

Another Interpretation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.11ab by Prajñākaragupta and His Forerunners

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Introduction

Dignāga holds the epistemological theory that our cognition possesses mental images in itself, so-called *sākāravijñānavāda* and argues that cognition has two forms (*dvirūpatā*), i.e., the appearance of the cognition itself (*svābhāsa*) and the appearance of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*). He tries to prove this in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) 1.11 and its auto-commentary *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV). In this article, I would like to reconsider the argument, especially the one in PS(V) 1.11ab, and show a different interpretation from the commonly accepted one. After briefly looking at PS(V), we will examine the interpretation in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (PVA) and then trace it back to Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP), Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (PVT), and Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PST).

1. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*) 1.11ab

To begin with, let us overview the Sanskrit text of PS 1.11ab with the first half of its commentary in PSV and its translation by Kellner (2010: 209–210)¹⁾ as an example of the prevalent interpretation.

*atha dvirūpaṃ jñānam iti kathaṃ pratipādyam.*²⁾

viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣāt tu dvirūpatā / (PS 11ab)

(1)³⁾ **viṣaye** hi rūpādau yaj **jñānaṃ** tad arthasvābhāsam eva. (2) *viṣayajñāne tu yaj jñānaṃ tad viṣayānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ svābhāsaṃ ca.* (3) *anyathā yadi viṣayānurūpaṃ eva viṣayajñānaṃ syāt svarūpaṃ vā, jñānajñānaṃ api viṣayajñānenāviśiṣṭaṃ syāt.* (PS(V) 4, 19–25)

PSV: [Question:] Now, how can it be known that cognition has two forms?

[Argument 1:] PS 1.11ab: There are two forms [in cognition] on account of the difference between the cognition of an object and the cognition of that [object-cognition].

PSV: (1) That is to say, the cognition [that applies] to an object like color and the like certainly (*eva*) has the appearance of the object and of itself (*arthasvābhāsa*), (2) whereas the [second] cognition [that applies] to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object, and [also] its own appearance. (3) Otherwise, if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or had [only] its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be different from the cognition of the object.

The introductory question in PSV clearly expresses that this argument proves that cognition has the two forms. In PS, accordingly, “cognition” is supplemented as the substratum of the two forms (*dvirūpatā*), and the long compound in the ablative case (*viṣayajñāna-tajjñāna-viśeṣāt*) is regarded as the reason, which is analyzed as *Dvandva* and genitive *Tatpruṣa*.

viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣa → [*jñānasya*] *dvirūpatā*
 the cognition of an object and the cognition of that object-cognition are different
 → cognition has two forms

This interpretation of PS 1.1.1ab is supported at least by the two major Tibetan translations,⁴⁾ but it contains some difficulties. Above all, it is difficult to understand this argument in conformity with the content of PSV. In fact, Dharmakīrti’s successors reject this interpretation⁵⁾ and give a different one, which will be discussed later.

2. Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of the PSV

How is the argument in PS 1.1.1ab restructured in PSV? We can find an important clue in Prajñākaragupta’s PVA 403, 17–21, where he cites PS(V) 1.1.1ab and comments on it.⁶⁾

*viṣaye yaj jñānaṃ tad arthasvābhāsam iti sādhyam. uttaro hetuḥ. anyathetyādi bādhaḥ
 pramāṇam.* (PVA 403, 20–21)

According to this analysis, sentences (1) to (3) in the PSV quoted above construct the argument as follows:

- (1)⁶⁾ What is to be proved (*sādhyā*): the cognition that applies to an object like color and the like has the appearance of the object and of itself.
- (2) Reason (*hetu*): the second cognition that applies to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object, and also its own appearance.
- (3) Proof which invalidates the presence of the reason in the opposite of what is to be proved ([*sādhya viparyaye*] *bādhaḥ pramāṇam*): if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or

had only its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be differentiated by⁷⁾ the cognition of the object.

Here the outline of the argument is provided as follows: the cognition of the object-cognition having the two forms (i.e., the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object and the appearance of itself), for which another reasoning would be required, proves the object-cognition having the two forms (i.e., the appearance of the object and of itself).

**viṣayañānāñāṇaṃ arthānurūpaññānābhāsaṃ svābhāsaṃ ca → viṣayañānam arthasvābhāsam*
the cognition of the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object
and its own appearance → the cognition of the object has the appearance of the object and of itself

This is totally different from the previous argument that the difference between the cognition of an object and the cognition of the object-cognition proves that cognition in general has the two forms.

3. Devendrabuddhi and others' interpretation of the PSV

This interpretation of PSV is actually not unique to Prajñākaragupta, but it seems to be widely shared among Dharmakīrti's successors, such as Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, and Jinendrabuddhi. For example, Devendrabuddhi analyzes sentence (1), what is to be proved for Prajñākaragupta, as the thesis (**pratijñā, dam bca'*), while Śākyabuddhi and Jinendrabuddhi analyze it as the conclusion of the proof (**sādhanaṣṭaka, sgrub par byed pa'i 'bras bu; pramāṇaṣṭaka*). As for sentence (2), they agree that it is the reason.

