

What Is ‘the Awareness Whose Domain Is the Tree’?

The Concept of a *karman* in the Nyāya *pramāṇa* Theory

OGAWA Hideyo

0. Introduction There is evidence to show that Uddyotakara learned Pāṇini’s *kāraka* theory from Bhartṛhari. Under NS 2.1.16, in order to account for the accusative form *vrkṣam* (*vrkṣa* ‘tree’; *vrkṣa-am* A 2.3.2 *karmaṇi dvitīyā*) in the utterance [1] *vrkṣam paśyati* ‘[Devadatta] is seeing a tree,’ Uddyotakara adopts the definition of the *kāraka karman* ‘object’: *kriyāviśayatvaṃ karmatvaṃ* ‘To be the domain (*viśaya*) of an action (*kriyā*) is to be a *karman*,’ derived by Bhartṛhari from A 1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*. The tree is named *karman* because it is the domain of the action of seeing denoted by the verb *dṛś* (*dṛś* → *paśya* [A 7.3.78 *pā...dṛśi...sadām piba...paśya...sīdāḥ*]). Vācaspati’s interpretation of the definition applied in the present case fully reveals the characteristics of the Nyāya *pramāṇa* theory. The purpose here is to show how Uddyotakara’s, and hence Bhartṛhari’s, concept of a *karman* is embodied in the analysis of the cognitive event expressed by [1].

1. *kriyāviśayatva* Vācaspati comments on the definition of a *karman* as follows: NVTT on NV to NS 2.1.16 (437): [A] *anātmāsamavetakriyāphalaśālitvaṃ kriyāviśayatvaṃ karmatvaṃ* / [B] *devadattasamavetayā hi kriyayā darśanalakṣaṇayā vrkṣaviśayo’nubhavo janyate* / [C] *idam eva cānubhavyārthaviśayatvaṃ yad arthādhīnanirūpaṇatvaṃ ...*

1.1. *kriyāphalaśālitva*

[A] says that the expression *kriyāviśaya*, which Udayana (NVTP [346]) glosses as *kriyāśraya* ‘the basis of an action,’ refers to ‘that which is possessed of the result of that action which inheres in another entity [lit. what is not itself]’ (*anātmāsamavetakriyāphalaśālin*). The term *kriyā* in the definition implies a result of the action (*kriyāphala*) because of the action in question being that immediately after which the result comes out (see Ogawa 2022). The terms *viśaya*, *āśraya*, and *-śālin* are synonymous. The qualification of the action by the negative compound *an-ātman* ‘not self, another,’ which is synonymous with the word *para* ‘another,’ serves to prevent the name *karmam* from undesiredly applying to Caitra in [2] *nagaram gaacchati caitraḥ* ‘Caitra is going to the city.’ Reaching (*prāpti*),

i.e., contact (*saṃyoga*), which is the result of the action of going, inheres both in the city and in Caitra. Nonetheless, the action of going inheres in Caitra himself (NVTṬ on NV to NS 2.1.16 [438]; NVTṬ on NS 3.1.1 [704]: *parasamavetakriyāphalaśālitva*).

1.2. *arthādhīnanirūpaṇatva*

[C] states that, for an awareness (*anubhava*), to have an object (*artha*) as a domain (*viśaya*) is to be determined in dependence upon the object (*arthādhīnanirūpaṇatva*). This point makes sense within the framework of *anuvyavasāya* 'after-determination, inward mental perception, apperception,' typically formulated as 'I know the pot' (*ghaṭam ahaṃ jñāmi*) or 'I have the knowledge of the pot' (*ghaṭajñānavān ahaṃ*). In the Nyāya *pramāṇa* theory, when an awareness arises it can then be connected with the internal organ (*manas*) to generate the *anuvyavasāya*. Accordingly, Vācaspati correctly says that the essence of the knowledge is not determined without its object being determined (NVTṬ on NS 1.1.4 [122]: *na cārthanirūpaṇam antareṇa jñānarūpanirūpaṇam*). Keśava brings out this point more neatly by saying the following: TBh on *buddhi* (79): *sarvaṃ jñānam arthanirūpyam arthapratibaddhasyaiva tasya manasā nirūpaṇāt / ghaṭajñānavān ahaṃ na tu jñānavān ahaṃ ity etāvanmātraṃ jñāyate*. Any knowledge is to be determined on the basis of its object, because the knowledge is determined through the internal organ only if it is connected with its object. The *anuvyavasāya* which follows the knowledge is of the form 'I have the knowledge of the pot' and not merely of the form 'I have a knowledge.'

