

A Problem of *Samśaya* Theory of the Early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

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Here I would like to discuss Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *anekadharmopapatti* in NS 1-1-23 with relation to VS 2-2-26.

Text 1. VS 2-2-26

tulyajātiyeṣv arthāntarabhūteṣu ca viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt/

Text 2. NS 1-1-23

samānānekadharmopapatter vipratipatter upalabdhyānupalabdhyavyavasthātaś ca vi-
śeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ samśayaḥ /

Text 3. NBh (Chowkhamba SS) p. 122

anekadharmopapatter iti/ samānajātiyaṃ asamānajātiyaṃ cānekam/ tasyānekasya
dharmopapatteḥ—viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt/
samānajātiyebhyo asamānajātiyebhayaś cārthā viśiṣyante/ gandhavattvāt pṛthivy
abādibhyo viśiṣyate guṇakarmabhyāś ca/
asti ca śabde vibhāgajanyatvaṃ viśeṣaḥ/ tasmin dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma veti sandehaḥ/
viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt/ kiṃ dravyasya sato guṇakarmabhyo viśeṣaḥ, āhosvid
guṇasya sata iti, atha karmaṇaḥ sata iti viśeṣāpekṣā—anyatamasya vyavasthāpakam
dharmaṃ nopalabha iti buddhir iti/

As regards these texts the following understanding is accepted among scholars¹⁾.

1. Neither NBh nor NV conveys the original meaning of *anekadharmopapatteḥ*, which must have been “from the perception of many properties of an entity”.
2. Doubt from the perception of a differential feature is defined in VS 2-2-26. NBh borrowed it for interpreting *anekadharmopapatti*.
3. On the other hand the Vaiśeṣika after Praśastapāda rejected this type of doubt, since Praśastapāda regarded it as another type of *avidyā*, i. e. *anadhyavasāya*.

Here I should like to offer an amendment of this theory.

Text 3 should be interpreted as follows²⁾.

“Because of the appearance³⁾ of a property of many [objects]” is to be understood as thus. By “many” is here meant objects that are homogeneous as well as heterogeneous [to the thing in question]. [Doubt arises] from the appearance of a property of those many [objects], for a differential feature is perceived to serve in two ways.

Objects (*artha*) [i. e. substances, qualities and actions]⁴⁾ are differentiated from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous objects. Thus earth is differentiated from [homogeneous objects such as] water and so on as well as [heterogeneous objects such as] qualities and actions because of [the differential feature] of having smell⁵⁾.

And being produced by disjunction subsists in sound as its differential feature. And then there arises a doubt whether [sound is] a substance, a quality or an action, since the differential feature is found to work in two ways. The doubt of this type takes the following form: “Is it, being a substance, differentiated from qualities and actions? Or is it, being a quality, [differentiated from substances and actions]? Or is it, being an action, [differentiated from substances and qualities]?”—that is, [it is] an idea seeking for a differential feature⁶⁾ in the form that no such property that would definitely establish any one of them is perceived.

This interpretation has almost the same construction as Candrānanda’s commentary on VS 2–2–24, 25, 26⁷⁾.

24. Sound is the object of which the organ of apprehension is the ear.

Sound is the object perceived by the ear. The word “object” is not applied to generality and so on by convention, so that sound can never be sound-ness.

25. Then there arises a doubt whether it is a substance, a quality or an action.

Since [the differential feature is] common to [all the three objects], as regards sound there arises a doubt whether it is a substance or any other object.

26. Because a differential feature is observed [to work] both on homogeneous and heterogeneous objects.

[A differential feature of earth], earthness is observed to differentiate earth from homogeneous objects such as water and so on as well as from heterogeneous objects such as qualities and actions. Therefore [a doubt arises] in respect of sound. Whether does this differential feature of sound, being perceived by the ear, differentiate sound from qualities, the homogeneous objects, as well as the heterogeneous objects or not? The structure of this commentary is as follows.

