

# Śrīharṣa's Critique of the Naiyāyikas' Argumentation Theory

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**1. Introduction** This article discusses the second chapter of *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (Kh) of Śrīharṣa (ca. 12c), a well-known skeptic philosopher of Advaita Vedānta. In this chapter, he criticizes the definitions of “conditions of defeat” (*nigrahasthāna*) in the Nyāya tradition by using his “refuting principles” (*khaṇḍanayukti*). This study attempts to identify the context in which the Naiyāyika's argumentation theory is critiqued in Kh, and subsequently estimate the attribution of the definitions. To clarify the structure of Śrīharṣa's refuting principles, this study also examines his criticism of “abandonment of thesis” among the four definitions that are directly criticized. Through this discussion, we consider the position of Śrīharṣa in the history of Indian argumentation theory.

**2. Śrīharṣa's view of Argumentation Theory** Śrīharṣa criticizes realism by employing “refuting principles,” conceding to the type of debate called “wrangling” (*vitandā*), traditionally accepted in the Nyāya school.<sup>1)</sup> He, thereafter, admits “the contract of agreements of the rules for conduct” (*vyavahāranīyamasaṁyabandha*) as preceding the discussion.<sup>2)</sup> According to the rules, an opponent should indicate the proponent's conditions of defeat in debates, such as “abandonment of thesis” in debates.

**3. Context of Śrīharṣa's Criticism** Śrīharṣa, in the first chapter of Kh, clarifies his skeptical position against realism and the methodology of criticism. In the latter part, he criticizes the definitions of *pramāṇa* in other schools and the related concepts, the last of which is “pseudo-reasons” (*hetvābhāsa*). The second chapter of Kh begins as follows: “[Opponent:] If it is hard to define the pseudo-reasons, then other conditions of defeat such as ‘abandonment of thesis’ would invalidate [the “non-duality” (*advaita*)].”<sup>3)</sup> Naiyāyikas admit to “pseudo-reasons” as twenty-second subdivision of the twenty-two kinds of “conditions of defeat.” Therefore, the second chapter is positioned to emphasize the comprehensiveness of the criticized subjects and the versatility of “refuting principles.”

**4. Definitions** Śrīharṣa points out that the definitions of (1) abandonment of thesis (*pratijñāhāni*), (2) another thesis (*pratijñāntara*), and (3) contradiction of thesis (*pratijñāvirodha*), that are listed as the first three conditions of defeat among twenty-two, are invalid. After the critique of “retaliation” (*pratibandī*); the technique that argues “*the same fault arises on the part of you!*,” he refutes the definition of (4) deviation from [one’s own] tenet (*apasiddhānta*); listed as twenty-first condition of defeat.

Śrīharṣa assumes the following definitions to be adopted by Naiyāyikas: (1) *pratijñāhāni*: retracting what has been mentioned and accepted, (2) *pratijñāntara*: stating the part of what is to be proved; that is mentioned by [the proponent] himself and criticized by the opponent; by adding the qualifier not mentioned before, (3) *pratijñāvirodha*: a mutual contradiction between two parts of one sentence [mentioned] by the same speaker, indicating of which is not dependent on indicating of “the being pervaded by what is opposed to what is to be proved [i.e., the being Contradictory reason as one of the five pseudo-reasons],” (4) *apasiddhānta*: assenting what is opposed to [one’s own] tenet.<sup>4)</sup> These definitions are not consistent with the traditional ones in *Nyāyasūtra*.<sup>5)</sup> In fact, many definitions of conditions of defeat in the *Nyāyasūtra* have long been subject to differing interpretations among Naiyāyikas.<sup>6)</sup> Buddhist Dharmakīrti criticized the ambiguous definitions in his *Vādanīyāya*. Later, Naiyāyikas struggled to reinterpret them against Dharmakīrti, and as is well-known Udayana redefined the conditions of defeat in his *Nyāyaparīṣiṣṭa* (NP) and *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* (NVTP) by mentioning “it is the meaning of *sūtra* that ...” (*iti sūtrārthaḥ*) and the like. Interestingly, the above definitions in Kh are almost identical to his new definitions. Namely, the definitions (1) and (4) in Kh correspond to the ones in Udayana’s NVTP.<sup>7)</sup> Therefore, we can safely say that the target of Śrīharṣa’s objection in this context is either Udayana himself or his successor. In this regard, (2) and (3) are not precisely similar to Udayana’s definition, although, it is certain that the same contents may be reconstructed from his interpretation in NP and NVTP.<sup>8)</sup> Especially, Udayana defines (2) by using the term “addition of another qualifier” (*viśeṣaṇāntaraprakṣepa*), but Śrīharṣa shows the definition of “arguing the qualifier not mentioned before” (*pūrvānuktaviśeṣaṇato ’bhidhānam*) for Naiyāyikas, and mainly focuses his criticism of (2) on the part of the definition.<sup>9)</sup> This fact brings up two possibilities: 1) Śrīharṣa modifies Udayana’s definitions for clarifying Śrīharṣa’s concern, or 2) Śrīharṣa criticizes the definitions