There are two points to note: First, the terms *artha* and *viśaya* in the phrase *artha-viśayatva* have different meanings. The tree is characterized as *artha* 'object, action-provoking object, something desired (*arthyate*)' 1) to be obtained (*upādātum: upādeya*), 2) to be discarded (*hātum: heya*), 3) neither to be obtained nor to be discarded, i.e., to be ignored (*upekṣaṇīya*). Second, the term *viśaya* is used in the sense of a domain. As Ogawa 2021 pointed out, when X is said to be the domain (*viśaya*) of Y, the following three hold: Y does not exist in the domain other than X (*anyatrābhāva*); X is the basis (*āśraya*) of Y; Y is established in dependence upon X (*X-adhīna[āyatta]sthitī*). This third point is clearly expressed by [C]. It is to be noted in this connection that the Nyāya school holds the theory that knowledge is formless and cannot take on the form of its object (*nirākāra-vāda*).

2. *vrkṣaviśayo'nubhavaḥ* According to [B], the awareness whose domain is the tree (*vrkṣaviśayo'nubhavaḥ*) is produced by the action of seeing (*darśana*) which inheres in

Devadatta. This result is related to the tree by the relation of *viṣayatva* 'domain-ness,' a relational abstract correlative to *viṣayitva* 'domain-possessor-ness,' so that the tree is named *karman*, though the awareness inheres in the ātman.

2.1. *jijñāsā, jñāna*

According to Udayana (NVTP on NS 2.1.16 [347]), the term *darśana* which is supposed to signify the meaning of the verb *dṛś* in *paśyati*, as an instrument noun, refers to 'that through which something is seen', i.e., *jijñāsādi* 'preparatory factors such as a desire to know (*jijñāsā*)' and the application of the sense organ (*karaṇapraṇidhāna*); and, as an action noun, *jñāna* 'cognition, knowledge.' In the latter case, *hānādyanubhava* 'the awareness that produces discard (*hāna*), obtainment (*upādāna*), or indifference (*upekṣā*)' is taken into account. Thus [3] *darśanena vṛkṣa-viṣaya-anubhavaṃ janayati* '[Devadatta] is bringing about the awareness whose domain is the tree, through the act of seeing,' which is a paraphrase of [1], has the following equivalents: [4] *jijñāsāyā* ... '... through the desire to know'; [5] *jñānena* ... '... through the knowledge.' [5] is properly paraphrased as [6] *jñānena hānādyanubhavaṃ janayati* '[Devadatta] is bringing about the awareness that produces discard etc., through the knowledge.'

2.2. *svaviṣaya, viṣayāntara*

There is a reason that Udayana introduces the two interpretations of the term *darśana*. A *pramāṇa* has two domains: its own domain (*svaviṣaya*, D1) and the domain other than that domain (*viṣayāntara*, D2). For a cognitive process consists of two stages: the stage where occurs the cognition (C1) of the object which is the domain of C1's own; the stage where occurs, through C1, the cognition (C2) of the qualifier of the object, i.e., discard etc. or a property such as that of being to be discarded, which is the domain other than C1's own domain. On this assumption, Uddyotakara says the following: NV on NBh to NS 1.1.3 (89–90): (a) *sarvaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ svaviṣayaṃ prati bhāvasādhanam pramitiḥ pramāṇam iti* / (b) *viṣayāntaraṃ prati karaṇasādhanam pramīyate 'neneti pramāṇam* / (c) *yadi bhāvasādhanāḥ pramāṇaśabdaḥ kiṃ phalam viṣayasyādhigatatvāt* / (d) *uktaṃ phalaṃ hānādibuddhaya iti* (NBh on NS 1.1.3 [87]) / (e) *jñāte tadbhāvāt / jñāte khalv arthe tridhā buddhir bhavati heyō vopādeyo vopekṣaṇīyo veti*. The word *pramāṇa* (*pra-mā + LyuT*), which is taken as an action noun (A 3.3.115 *lyuṭ ca*) with respect to the *pramāṇa*'s own domain, signifies the action of knowing, cognition, knowledge, relative to the object that is its own domain: a derivational analysis (*vigraha*) in this case is given as *pramitiḥ*

