

# Technical Terms Relating to *prayoga* in the *Nyāyabindu* and Its Commentaries

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**1. Introduction** Chapter 3 of the *Nyāyabindu* (NB) begins with a definition of *parārthānumāna* and its major categories. This is followed by a *prayoga* passage, which describes the subcategories of the syllogism and provides a general discussion. This paper examines the portion of this passage that defines *parārthānumāna* in NB 3.1–7.

There has hitherto been little research on the subject of Dharmakīrti's syllogism itself. Inami (2018), however, has enabled us to understand the features of Dharmakīrti's syllogism in greater detail. On the other hand, the subcategories, which show how logical reasons (*hetu*) can be formulated, as exemplified in NB 3.8–25, have not been studied in detail. Therefore, it is crucial to study Dharmakīrti's syllogism, examining the *prayoga* passage in NB and its commentaries. To understand the entire passage in greater detail, it is essential to understand the necessary technical terms. In this paper, we focus on certain terms to express basic concepts for the construction of syllogisms. Clarifying the meaning of each term will provide a basis for understanding the members of the syllogism and the subconcepts related to them.

**2. Definition of *parārthānumāna*: What does *ā-khyā* mean?** The definition of *parārthānumāna* in NB is as follows:

(1) “Inference for others” is the [word] that indicates logical reason with three characteristics (positive concomitance, negative concomitance, and topic of the proposition).<sup>(1)</sup> (2) Because the result (inference) is expressed figuratively for the cause (word). (3) It (inference for others) is twofold. (4–5) Because there is a distinction of syllogism between one that has the same property and one that has different properties. (6–7) There is no distinction based on the meaning between these two other than the distinction of the syllogism. (NB 3.1–7)

Of these sūtras, we focus on the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh and examine them based upon Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (NBṬ) and Durvekamiśra's *Dharmottara-pradīpa* (DhPr). This section examines the meaning of the term *ākhyāna* as used in the

first sūtra, where *parārthānumāna* is defined as “*trirūpaliṅgākhyāna*.” Dharmottara paraphrases *ā-khyā* as *pra-kāś*, “to be indicated [i.e.,] shown by it.”<sup>2)</sup> Moreover, this *ākhyāna* is a word (*vacana*).<sup>3)</sup> What exactly do *ā-khyā* and *pra-kāś* mean? Durvekamiśra explains this as follows:

Based on the denotation (*abhidhāna*) of two characteristics, one [characteristic] is connoted.... Because something to be denoted (*abhidheya*) and something to be connoted (*gamyamāna*) are equally something to be shown (*prakāśya*), this [word], “to be shown” (*prakāśyate*), brings together two (*abhidheya* and *gamyamāna*). (DhPr 150,14–18)

In summarizing this interpretation of Dharmottara and Durvekamiśra, the following structure emerges. First, the word *parārthānumāna* indicates logical reason with three characteristics. Of these, two are denoted (*abhidheya*), and one is connoted (*gamyamāna*). Thus, the object indicated by the act of *ā-khyā* includes both what is directly stated in words and what is indirectly known from them. To further understand the meaning of *ā-khyā* discussed in this section, we now examine *abhidheya* and *gamyamāna*.

**3. Two kinds of *abhidheya*** In his commentary on the fifth sūtra, Dharmottara analyzes the words *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* and gives examples of two kinds of the syllogism (NBṬ 152,11–14). In the first syllogism, *sādharmyavat*, *anvaya* and *pakṣadharmatā* are given directly, while in the second syllogism, *vaidharmyavat*, *vyatireka* and *pakṣadharmatā* are given directly. In other words, *vyatireka* is understood indirectly in the former, and *anvaya* is understood indirectly in the latter.

Next, Dharmottara’s commentary on the sixth sūtra begins with the opponent’s question, “For these two syllogisms, if what is denoted is distinguished, how is it that the three characteristics of the logical reason that are shown are not distinguished?”<sup>4)</sup> Dharmottara paraphrases the word *artha* (meaning) in the sūtra (*nānāyor arthataḥ kaścīd bhedaḥ*) as *prayojana* (the requirement for formulation) and then responding as follows:

Two inferences are formulated for “requirement for formulation” [i.e.,] “the entity (*vastu*) to be shown.”... Both of the two [inferences] must show the logical reason with three characteristics. Hence, for these two inferences, there is no distinction between the requirement for formulation to be shown. (NBṬ 152,17–20)

Durvekamiśra understands this point in much the same way as Dharmottara. In summary, there are two kinds of syllogisms, one in which something that is denoted (*abhidheya*) is

different but something that is shown (*prakāśya*) is not different. Furthermore, in this commentary on the sixth sūtra, as in the first sūtra, the object of the action *ā-khyā* or *prakāś* is logical reason, with three characteristics.

**4. What is *gamyamāna* in the syllogism?** In this section, we find a commentary on the seventh sūtra, in which Dharmottara gives reasons and examples for the fact that what is shown in the two syllogisms is not different.

