Remarks on Yijing's 義淨 Diction in His Translations

Yong Tsun Nyen

1. The abstruseness of Yijing's translations

Yijing's 義淨 (635-713) translations, the *Guan suoyuan lun shi* 觀所緣論釋 (*Explication of the Investigation of Perceptual Object*, thereafter GSYLS) and the *Cheng weishi baoshen lun* 成唯識寶生論 (*The Generation of Treasurable [Wisdom] for [Understanding] the Establishment of Consciousness-Only*, thereafter BSL), are important sources for modern scholars to understand the thoughts of Dharmapāla (mid sixth century) and his influence in the development of Buddhist philosophy in India as well as in China. The former is Dharmapāla's commentary on Dignāga's (ca. 480-540) *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and *Vṛtti*, and the latter is Dharmapāla's commentary on Vasubandhu's (late fourth-early fifth century) *Vimśikā* (or *Vimśatikā*) and *Vṛtti*.

The GSYLS and the BSL are difficult to understand due to Yijing's abstruse style of translation. Hence, it is vitally necessary to form a coherent picture of his diction in translation, such as the use of fixed expressions or use of synonyms when conveying the details of complicated arguments involving disparate philosophical schools. Besides, it is also important to be aware of the irregularities exhibited in his translations as well as his phonetic transcriptions of Sanskrit terms.

2. The pūrvapaksa/uttarapaksa-markers

The GSYLS and the BSL contain numerous debates involving the *pūrvapakṣa* (objections by other Buddhist and non-Buddhist scholars) and the *uttarapakṣa* (replies by Vasubandhu/Dignāga and Dharmapāla). To fully understand the philosophical viewpoints propagated by these parties, one must be able to identify the beginning and the end of each argument presented in the texts.

In his translations, Yijing uses common markers to distinguish the pūrvapakṣa from

the *uttarapakṣa*. Although it is possible that some of these markers are translated from the original Sanskrit texts instead of being added by Yijing, yet enough similar markers occur regularly throughout his translations and thus form a recognizable pattern.

The following table lists several $p\bar{u}rvapak\bar{s}a$ -markers found in the GSYLS or the BSL:

youshuo 有說	Some maintain [as follows:]
you yu fu zuo 有餘復作	Other [masters] also make [the following statement:]
you wainan yun 有外難云	Outsiders/non-Buddhists censure [as follows:]
you yizhi yun 有異執云	Holding a wrong view, other people state [as follows:]
rusi ji zhe 如斯計者	those who conjecture in this way

1. BSL (T31, 86a): <u>有異執云</u>, 然而獄卒由自他業增上所生, 不被害故互相苦刻, 他不許也,

Holding a wrong view, other people state [as follows]: Hell-guards are born by having the karma of self and others as the subordinating [cause]. Since they are not harmed, he does not allow that they (hell-dwellers and hell-guards) injure each other.

2. GSYLS (T31, 889b): 如有說云, 若識有彼相, 彼是此之境.

As some maintain [as follows:] If cognition contains the image of an [entity], that [entity] is the [perceptual] object of this [cognition].

(Cf. parallel sentence in the ĀPṬ (D 177a3; P 185b6): 'di ltar rnam par ses pa gan ltar snan bar skye ba de ni de'i yul yin par 'dod do zes bsad do //)

The following table lists several *uttarapakṣa*-markers found in the GSYLS or the BSL:

wu rushi shi 無如是事	Such a case does not arise.
shigu ding zhi 是故定知	Therefore, [we] know for certain that
cheng wu si guo 誠無斯過	This fault does not take place at all.
shi yi buran 是亦不然	This is not the case, either.

1. BSL (T31, 90a): 若說方便趣我無性, 是亦不然.

If for the sake of convenience [the opponents] say that one enters the nature of nonexistence of the self, this is not the case, either.

2. GSYLS (T31, 891a): <u>無如是事</u>, 非於根識所觀境處極微有殊, 然此總聚是三佛栗底, 而此總聚非根識境, 此已厈破.

Such a case does not arise. It is not the case that where there is an object to be investigated by the sensory consciousness the atoms (*paramāṇu) [of this object] are distinct. However, this aggregate [of atoms] is [only] a conventional existence (samvrti) and is not the object of

sensory consciousness. This [view] has already been refuted.

3. Multiple translations for the same Sanskrit term

In the GSYLS and the BSL, Yijing occasionally uses multiple translations for the same Sanskrit term. In the following example from the BSL, Yijing translates *pratyakṣa* (direct perception) as *biegen* 別根 and *xianliang* 現量 in the same passage. In the GSYLS, Yijing translates *paramāṇavaḥ (rdul phra mo rnams, atoms) as zhong wei 衆微 whereas in the later part of the passage he uses the term chen 塵 to refer to atoms.