pramāṇam iti. As is suggested by (c) and (e), the word *pramāṇa*, as an action noun, refers to the result of the action of knowing denoted by the verb *mā* preceded by the upasarga *pra*, which is described as *artha-adhigati* 'the understanding of the object,' *artha-jñāna* 'the knowledge of the object.' On the other hand, the word *pramāṇa*, which is taken as an instrument noun (A 3.3.117 *karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca*) with respect to the domain other than the above-described domain, signifies the instrument for knowing properties such as that of being to be obtained, possessed by the object: a derivational analysis in this case is given as *pramīyate 'neneti*. This amounts to saying that the result of the action of knowing, referred to by the action noun *pramāṇa*, serves as instrument for bringing about a cognition such as 'This object is to be discarded.' In short, one first cognizes a given object, as a result of which there occurs an understanding of the object (*pramāṇa* as an action noun), and then proceeds to determine, on the basis of the first cognition, whether the object is to be discarded, obtained, or ignored.

Vācaspati describes *viṣayāntara* by using the expressions *hānādiviṣaya* 'the domain that is discard etc.' and *heyatvādikaṃ viṣayaḥ* 'the domain that is a property such as that of being to be discarded' (NVTṬ on NS 1.1.3 [89]). The Naiyāyikas' basic point must be kept in mind that a *pramāṇa* 'a means of knowledge' is invariably connected with the object it indicates (*arthavat*) because, when the object is understood through the *pramāṇa*, the activity (*pravṛtti*) taken towards the object has efficacy (*sāmarthyā*) (NBh on NS 1.1.1 [1]: *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*).

2.3. *karaṇa*

The third triplet ending (*Tā*) used in [3]–[6] signifies an instrument (*karaṇa*) by A 2.3.18 *karṭṭkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*. A 1.4.42 *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam* provides that a *kāraka* which is the means par excellence of bringing about an action is called *karaṇa*, since it serves as a means of bringing the act in question to accomplishment more than any other *kāraḥ* spoken of. Bhartṛhari explains A 1.4.42 as follows: VP 3.7.90: *kriyāyāḥ pariniṣpattir yadvyāpārād anantaram / vivakṣyate yadā tatra karaṇatvaṃ tadā smṛtam* ("When it is intended to be conveyed that an action is brought to completion immediately after the activity (*vyāpāra*) of X, the property of being an instrument (*karaṇatva*) is found in X. This is what is handed down in grammar."). To say that an action is brought to completion (*pariniṣpatti*) amounts to saying that the result of the action is accomplished; the term *kriyā* here implies a result of an action. Accordingly, when it is intended to be conveyed

that immediately after the activity of an entity a result of an action is accomplished, the entity is spoken of as a *karaṇa*. In other words, the *kāraka* named *karaṇa* is that whose activity, a subsidiary (*avāntara*) relative to the main (*pradhāna*) activity, brings about a result of this main activity directly through no intermediary of the activities of other *kāraṇas* engaged in the main activity. It is to be noted that Uddyotakara also holds the *karaṇa* to be the most immediately antecedent to the action (NV on NS 2.1.16 [437]: *ānantaryapratipattiḥ karaṇasya sādhatamatvārthaḥ*).