When positive concomitance is mentioned, the understanding of negative concomitance occurs, according to a logic to be described later.<sup>5)</sup> Furthermore, when negative concomitance is [mentioned], understanding positive concomitance [occurs]. If there is a distinction between what is denoted (*abhidheya*), it does not follow that there is also a distinction between the meaning that is understood indirectly (*sāmarthyagamyā*). This is because in these two sentences, “A fat Devadatta does not eat at noon” and “A fat Devadatta eats at night,” what is [meant and] understood (*gamyamāna*) is the exact same, even though there is a distinction between what is denoted. Likewise, in this case, although there is a distinction in what is denoted, the entity (i.e., the logical reason), as it is understood, is exactly the same. (NBṬ 153, 6–10)

Here, Dharmottara uses the words *sāmarthyagamyā* and *gamyamāna*. Although there seems to be no clear paraphrase, Dharmottara is probably using *gamyamāna* in much the same sense as *prakāśya*, that is, as a word that modifies a logical reason. Moreover, Dharmottara likely intended *prakāśya* and *gamyamāna* to mean both *abhidheya* and *sāmarthyagamyā*.

Durvekamiśra explains this same example and goes on to say:

Even though there is a distinction between what is denoted [i.e.], positive concomitance and the topic of the proposition and negative concomitance and the topic of the proposition, what is presently understood is the same and is not distinguished. (DhPr 154,16–17)

Thus, Durvekamiśra draws on Dharmottara’s commentary directly and uses it to explain the expression (*bhede ’pi gamyamānam ekam*). However, we should recall Durvekamiśra’s interpretation in the first sūtra. When we examined the meaning of *ā-khyā*, the understanding of Durvekamiśra was that *prakāśya* included *abhidheya* and *gamyamāna*. In other words, Durvekamiśra would likely interpret *gamyamāna* as that which is indirectly understood.

The meaning of *gamyamāna* as used by Dharmottara is countered by the objection

that what is understood (*gamyamāna*) is said to be what is understood indirectly (*sāmarthyapratīyamāna*).<sup>6)</sup> According to this criticism, if *gamyamāna* is taken as indirect understanding in the context of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* in the seventh sūtra, then when *anvaya* is given directly, *vyatireka* is understood indirectly, and when *vyatireka* is given directly, *anvaya* is understood indirectly. Therefore, what *gamyamāna* and *prakāśya* refer to is not the same thing. Durvekamiśra responds then to the question of how it can be that what is understood in two sentences is the same.

For here, another meaning of the word *gamyamāna* is intended. That is, by the word *gamyamāna*, there is here [intended] that which is denoted (*abhidheya*) and that which is indirectly shown (*sāmarthyaparakāśya*). (DhPr 154,23–24)

In Durvekamiśra's commentary on the seventh sūtra, the word *gamyamāna* used by Dharmottara is interpreted to include two meanings, *abhidheya* and *sāmarthyaparakāśya*. Durvekamiśra's understanding of the first sūtra, on the other hand, interprets the word *prakāśya* as having two meanings, *abhidheya* and *gamyamāna*. In the first sūtra, Durvekamiśra uses *gamyamāna* in the sense of something understood indirectly and then introduces an objection in the seventh sūtra. Moreover, in his reply, he does not use the word *sāmarthyagamyā*, which was used by Dharmottara to mean indirect understanding, but replaces it with *sāmarthyaparakāśya*. Thus, it is possible that Durvekamiśra did not bother to add *sāmarthya* to *gamyā* (-*māna*), but it meant indirect understanding. Hence, we can assume that Durvekamiśra was critical of Dharmottara's interpretation, which took *prakāśya* and *gamyamāna* to be synonymous and incorporated *abhidheya* and *sāmarthyagamyā*.

**Conclusion** To conclude:

(1) The word *ā-khyā*, used in the definition of *parārthānumāna* are paraphrased by Dharmottara as *pra-kāś*. According to Durvekamiśra, *prakāśya* includes *abhidheya* and *gamyamāna*, and the act *ā-khyā* includes meanings that are directly stated in words and meanings that are indirectly known from these. (2) The two syllogisms have different *abhidheya*: *anvaya* and *pakṣadharmatā* on the one hand and *vyatireka* and *pakṣadharmatā* on the other. Nevertheless, *prakāśya* is the same in both syllogisms, namely, a logical reason with three characteristics. (3) Dharmottara considered *gamyamāna* to be synonymous with *prakāśya* and included *abhidheya* and *sāmarthyagamyā* among them.

Durvekamiśra initially interpreted *gamyamāna* to mean indirect understanding, as in (1), but he then reinterpreted *gamyamāna* as a concept that brings *abhidheya* and *sāmarthyaprakāśya* together, conforming to Dharmottara’s interpretation.

## Notes

- 1) This complement is based on NBT 150,3. 2) NBT 150,4; The rationale for replacing *ā-khyā* with *pra-kāś* can be traced back to Dignāga’s definition of *parārthānumāna* (*svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana*; see Kitagawa 1965, 126). Dharmakīrti had followed Dignāga’s definition in PVin 3.1ab, which preceded NB, but in NB, he began to use the definition “*trirūpalingākhyāna*.” The background to Dharmakīrti’s change in the definition of *parārthānumāna* needs to be examined diachronically using his other works and their commentaries. See Ono 2005. 3) NBT 150,5. 4) NBT 152,15. 5) It seems to refer to NB 3.26–32. This passage states an understanding of *vyatireka* by *sādharmyavat*, an understanding of *anvaya* by *vaidharmyavat* and that *svabhāvapratibandha* is the basis for them. 6) DhPr 154,18.

## Abbreviations

**DhPr** Dharmottarapradīpa (Durvekamiśra). *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra’s Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu]*. Ed. Malvania Dalsukhbhai. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 2. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955. **NB** Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti). See DhPr. **NBT** Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara). See DhPr. **PVin** Pramāṇaviniścaya (Dharmakīrti), Chapter 3. *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya: Chapter 3*. Ed. Hugon Pascale and Tomabeche Toru. Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House & Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011.

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