A Source of Gangeśa's Conclusive Definition of vyāpti

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I Modern scholars of the Navya-nyāya concept of vyāpti have been mainly working on analyzing the logical or formal structure of its definitions presented by Gangeśa (G). He mentions twenty-one provisional definitions (*pūrvapakşalakşana*) in his *Tattvacintāmaņi*, and after them he gives a conclusive definition (*siddhāntalakşana*). Seven definitions are furthermore enumerated and considered satisfactory. However, they apply to cases dealing with the relation between only particulars. Later Navya-naiyāyikas took G's twenty-second definition¹⁾ to be universally applicable and be a genuine conclusive one.

B.K. Matilal remarked that G's conclusive definition was only a modified version of the final definition of Manikantha (ca. 1300). Furthermore, he added that a similar definition to Manikantha's was found in the list given in the $Ny\bar{a}yasiddh\bar{a}ntad\bar{a}pa$ of Śaśadhara (Ś)²) (12nd cent.). However, he did not mention which one such a definition is in Ś's list. Here in this paper I would like to identify Ś's definition which Matilal referred to, show its logical or formal structure, and demonstrate why G's definition is more satisfactory than Ś's.

I We cannot find \hat{S} 's definition in question among the first sixteen definitions listed as provisional by him.³⁾ He does not clearly mention his own conclusive definition. He makes some opponent interpret the ninth definition, *avinābhāva*, as follows: the state of having a probandum which is not a counterpositive of the constant absence which occurs throughout the locus of the absence and which shares a locus with a probans (*sādhanasamānādhikaraņavyāpyavrttyatyantābhāvāpratiyogisādhyakatva*).⁴⁾ \hat{S} also makes another opponent appear and deny the validity of this definition. However,

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Ś immediately negates the ground for the denial of this another opponent.⁵¹ Thus he seems to implicitly contend that the above-mentioned definition is one of his conclusive definitions.⁶¹

The logical structure of this definition can be illustrated in figure 1. Here there is no space to explain the system of this figure, and hence I want readers to refer to my book or papers.⁷⁾



Figure 1

The definition does not expressly prescribe that a counterpositive should not exist in the locus of its absence. However, since the absence should exist throughout its locus, its counterpositive turns out not to exist in the locus of the absence simultaneously. In figure 1, hence, a broken line is drawn between the two rectangles respectively referring to a counterpositive and the locus of a probans (i.e., the locus of its absence).

I To compare the logical form of \hat{S} 's and G's conclusive definitions, we will proceed to G. His definition runs as follows: $vy\bar{a}pti$ is the coexistence of the property x (e.g., a probans) with the property y (e.g., a probandum) which is not what is qualified by the delimitor of the counterpositiveness of the constant absence which does not share a locus with its counterpositive and which shares a locus with the property x (pratiyogyasamānādhikaraṇayat-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnam yan na bhavati tena samam tasya sāmānādhikaraŋyam vyāptiķ).⁸⁾ The logical form of this definition can

A Source of Gangeśa's Conclusive Definition of $vy\bar{a}pti$ (T. WADA) (11) be shown in figure 2. The arrow is drawn from the rectangle representing a delimitor to the rectangle representing a delimited property.



Figure 2

Comparing the logical structure of G's definition with that of Ś's one, we notice that only the former introduces the concept of delimitor $(avacchedaka)^{9}$ to the definition. It is not true that Ś did not know this concept, for he defined it in the same chapter dealing with the definitions of $vy\bar{a}pti$.¹⁰⁾ G's novelty lies in utilizing this concept in order to make Ś'a definition more satisfactory. To understand his novelty, we will see how his definition gets free from a defect which Ś's may suffer from. Let us try to apply Ś's definition to a valid case¹¹⁾ and confirm that it is not applicable. A valid case is, for instance, "this mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke" (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt).