Moreover, Devendrabuddhi and others arranged the argument into Dharmakīrti's formula style along the line of this idea.

[Pervasion (*vyāpti*):] if X is cognized (**ālambyate*) as having the form (**ākāra*) of Y by the cognition of itself (**svajñāna*), X has the form of Y. For example, a cow is cognized as having the form of being endowed with the dewlap and so on (**sāsnādimat*) by the cognition [of itself], and [it has the form of] being endowed with the dewlap and so on.

[The reason is a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*):] cognition of an object (**[viṣaya]ñāna*) is cognized as having the form of the object (**viṣayākāra*) by the cognition of itself.

[Sort of the reason:] this is a reason that is an effect (**kāryaḥetu*), because this differentiation (**vyanasthā*) that [X is] cognized as having the form of it (Y) depends on [the cause, namely,] the object (**artha*, X) that has the form of it (Y).⁸⁾ Otherwise [i.e., when this causal relation is not

accepted],⁹⁾ this is a reason that is an essential property (**svabhāva*hetu).¹⁰⁾

*viṣaya*jñānam: (*viṣayākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate* → *viṣayākāram*)

cognition of an object: (is cognized as having the form of the object by the cognition of itself → has the form of the object)

In this formal argument, only the form of the object among the two forms is dealt with and the form of the cognition itself is disregarded, for no one disputes that cognition has the form of the cognition itself.¹¹⁾ It also unifies the subject of the argument into cognition of the object, by modifying the reason “cognition of the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition (i.e., the object-cognition) that resembles the object” (**viṣaya*jñānājñānam arthānūrūpajñānābhāsaṃ) in PSV to “cognition of an object is cognized as having the form of the object by the cognition of itself (i.e., the cognition of the object-cognition)” (*viṣaya*jñānam *viṣayākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate*) in a passive form.

4. Devendrabuddhi and others’ interpretation of the PS

Now the question is how we can apply this interpretation of PSV to PS 1.1.1ab. The explanation for PS 1.1.1ab in PVP, PVT, and PST¹²⁾ has not been regarded to be acceptable because of its artificiality, but its significance will be apparent if we reconsider it with this question in mind.

According to their explanation, the long compound *viṣaya*jñāna-*tajjñāna*-*viśeṣāt* is analyzed as locative *Tatpuruṣa* and *Karmadhāraya*, and the pronoun *tad* refers to *viṣaya*, which implies *viṣayākāra* (having the form of the object).¹³⁾ In this case, the locative case of *viṣaya*jñāna seems to indicate not only that *viṣaya*jñāna is the object of *tajjñāna*, i.e., the cognition of this object-cognition, but also that it is the subject of the whole argument. Based on this assumption, the argument can be illustrated as follows:

*viṣaya*jñāna: (*tajjñānaviśeṣa* → *dvirūpatā*)

cognition of an object: (the cognition of which is differentiated [in terms of] having the form of the object → has the two forms (esp. the form of the object))

It is not so difficult to read the similarity between this argument from PS and the previous arguments from PSV discussed in sections 2 and 3.

Conclusion

As we have seen, Dharmakīrti’s successors, such as Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Jinen-

drabuddhi, and Prajñākara Gupta, interpreted PS(V) 1.1.1ab in a different way from the commonly accepted one. According to them, sentence (1) of PSV should be regarded as what is to be proved (*sādhya*), the thesis (**pratijñā*), or the conclusion of the argument (**sādhanaphala*, *pramāṇaphala*), and sentence (2) as the reason (*hetu*). Therefore, the structure of the argument is that cognition of an object (*viśaya-jñāna*) having the two forms is proved by the cognition of this object-cognition (**viśaya-jñāna-jñāna*) having the two forms. Moreover, Devendrabuddhi and others structured a formal argument in Dharmakīrti's formula style, where the subject is unified into the cognition of the object and only the form of the object is dealt with. They also analyzed the long compound in PS 1.1.1ab, *viśaya-jñāna-tajjñāna-viśeṣāt*, along this interpretation of PSV.

Notes

1) Kellner provides a relatively clear explanation, basically following Hattori (1968: 29–30).

2) Fully reconstructed words without attested Sanskrit fragments from PST are printed in roman type-face as in Kellner (2010: 209).

3) I added the numbering (1) to (3) for the sake of later discussion.

4) For the details of Tibetan translations by Vasudhara-kṣita (*yul shes pa dang de'i shes pa'i // dbye bas blo yi tshul gnyis nyid //*) and Kanakavarman (*yul shes pa dang de shes pa'i // dbye bas blo yi tshul gnyis nyid //*), see Hattori (1968: 184–185).

5) Śākyabuddhi most definitely rejects this interpretation. See PVT (D224a7–b1, P276b7–277a1): *yul shes pa dang de shes pa dag gi bye brag ces 'grel pa byed pa kha cig gi (gis?) zlas dbye ba'i (*Dvandva) snying po can gyi de'i skyes bu'i (*Tatpuruṣa) drug pa (genitive) yin par rtogs so // de yang rigs pa ma yin te gang gi phyir nram pa med pa yin na yang nram par rtog pa dang rtog pa med pa rang gi mtshan nyid tha dad pa'i sgo nas yul shes pa dang de shes pa dag gi bye brag gzhan gyis de'i tshe brjod par nus pa /*.

