥ. Śaḍdarśanaprakāśana-granthamālā 1. Varanasi: Śaḍdarśana Prakāśana Pratiṣṭhāna, 1968. **NM** *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇī*. Ed. K. S. Varadācārya. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1983. **NMGBh** *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. L. D. Series 35. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1972. **NR** *Mīmāṃsāślokaavartikam Śrīmatkumārīlabhaṭṭapāda-viracitam Nikhilatantrāparatantraśrīmat-Pārthasārathimiśrapraṇīṭayā Nyāyaratnākaraḥkhyayā vyākhyayā 'nuṣaṭam*. Ed. Rāmaśāstri Tailanga. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, no. 3. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1898. **ŚV** See Yamakami et al. 1985. **ŚVK** *The Mīmāṃsāślokaavartika of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamīśra: Part III*. Ed. V. A. Rāmaswami Sastri. Trivandrum: The Superintendent, Government Press, 1943. **ŚVTṬ** *Ślokaavartikavyākhyā Tātparyāṭikā of Uṇveka Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri, rev. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras: University of Madras, 1971. **TR/SS** *Varadarāja's Tārīkarakṣāsārasaṃgraha with the Commentary Vṛtti of Harihara Ḍikṣita*. Ed. Yatirajasampatkumara. Tirupati: Haripriya Publications, 2004.

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