1. Sound is defined as one of the objects (*artha*=*dravyaguṇākarma*).

2. Every one of the objects has a differential feature which differentiates its abode from homogeneous objects as well as heterogeneous objects.
3. Sound has a differential feature, i. e. being perceived by the ear.
4. Since having a differential feature is common to all the three objects, a doubt arises as regards sound.

This structure reflects the three required conditions of doubt laid down in VS 2-2-19, i. e. *sāmānyapratyakṣa*, *viśeṣāpratyakṣa* and *viśeṣasmṛti*⁸⁾. The above mentioned Vātsyāyana's interpretation has the same structure. Although there are several pieces of evidence that Vātsyāyana recognized *asādhāraṇadharmā* as a cause of doubt, we can place no confidence on them⁹⁾. But it is to be noted that a slight but serious difference lies between Vātsyāyana's and Candrānanda's interpretation: i. e. the former regards the *viśeṣa* of this case as *anekadharmā*, while the latter regards it as *sādhāraṇadharmā*. The differential feature can surely work as a common feature of *artha* since it is commonly found in every *artha*, but the differential feature itself cannot be a common feature. Laying stress on this point, one would not take this *viśeṣa* as *sādhāraṇadharmā*. The Naiyāyika thought of it as *anekadharmā* (a property related to many objects). Probably this opened the possibility of allowing Uddyotakara's interpretation. But this does not mean that Vātsyāyana's *anekadharmā* can be identified as *asādhāraṇadharmā*.

There is a marked difference between this type of interpretation and the following Uddyotakara's¹⁰⁾.

[Doubt arises in respect of sound], because its differential feature, being produced by disjunction, is not found in any one of substances, qualities and actions, that is, it is not found anywhere [except in sound]. Being produced by disjunction causes a doubt because of being excluded from every other object.

This interpretation is based on his theory that doubt arises from the perception of a peculiar characteristic. He interprets *anekadharmā* as *asādhāraṇadharmā*. (We will see how similar is this interpretation to Dignāga's view on this problem.) But at the same time he seems to show some hesitation in denying the older view, for he repeatedly expresses that a doubt caused by *samānadharmā* and a doubt caused by *asādhāraṇadharmā* can be taken as one and the same

type from the point of view that both of them are caused by the lack of correspondence (*vyabhicāritva*)¹¹⁾.

We can conclude from this difference that Vātsyāyana holds a different view from Uddyotakara's on *anekadharmā*. Candrānanda's interpretation is the same as Praśastapāda's¹²⁾. Therefore it could be said that Vātsyāyana, Praśastapāda and Candrānanda share the similar interpretation of VS 2-2-26. And this means that no such interpretation of VS 2-2-26 or *anekadharmopapatti* as Uddyotakara suggests is found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literatures before the time of Uddyotakara. It is probably because an axiom that doubt is caused not by a differential feature but by a common feature was held by them before the time of Uddyotakara. The axiom is explicitly expressed in NS 5-1-15¹³⁾. And besides, it is a logical conclusion of VS 2-2-19 and NS 1-1-23, for doubt is defined by the expressions "*viśeṣāpratyaṅkṣāt*" and "*viśeṣāpekṣaḥ*" in these sūtras.

If it is the case, what made Uddyotakara give up this axiom? It is probably the same cause as that which forced Praśastapāda to set up *anadhyavasita* as a separate fallacious reason: that is, Dignāga's criticism.

Dignāga attacks the Vaiśeṣika view of doubtful reasons (*sandigdha*) as follows¹⁴⁾.

Not only "because of having horns it is a cow" is the doubtful reason, but also a too specific reason is [this kind of fallacious reason]. Thus [the specific characteristic of sound,] being perceived by the ear, causes a doubt as to which one of the six categories sound belongs to. Since this characteristic subsists nowhere [except in sound], it is a cause of doubt concerning many entities.

(Objection) The differential feature, [being perceived by the ear], is observed [to be excluded] from both homogeneous and heterogeneous entities, therefore it is virtually a common feature just as being straight up [of a man and a post].