2.4. *karaṇavyāpāra*

Vācaspati defines the activity of the instrument as follows: NVTṬ on NBh to NS 1.1.3 (87): *sa tu vyāpāra ucyate yaḥ kārakaiḥ phale janayitavye caramabhāvī dharmabhedaḥ phalotpādānukūlo'pekṣyate*. The result (*phala*) of a principal action is to be produced by a set of *kāraṇas* (*kārakaiḥ*) that participate in the action. Accordingly, component factors occurring in sequence are involved in producing the result. Under this assumption, the activity of an instrument (*karaṇavyāpāra*) is that specific property of the instrument which occurs at the last moment before the result of the principal action arises (*caramabhāvī dharmaviśeṣaḥ*) and which is expected to be conducive to the production of the result (*phalotpādānukūla*). When a cloth is to be produced from threads, specific contacts among the threads are the activities of the threads that serve as instrument; when heaven is to be gained through sacrifice, *apūrva* 'unseen potency', a property of the ātman, is the activity of the sacrifice that serves as instrument. Similarly, when the result in the form of *pramā* 'knowledge' is brought about through a *pramāṇa* 'a means of knowledge' like the sense organ etc. set into play by an agent, the sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) or cognition (*jñāna*) is the activity of the *pramāṇa* (NVTṬ on NBh to NS 1.1.3 [87]).

2.5. *indriyādipramāṇavyāpāra*

The status of being an instrument depends upon a speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*). Therefore the Naiyāyikas can characterize a *pramāṇa* such as the sense organ in different ways. What activity the means of knowledge performs determines what result it produces. Pakṣila says the following: NBh on NS 1.1.3 (87): *yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṃ pramitiḥ yadā jñānam tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam*. According to Vācaspati, when the sense-object contact is the activity of the *pramāṇa*, then this contact leads to the result defined as *pramiti* in relation to the *pramāṇa*: this result consists in knowledge (*jñāna*), or *sākṣātkārijñāna* 'direct knowledge', bare (*ālocana*) or determinate (*savikalpaka*) (NVTṬ

on NBh to NS 1.1.3 [87]: *yadā sannikarṣo vyāpāra indriyādeḥ pramāṇasya tadā jñānam ālocanaṃ vā savikalpakaṃ vā sāṅśātkārijñānaṃ pramitiḥ phalam*). In addition, when the knowledge resulting from the sense-object contact becomes the activity of the sense organ in the subsequent stage, the result of the knowledge is what is characterized as *hānabuddhi*, *upādānabuddhi*, *upekṣābuddhi* (NVTṬ on NBh to NS 1.1.3 [87]: *yadā jñānam ālocanaṃ vā vikalpo vā vyāpāra indriyādīnāṃ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam*). According to Uddyotakara, both contact and cognition constitute a means of perceptual knowledge because both produce definite cognitions (*paricchedaka*) (NV on NBh to NS 1.1.3 [90]).

2.6. *upādānabuddhi*

Vācaspati explains the process of the perception of water (*salila*) (NVTṬ on NS 1.1.3 [87–88]): At the first stage, <1> the bare awareness of the water (*toyālocana*) occurs first and then <2> the determinate cognition of the water in the form 'This is water' (*toyavikalpa*) follows. At the second stage, in order to proceed to obtain the water, one has to acquire the following inferential cognition: [Thesis:] The present water is the cause of quenching thirst; [Reason:] Because of bearing the generic property of being water; [Example:] Like the water in previous cases. Accordingly, in the next stages one has the following: <3> the awakening (*udbodha*) of the memory impression (*saṃskāra*) which is the seeds of the recollection (*smṛti*) of that water of the same class as the water currently perceived whose property of being the cause of quenching thirst previously was perceived; <4> the recollection of the water, through which is recollected the invariable concomitance between the property of bearing the generic property of being water and that of being the cause of quenching thirst (*vyāptismaraṇa*); <5> the consideration of an inferential mark (*liṅga-parāmarśa*) that the present water has that property of bearing the generic property of being water which is invariably concomitant with the property of being the cause of quenching thirst (*liṅgaparāmarśaḥ tajjātīyaṃ cedam iti* [-jātīya A 5.4.9 *jātyantāc cha bandhuni*]); <6> there occurs an inferential cognition that the present water is the cause of quenching thirst. The consideration of the inferential mark carries out the operation of directly apprehending, with respect to the inferential mark which consists in the property of bearing the generic property of being water, aided by the recollection of the invariable concomitance between both properties; its memory is in the state of dying out. That is, the consideration of the inferential mark perceives the present water as having that property of

bearing the generic property of being water which is invariably concomitant with the property of being the cause of quenching thirst. This very consideration of the inferential mark is called *upādānabuddhi*. After inferring that the present water is the cause of quenching thirst, one takes action towards the water in question and obtains it if one desires to obtain it. According to Vācaspati, the term *upādāna* is an instrument noun (*upādīyate'neneti*), referring to 'that through which something is obtained'. This term and the term *buddhi* form a *viśeṣaṇapūrvapadakarmadhāraya*, meaning 'a cognition that is the instrument for obtaining something' (*upādānaṃ cāsau buddhiś cety upādānabuddhiḥ*).