6) This numbering corresponds to that in PSV quoted in section 1.

7) Kellner's translation "not be different from the cognition of the object" for *viśaya-jñānenāviśiṣṭam* seems to be too affected by the Tibetan translations, so I changed it.

8) For this syntactical structure, see PVT (D227a5–6, P280a8): *de'i nram pa can la dmigs pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs nyid sgrub par byed do //*. Accordingly, the punctuation of PST 79, 14–15 should be changed as in n. 12.

9) See PVT (D227a7–b1, P280b3): *gzhan gyi tshe ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so zhes bya ba ni gal te ji skad du bshad pa'i rgyu dang 'bras bu nyid du mi 'dod pa de'i tshe rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs nyid yin te /*.

10) See PVP (D232a2–4, P273b6–274a1): *shyor ba ni gang zhig gang gi nram pa can la rang gi shes pas dmigs par 'gyur ba de ni de'i nram pa can du 'gyur te / dper na lkog shal la sogs pa dang ldan pa'i nram pa can gyi ba lang gi shes pas dmigs pa na lkog shal la sogs pa dang ldan pa yin pa lta bu'o // yul gyi nram pa can gyi shes pa yang rang gi shes pas dmigs pa yin no // de'i nram pa can la dmigs pa zhes bya ba'i nram gzhas 'di ni don de'i nram pa can gyi (gyi D; gyi om. P) rgyu can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ni 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs nyid yin la / gzhan gyi tshe ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so //*. I translated this PVP referring to the parallel in PST 79, 11–15: *yad yadākāraṃ svajñānenālambyate, tadākāraṃ tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsānādīmadākāraḥ svajñānenālambyamāno gauḥ sāsānādīmadākāraḥ. viśayākāraṃ ca viśaya-jñānaṃ*

svajñānenālambyate. tadākāro 'yam ālambyata ity asyā vyavasthāyās tadākāranibandhanatvāt, tasyāṃ sādhyāyam idam kāryam. tadākāratve tu svabhāvaḥ.

11) See, for example, PST 77, 14–78, 1: *na hi sa kaścid vādī, yo jñānasya jñānarūpaṃ necchati.*

12) See PVP (D231a5–6, P272b7–8): *yul shes pa* ni gzugs la sogs pa 'dzin pa ste mig la sogs pa'i nram par shes pa'o // *yul shes pa* de la *de'i shes pa* ni *yul shes pa de'i shes pa*'o (yul shes pa de'i shes pa['o] PVT; shes pa ste yul shes pa'o DP) // yul gyi nram pa can gyi shes pa'i shes pa ni rtog (rtog PVT; rtogs DP) pa zhes bya ba'i don to // de nyid *bye brag* yin te yul gyi shes pa nyams su myong ba'i nram pa'i khyad par las zhes bya ba'i (zhes bya ba'i D; zhes pa'i P) don to //, PVT (D224b1–225a1, P277a1–277b3), and PST 77, 6–13: *viśaya jñānata jñānaviśeṣāt tv ityādi. viśaya jñānaṃ rūpādigrāhi cakṣurādivijñānam. viśaya jñāne tajjñānaṃ viśaya jñānata jñānam. atra yadi tacchabdena viśaya jñānaṃ sambadhyeta, tasyopādānam anarthakaṃ syāt, vināpi tena viśaya jñānālabhānasya jñānasya pratīteḥ. tasmāt tacchandopādānasāmarthyād guṇabhūto 'pi viśayaḥ sambadhyate, anyasyehāprakṛtatvāt. tad etad uktaṃ bhavati — viśaya jñāne viśayākāraṃ jñānam iti. tad eva viśeṣaḥ. tathā hi tad viśaya jñānād adhikena viśayākāreṇa viśiṣyate. parābhiprāyeṇaivam uktaṃ. paro hi viśaya jñānasyānubhavākāraṃ kevalam icchati. tajjñānasya tv anubhavākāro 'py asti.*

13) Tibetan translations of PS included in PVP, PVT, PST and PVA seem to follow this interpretation. For example, see PVT (D225a1, P277b3): *yul shes de yi shes pa yi // bye brag las (las D; la P) ni tshul gnyis nyid //.*

Abbreviations

- PS(V) *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1: A Hypothetical Reconstruction of the Sanskrit Text with the Help of the Two Tibetan Translations on the Basis of the Hitherto Known Sanskrit Fragments and the Linguistic Materials Gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭikā.* Ed. Ernst Steinkellner, 2005. Accessed October 11, 2018. http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf.
- PST *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśāḍāmalavātī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā.* Sanskrit texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 1.15. Eds. Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic. Beijing: China Tibetology publishing house, 2005.
- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953.
- PVP Tibetan translation of Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*. D 4217, P 5717(b).
- PVT Tibetan translation of Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. D 4220, P 5718.

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