(Answer) It is not so. Because a doubt whether X is Y is never caused by X being excluded from Y. Thus having a substance [, a characteristic of X which differentiates its abode from substances,] would not cause a doubt whether X is any one of the substances such as earth and so on. Accordingly this [differential feature] is a cause of doubt with regard to all the entities, and is nothing but a too specific [reason], since it cannot be excluded from all the entities.

This criticism urged the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to change either theory of doubt or of fallacious reasons, for adoption of *asādhāraṇa* as another kind of doubtful

reason would incur a contradiction to the axiom of doubt, while disregard of *aśādhāraṇa* would leave their theory of fallacious reasons defective according to the canons of *trairūpya*.

Prāśastapāda preferred to change the theory of fallacious reasons rather than abandon the axiom of doubt, so that he set up *anadhyavasita* as a separate type of *anapadeśa*. On the other hand Uddyotakara preferred to recognize *aśādhāraṇa* as a variety of *anaikāntika*, and thus he changed the theory of doubt, and gave up the axiom of doubt.

Conclusion

1. Doubt from perception of a differential feature is not defined in VS 2-2-26.
2. Vātsyāyana's interpretation of VS 2-2-26 conforms to Prāśastapāda's and Candrānanda's.
3. According to them the doubt explained in VS 2-2-26 is that which is caused by a differential feature working as a common feature of all the three *padārthas* called objects (*artha*), i. e. substances, qualities and actions.
4. Doubt from the perception of a differential feature or a peculiar characteristic was not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika before Uddyotakara, since it was their axiom that doubt is caused not by a differential feature but by a common feature.
5. What made the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika split on this subject matter was Dignāga's criticism on the Vaiśeṣika theory of fallacious reasons.

1) See Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar*, Leipzig 1928, pp. 174 f, Hattori, "Ronshou no Zendankai tositeno samśaya", *Dr. Kanakura Commemoration Volume*, Kyoto 1966, pp. 267 f.

2) Cf. Jha, G, *The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama*, Allahabad 1915 (Rep. Kyoto 1983), pp. 300f, Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika System*, Amsterdam 1918, p. 175, Hattori, "Ronshou-gaku Nyumon" (*Sekai no Meicho* vol. 1), Tokyo 1969, pp. 366 f. Gangopadhyaya, *Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary*, Calcutta 1982, pp. 33 f.

3) *upapatti*=*sadbhāva*. See NBh (ChSS) p. 214, *Nyāyamañjarī* (KSS) II. p. 119. 6.

4) See VS 8-14 *artha iti dravyagunākarmasu*

5) This paragraph is usually interpreted as an example of this type of doubt as the text p. 81 of the *Tarkabhāṣā* (Bombay SS). But it is not accurate. This part forms a correspondent to the *viśeṣasmṛti* which is defined as one of the required conditions of doubt in VS 2-2-19.

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- 6) *viśeṣāpekṣā* is to be taken as an attribute of *buddhiḥ* at the end of the passage.
- 7) *The Vaiśeṣikasūtra with the Commentary of Candrānanda* pp. 20, 21.
- 8) This sūtra is not an enumeration of varieties of doubt, but a definition of doubt. See Hattori, "Ronshou...", p. 274. Cf. Ruben p. 174, n. 65, Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu* 1, Tokyo 1923, p. 326.
- 9) E. g. *Nyāyavārttikātparyāṭikā* (KSS 24) p. 256. 21. The śloka in NVT p. 257 are probably cited from an unknown Vaiśeṣika work. See Ruben p. 176, Hattori, "Ronshou...", pp. 279 f.
- 10) *Nyāyavārttika* (KSS 33 1916) p. 91. 22f.
- 11) *ibid.*, pp. 92, 99.
- 12) See my paper, "Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha Jiin no Setsu no Kenkyu", *Memoirs of Numazu College of Technology*, No. 17, 1982, p. 81.
- 13) NS 5-1-15 *sādharmyāt samśaye na samśayo vaidharmyād...*/ See Ruben p. 175.
- 14) *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Peking ed.), Kanakavarman's tr. 147b2, Vasudhararakṣita's tr. 63a6. See Hattori, "Prašastapāda and Dignāga", *WZKS XVI* 1972, p. 179.
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