3. darśanena In this connection it is useful to note Keśava's remarks on the instrument for a valid direct apprehension (*sākṣātkāripramākaṇa*). He considers three stages that constitute a single perceptual event: [7] *indriyeṇa nirvikalpakajñānaphalaṃ janayati*; [8] *indriyārthasannikarṣeṇa savikalpakajñānaphalaṃ janayati*; [9] *nirvikalpakajñānena hānādibuddhiphalaṃ janayati* (see TBh on *pratyakṣa* [32–33]). The sense organ, as instrument, has the subsidiary activity in the form of the sense-object contact, bringing about the result in the form of an indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) of an object. This sense-object contact, as instrument, has the subsidiary activity in the form of the indeterminate knowledge, bringing about the result in the form of the determinate knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*) of the object 'This is X.' The indeterminate knowledge, as instrument, has the subsidiary activity in the form of the determinate knowledge, bringing about the result in the form of a cognition that produces the discard, or obtainment of, or indifference to, the object.

[1] can be paraphrased as [3]–[6]. In [4], where the desire to know is an instrument, the activity of the instrument is the indeterminate knowledge and the result *vrkṣa-viśaya-anubhava* is the determinate knowledge. Since [5] is equivalent to [6], *vrkṣa-viśaya-anubhava* in [5] is identical with *hānādyanubhava* 'the awareness that produces discard etc.' In this case, if the knowledge as instrument is the indeterminate knowledge, the activity is the determinate knowledge and if it is the determinate knowledge, the activity is the consideration of the inferential mark such that this tree has that property of bearing the generic property of being a tree which is invariably related to the factor inducing one to practical activity. The awareness that produces discard etc. can be said to arise in the domain that is the tree. For discard etc. or a property such as that of being to be discarded serves to qualify the tree. Thus *vrkṣa-viśaya-anubhava* may be expressed as *hānādi*

(*heyatvādī*) -*viśiṣṭa-vṛkṣa-viṣaya-anubhava* 'the awareness whose domain is the tree qualified by discard etc. or by a property such as that of being to be discarded.'

4. Conclusion The tree in [1] is named *karman* because it is the domain of the action of seeing, which is the basis of the action and possessed of its result. The result is the awareness whose domain is the tree itself and its qualifier, i.e., discard etc. or a property such as that of being to be discarded, because the practical activity based on a *pramāṇa* must have efficacy. Thus the awareness is both the knowledge in the form 'This is none other than a tree' and the knowledge in the form 'This tree is to be discarded, obtained, or ignored' which is produced by means of the former knowledge. Bhartṛhari's definition of a *karman* evidently grows into a flowering of the Post-Pakṣila Naiyāyikas' analysis of the fundamentals of the Nyāya *pramāṇa* theory.

Abbreviations

A: Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Cardona 1997, Appendix. **NBh:** Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya*. *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṭikā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1985. **NS:** Akṣapāda Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*. See NBh. **NV:** Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*. See NBh. **NVTP:** Udayana's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi. Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi of Udayanācārya*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996. **NVTṬ:** Vācaspati's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*. See NBh. **TBh:** Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā. Tarka=bhāṣā of Keśava Miśra with the Commentary Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā of Cinnamṛghaṭṭa*. Ed. Devadatta Ramkrishna Bhandarkar and Pandit Kedarnātha, Sāhityabhūṣaṇa. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1979. **VP:** Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen*. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII, 4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

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Key words Bhartṛhari, Nyāya, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, *kāraka*, *karman*, *karaṇa*, *pramāṇa*, *phala*

(Former Professor of Hiroshima University, Ph.D.)