1. BSL (T31, 91c): <u>別根</u>如夢等. 雖無外境, 然亦得有, 此已如前細爲分別. 此若後緣時, 所見境已亡, 如何許現量.

Direct perception [of external object takes place] as in a dream and so forth. Though external object does not exist, yet [direct perception] is produced. This [idea] has been analyzed in detail before. When [an object] is perceived at a later moment, [since] the perceived object already ceased to exist, how can we allow that [the external object] is directly perceived?

(Cf. parallel sentences in v. 16 and its *vṛtti* of the *Viṃśikā*, see Silk (2016: 113): *pratyakṣabuddhiḥ* svapnādau yathā | (16a) vināpy artheneti pūrvam eva jñāpitam | sā ca yadā tadā | na so [']rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṃ kathaṃ mataṃ || 16bcd ||)

2. GSYLS (T31, 891a): 識境不別,如何得知. 由匪於其項甌等處<u>衆微</u>有別 …… 緣彼根識,便成相狀無有差殊,由此方成,於塵自體是所緣性.

How do we know that the cognition and the object are not different? Because it is not the case that where there are pots, cups, and so forth their atoms are different (namely, atoms of different objects should look alike) [Hence,] the sensory consciousness which takes them (the atoms) as object will [perceive] no difference in the form [of the atoms]; only through this way would it be proven that the body of atom itself is the perceptual object.

(Cf. parallel sentence in the ĀPV (159, 10-11): bum pa dań kham phor la sogs pa'i rdul phra mo rnams la ni mań du zin kyań khyad par 'ga' yań med do //)

4. Unnecessary phonetic transcriptions of Sanskrit term

Yijing also shows inconsistency by using phonetic transcriptions for Sanskrit words, which in other contexts are translated by more conventional Chinese terms. In the following example from the BSL, Yijing transcribes *taimirika* (the sufferer of *timira*, a disease of the eyes) as *dimilijia* 羝蜜梨迦 although this Sanskrit term is translated as *xuanyi ren* 眩瞖人 in another place of the same text. In the GSYLS, Yijing transcribes

paramāṇu (atom) as boluomonu 鉢囉摩怒 although this Sanskrit term is translated as jiwei 極微 in most parts of the GSYLS. An explanation for this inconsistency is that Yijing tries to maintain four-character phrase whenever possible in his translation.

1. BSL (T31, 80c): 依損根識,便能見彼.是故定知,<u>羝蜜梨迦</u>所有覺慧,緣實外境. Based on cognition due to the damaged sensory faculty, one sees those [hairs etc. floating in the

air]. Therefore, [we] know for certain that all cognitions of the *taimirika* (*dimilijia* 羝蜜梨迦) take real external objects as the perceptual objects.

2. GSYLS (T31, 890a): 如是且述鉢囉摩怒不是所緣, 彼之能立不相應故.

Thus far, [we] say that atom (boluomonu 鉢囉摩怒) is not the perceptual object because his (the opponent's) means for establishing [the nature of ālambana] is inadequate.

(Cf. vṛtti for v. 1 in the ĀPV (158, 7-8): de ltar na re źig rdul phra mo dag dmigs pa ma yin no //)

In conclusion, recognizing Yijing's usage of fixed expressions as well as the irregularities exhibited in his translation and transcription of Sanskrit terms are crucial steps toward understanding the philosophical thoughts of Dharmapāla.

Abbreviations

ĀPṬ Tibetan translation of Vinītadeva's Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā (dMigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel bśad, D no. 4241 175a3-187b5, P no. 5739 183a7-197b7).

ĀPV Tibetan translation of Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti (dMigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel pa). Ed. Frauwallner (1959: 157-161). Since the vṛtti includes all the kārikās, edition of the Tibetan translation of Ālambanaparīkṣā is not referred to.

BSL Cheng weishi baoshen lun 成唯識寶生論 (T31, 77b-96c).

GSYLS Guan suoyuan lun shi 觀所緣論釋 (T31, 889a-892a).

Vimśikā Vimśikā (or Vimśatikā) of Vasubandhu. Ed. Silk (2016).

Bibliography

Frauwallner, Erich. 1959. "Dignāga: sein Werk und seine Entwicklung." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens 3: 93–164.

Silk, Jonathan A. 2016. Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu's Viińśikā (I): Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions of the Verses and Autocommentary; An English Translation and Annotations. Harvard Oriental Series 81. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Key words 觀所緣論釋, 成唯識寶生論, Ālambanaparīksā, Dharmapāla, Yijing 義淨

(Graduate Student, Kyoto University)