Application will runs in the following manner. (1) The probans of this inference is smoke. (2) The probandum is fire. (3) The locus of the probans is a kitchen. (4) In a kitchen there does not exist mountain-fire, and so we can take the constant absence of mountain-fire there. (5) The counterpositive of this absence is mountain-fire. It is also true that the locus of the probans is an alter where kitchen-fire does not exist. Hence, in the alter there exists the constant absence of kitchen-fire, and its counterpositive is kitchen-fire. If we, thus, continue the similar way of

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taking up absence in the loci of the probans, we can take up the constant absence of all fire according to the loci.¹²⁾ Then the counterpositive will be all fire, and it is nothing but the probandum. Since \hat{S} 's definition prescribes that the counterpositive should differ from the probandum, we fail to apply the definition to the present valid case. It implies that the definition suffers from the defect of narrow-application.

Introducing the concept of delimitor, G overcomes this defect. Let us apply his definition to the present valid case. Steps (1) to (4) are the same as the above process. (5) The counterpositive of the constant absence of mountain-fire is naturally mountain-fire. In this stage, we have to seek the delimitor of counterpositiveness, and we are not allowed to look for other absence like in the above process. (6) Counterpositiveness exists in mountain-fire, and Navya-nyāya considers that mountain-fire-ness residing in mountain-fire circumscribes counterpositiveness within mountain-fire. Navya-nyāya designates a property possessing the function of circumscribing as a delimitor. The delimitor of counterpositiveness is, in the present case, mountain-fire-ness. (7) What is qualified by such a delimitor is mountain-fire, and not simply fire. Thus the condition stated in G's definition that a probandum is not what is qualified by the delimitor of counterpositiveness is fulfilled. Hence, we succeed in applying his definition to the valid case.

IV G could make the definition of $vy\bar{a}pti$ more satisfactory than \hat{S} 's by means of the concept of delimitor. Matilal pointed out that G's definition could be traced back to Manikantha and ambiguously to \hat{S} . Now it is clear that G's one shows similarity to \hat{S} 's 'conclusive' definition as far as logical form is concerned. Thus, making historical research on Navya-nyāya, we cannot neglect great influence of \hat{S} , one of early Navyanaiyāyikas, upon G's philosophy and logic.¹³⁾

On the method of numbering the definitions by G, I have followed C. Goekoop, The logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmani, Dordrecht: D. Raidel Publishing Company, 1967, pp. 19-21. 2) B.K. Matilal, Book Review: Goekoop 1967, JAOS 92 (1), p. 172. 3) Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, edited by B.K. Matilal,

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Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute, 1976, p. 65, 2-9. 4) Ibid., p. 67, 22-23. 5) Ibid., 6) Ś seems to conceive two more 'conclusive' definitions which are p. 68, 4-9. modified versions of avinābhāva (Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, p. 67, 24-26). 7) "Delimitor (avacchedaka) in Navya nyāya Philosophy (1)", Journal of Faculty of Letters, Nagoya University 102, 1988, pp. 32-36; "Describer (nirūpaka) in Nayva-nyāya", ABORI 69, 1989, 183-194; Invariable Concomitance in Navya-Nyāya, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1990, pp. 161-162. 8) I have used the edition of the Tattvacintāmani included in Geokoop 1967, p. 109. 9) For this concept. see Wada 1990, pp. 81-98. 10) Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, p. 68, 24. 11) The definition of vyāpti is a svarūpalaksaņa. It is not a defining characteristic residing in vyāpti, but it is logically equivalent to vyāpti. The examination of the definition consists in confirming whether a property regarded as the definition exists in a valid probans (i.e., the locus of $vy\bar{a}pti$) or not. For this issue, see Wada 1990, pp.99-105. See also M. Ishitobi, "Navya-nyāya ni okeru laksana no mondai" (Problems in laksana in Navya-nyāya), JIBS 27 (1), pp. 464-467. 12) This method is traditionally called sifting (cālanīnyāya). For this method, see D.H.H. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 50. It is obvious that to resolve this undesirable situation also. G formulates his conclusive definition. He does not make use of the word 'sifting', but he discusses this method of objecting in the chapter of sāmānyābhāva of the Tattvacintāmani. For the Sanskrit text, see Goekoop 1967, pp. 116-117. 13) S's influence regarding other themes has been pointed out by B.K. Matilal, Introduction to Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa, pp. 10-11; J. Vattanky, Gangeśa's Philosophy of God, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, p. 123; V.N. Jha, The Philosophy of Injunctions, Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, p. 5.

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