proposed by another Naiyāyika influenced by Udayana, such as Varadarāja.<sup>10)</sup> Considering the characteristic of Kh as a criticism of definitions, the same corresponding definitions should be found in other places. However, detailed inspection of commentaries of Kh and relevant texts would be required to find further clarity.

**5. Approach of Śrīharṣa's Criticism of *pratijñāhāni*** In the following section, the process of Śrīharṣa's criticism of (1) abandonment of thesis will be examined to clarify the structure of his objection to Naiyāyikas' argumentation theory. Śrīharṣa invalidates its definition "retracting what has been mentioned and accepted" (*svīkṛtokatyāga*). According to the commentaries, if only "retracting" (*tyāga*), the definition is "over-pervasion" (*ativyāpti*), because it includes all the abandonment of something. If only "retracting what has been mentioned" (*uktatyāga*), the definition also becomes "over-pervasion," because when a proponent rightly renounces (*tyāga*) what has been mentioned (*ukta*) by an opponent, the proponent should not be considered defeated.<sup>11)</sup>

#### 5.1. Additional qualification should be added

First, Śrīharṣa points out that the definition of "retracting what has been mentioned and accepted" is over-pervasion: If a proponent, who wants to prove that sound is non-eternal, erroneously mentions what has been accepted—"a pot is non-eternal" as a thesis, and retracts it, then the person should not be considered defeated. In fact, Udayana says in his *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, that if an opponent misses the opportunity to indicate a condition of defeat, because a proponent retracts it immediately, the proponent should not be defeated.<sup>12)</sup> Therefore, according to Śrīharṣa, the definition at least, needs the additional qualification—"when an opponent refutes [the thesis]" (*paradūṣite*).

#### 5.2. Neither of the meanings of *svīkṛta* are valid

Thereafter, Śrīharṣa examines the meaning of the word "what has been accepted" (*svīkṛta*). He offers two options: (1) "what has been simply accepted" (*iṣṭamātra*) or (2) "what has been accepted as existing" (*astitveneṣṭa*).<sup>13)</sup> As explained by the commentator Śaṅkaramiśra, if (1) is its meaning, the definition overapplies to this case; the Naiyāyika simply accepts sound as a quality and retracts the same sound as eternal.<sup>14)</sup> If Naiyāyikas interpret "retraction" as "non-acceptance following acceptance" (*svīkārapūrvako 'svīkārah*) to avoid the over-pervasion, they have to admit that the definition includes the meaningless qualification of "what has been accepted" (*svīkṛta*).<sup>15)</sup> Moreover, option (2) is also denied. Namely, Naiyāyikas accept "incompletely-pervasive

existing” (*avyāpyavṛtti*), such as “conjunction” (*saṃyoga*), that exists in a part of “ether” (*ākāśa*) and not in another part at the same time.<sup>16)</sup> If the retraction of what has been accepted as existing, is a fault, they would lose on their own.

### 5.3. Definition is never limited in object, time, place, agent, and form

In response to the above criticism, the following definition would be supposed: “non-acceptance of acceptance of the same thing, in the same form, at the same time and place, by the same agent” (*tasyaiva tadaiva tatraiva tenaiva tathaiवेष्टाणिष्टत्वम्*).<sup>17)</sup> However when the definition includes the pronoun *tad*, it is invalid in either case, that the pronoun demonstrates an individual (*vyakti*) thing (i.e., non-pervasion, *avyāpti*), or a general (*sāmānya*) thing (i.e., over-pervasion).<sup>18)</sup>

### 5.4. Uselessness of the qualification of *ukta*

Śrīharṣa also examines the validity of the term “what has been mentioned” (*ukta*). For Naiyāyikas, the qualification should be needed to avoid confusion with another condition of defeat, i.e., deviation from [one’s own] tenet (*apasiddhānta*).<sup>19)</sup> Śrīharṣa refutes this qualification by taking “Contradictory [reason]” (*viruddha*), a subdivision of pseudo-reasons, for instance. The contradictory reason is the pseudo-reason which exists in dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) and never in similar instances (*sapakṣa*). Whereas “Inconclusive [reason]” (*anaikāntika*), another subdivision of pseudo-reasons, also has the definition of what exists in dissimilar instances, although it exists in similar instances. However, if both “Contradictory reason” and “Inconclusive reason” have the same part in their definitions, only a pseudo-reason without their qualifications should be mentioned in place of them for simplicity. Also, in this case, according to Śrīharṣa, if a particular condition of defeat made of *pratijñāhāni* and *apasiddhānta* can be possibly defined by removing their qualifications, that is better.<sup>20)</sup>

As remarked above, Śrīharṣa criticizes each part of the definition of *pratijñāhāni*, i.e., *svikṛta*, *ukta*, and *tyāga*, in terms of the invalidity of their meanings and the definition’s over-pervasion and non-pervasion. According to him, the same manner of refuting principles is applied to all the definitions of twenty-two conditions of defeat.<sup>21)</sup>

**6. Conclusion** As indicated above, Śrīharṣa supposes the four definitions of “conditions of defeat” and criticizes them by refuting principles. Some of the definitions correspond to the “new” definitions by Udayana and not to the classical ones in *Nyāyasūtra*, although some seem to be reconstructed by Udayana’s definitive explanation

or quoted from other sources. Moreover, this paper showed the structure of his criticism toward “abandonment of thesis” (*pratiñāhāni*). The issues he discusses are not found in the texts before him. Further studies are needed to reveal the entire structure of Śrīharṣa's critique of the Naiyāyikas' argumentation theory, specifically referring to the commentaries and later Naiyāyikas' critical literature influenced by him.

### Notes

- 1) Kh, p. 109. Cf. Granoff 1978; Jhā 1986; Kawaguchi 1987. 2) Kh, pp. 9–10. 3) Kh, p. 503. 4) Kh, p. 503; 507; 514; 531. 5) NBh, p. 309; 310; 311; 319. 6) Cf. Ono 2017, 110ff. 7) NVTP, p. 588; 599. 8) NVTP, p. 589; 590, NP, p. 201; 203. 9) Kh, pp. 507ff. 10) Cf. TR, p. 216; 220; 222; 255. 11) Cf. Ānandapūrṇa's commentary, p. 550 (*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, ed. Svāmī Yogīndrānanda, Vidyābhavana Prācyavidyā Granthamālā 9, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Vidyabhavan, 1992). 12) Cf. Ono 2017, 42; 109; 347. 13) Kh, p. 504. 14) Cf. Śaṅkaramiśra's commentary, p. 510 (*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, ed. Navikāntha Jhā, Kashi Sanskrit Series 197, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970). 15) Kh, p. 504. 16) Kh, p. 505. 17) Kh, p. 505. 18) Kh, p. 506. 19) Cf. Ānandapūrṇa, p. 549; Śaṅkaramiśra, p. 510. 20) Kh, p. 506; Cf. Ānandapūrṇa, p. 553; Śaṅkaramiśra, p. 513; Jhā 1986, 390ff. 21) Kh, p. 506; 553.

### Abbreviations and Bibliography

**Kh** *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā of Śrī Harṣa with Śiṣyāhitaīṣiṇī Tīkā of Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya*. Ed. Esther A. Solomon. Research Publication Under U. C. G. Grant-31. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University, 1990. **NBh** *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997. **NP** *Nyāyaparīṣiṣṭa*. See Ono 2017. **NVTP** *Nyāyavārtikāitāparyapariśuddhi of Udayanācārya*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996. **TR** *Varadarāja's Tārikarakṣāsārasaṅgraha with the Commentary Vṛtti of Harihara Dīkṣita*. Ed. Yatirajasampatkumara. Tirupati: Haripriya Publications, 2004. **Jhā, Gangānātha**. 1986. *The Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā of Shri-Harṣa: An English Translation*. 2nd ed. Delhi: Satguru Publications. **Granoff, P. E.** 1978. *Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. **Kawaguchi Ken** 河川賢. 1987. *Śrīharṣa no hitei no ronri* シュリーハルシヤの〈否定の論理〉. *Nanto Bukkyō* 南都仏教 58: 18–35. **Ono Takuya** 小野卓也. 2017. “Indo koten touronjutsu kenkyū” インド古典討論術研究. PhD diss., The University of Tokyo.

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**Key words** Śrīharṣa, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, *nigrahasthāna*, Nyāya, Udayana

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