Svabhāvapratibandha Revisited

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The aim of this paper[1] is to clarify the significance of two key-terms of Dharmakīrti's logic, viz. *svabhāvapratibandha* and *tādātmya*, which have been recently much discussed by young Japanese scholars. I have surveyed how the concept of logical connection was conceived by Indian logicians as the foundation of inference and proof and how and by whom it was identified as *vyāpti* (pervasion). I came to the conclusion that there were four distinct stages in the development of the concept of logical connection in India. Namely,

Stage I : As represented by *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (ca. 2 & 3 c. A. D.) and *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (ca. 300 A. D.), where several concrete relations (*sambandha*), such as 'causal relation', between probans and probandum are regarded as the foundation of inference. A similar view is found in Asaṅga (4 c.)[2].

Stage II : By the time of Vasubandhu (ca. 400–480) an abstract relation between probans and probandum, called 'inevitability' (*nāntarīyakatva/avinābhāva*), was propounded as the foundation of inference.

Stage III : It was probably Dignāga (ca. 480–530) who introduced the notion of *vyāpti*—pervasion of probans by probandum in the 'universe of discourse'—as the foundation of the above-mentioned abstract and inevitable relation. The notion of *vyāpti* was gradually accepted by most of Indian logicians, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist.

Stage IV : Finally Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) proposed the concept of *svabhāvapratibandha* as the universal basis for inference.

Dignāga never discussed how his concept of the logical connection of inevitability or *vyāpti* was related to reality and how it could have universal applicability. Dharmakīrti solved these problems by introducing the concept of *svabhāvapratibandha*.

For instance, when we infer the existence of a hidden fire from the perception of smoke, Dignāga justifies the inference by pointing to the inevitable rela-

tion between smoke and fire which is due to the fact that the domain of smoke is pervaded by the domain of fire in the universe of discourse[3]. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, justifies the inevitable relation between smoke and fire by his *svabhāvapratibandha*, i. e. a universal connection between smoke and fire[4], which is supported by the fact that in reality smoke arises from fire.

Svabhāvapratibandha provides the universal basis for inference, since it expresses a universal connection between two general concepts, viz. *hetu-svabhāva* and *sādhya-svabhāva*. Although Steinkellner explicitly states that *svabhāva* in this compound can only have the ontological meaning, viz. 'essence'[5], I would rather take it to mean 'concept', the second meaning of *svabhāva* used in logical contexts as pointed out by Steinkellner himself. According to Dharmakīrti's ontological conviction that everything is momentary, a relation or connection is possible not in reality but only in the conceptual universe because only concepts, being understood as 'exclusion of others' (*anyāpoha*), can have the nature of the 'universals' (*sāmānya*) of other systems of Indian philosophy[6]. Thus, *svabhāva* in *svabhāvapratibandha* primarily denotes 'universal' as exemplified by smoke-ness or fire-ness conceptually constructed by *anyāpoha*; in other words, the 'concept' of smoke or fire[7].

The above argument does not preclude the possibility of the meaning of 'essence' for *svabhāva* in *svabhāvapratibandha*. Precisely because of the double meaning of the term *svabhāva*, *svabhāvapratibandha* can be understood to be related to reality. Though it primarily indicates the universal connection between two concepts in the universe of discourse, it secondarily or metaphorically indicates the essential connection between two realities, say smoke and fire.

The reason why the universal connection between smoke and fire, (namely, wherever there is smoke, there is fire), is observed in the universe of discourse, is because in reality the two entities are essentially connected in that smoke arises from fire. Similarly we can successfully infer the existence of a tree from the existence of a Śiṃśapā tree because in reality there is one and the same essence which is called 'tree' as well as 'Śiṃśapā'.

Thus, because of the double meaning of the term *svabhāva* I propose to understand the compound *svabhāvapratibandha* as having two meanings, viz.

(1)　a universal connection between *hetu* and *sādhya* in the universe of discourse, and (2)　an essential connection between two items in actual reality. The same is true of *tadutpatti* and *tādātmya*, Dharmakīrti's two fundamental analyses of the universe of discourse and the foundation of *svabhāvapratibandha*. They represent the logical relations of causation and class inclusion as well as the actual states of affairs in reality.

As for *tādātmya*, Steinkellner takes it to mean 'real identity', i. e. "the fact that one property is in reality the same as the other property."[8] This interpretation, however, captures only one side of the term *tādātmya*. In logical contexts the term can only mean that one class is included in another, as e.g. "Śiṃśapā is a tree." The term *tādātman*, from which *tādātmya* is derived, as well as its synonyms *tatsvabhāva-* and *tadbhāva-*, can be used in the sentence form "A B-*ātmā*," meaning "A is B."[9] Thus *tādātmya* in logical contexts means not merely 'identity' but 'class inclusion'. In this sense *tādātmya* is more or less synonymous with *vyāpti*. It was perhaps Stcherbatsky who first translated *tādātmya* by 'identity'. He had already grasped the double meaning of *tādātmya* in his celebrated *Buddhist Logic* vol. I, p. 554:

> "Identity (*tādātmya*), ...; the Buddhist law means reference of two different concepts to one and the same point of reality; the concepts are identical in that sense that the one is included in the other; ...."

In the universe of discourse *tadutpatti* represents the relation "A arises from B," while *tādātmya* means the relation "A is B". In reality the former holds when A and B are different entities, while the latter holds when A and B are one and the same entity.

Now, according to Buddhist tradition, everything is subject to causation. A Śiṃśapā tree can exist because of its preceeding casual factors. Thus, *tadutpatti* is, in the final analysis, the principle which governs the real world of our experience as understood by Dharmakīrti. Causal relation can be determined only by identifying 'cause' and 'effect'. Thus, *tādātmya* seems to be the principle which governs Dharmakīrti's universe of discourse or our world of concepts. Therefore, I agree with Richard Hayes' suggestion that there is no fundamental difference between *kāryahetu* and *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's logic[10].

Conclusion: Buddhist logic up to Dignāga can be characterized by its strong inductive nature. It was given a deductive nature by Dharmakīrti's introduction of *svabhāvapratibandha* into the Buddhist theory of inference. This becomes clearer when we compare Dignāga's logical proof, which consists of [*pratijñā*,] *hetu*, and *dṛṣṭānta*, with Dharmakīrti's, which consists of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* with *pratijñā* being understood.

1) This paper is a revised English version of Katsura [1986] *The Origin and Development of the Concept of Vyāpti in Indian Logic—from the Carakasaṃhitā up to Dharmakīrti—* (in Japanese) **Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 45, Tokushūgō** 1, pp. 96–100. See this for abbreviations. A brief English summary appeared in **Tetsugaku** 38, 186.

2) In the early *vāda* texts, such as *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Nyāyasūtra*, we find no trace of the concept of a logical connection.

3) I once suggested that Dignāga's universe of discourse consists of hierarchy of Vaiśeṣika-like genuses and species. See Katsura [1979b].

4) I support Steinkellner's interpretation of the compound *svabhāvapratibandha*, "a connection by essence/essentially (*svabhāvena*) of a proving essential property (*svabhāvasya*) with an essential property to be proven (*svabhāve sādhye*)," though I don't agree with his interpretation of the term *svabhāva* in this compound. See Steinkellner [1984] p. 471, fn. 40. *Svabhāvapratibandha* is essentially an instrumental *tatpuruṣa* compound, and commentators' understanding of the compound as either a genitive or a locative *tatpuruṣa* expresses only a part of the whole meaning of the term.

5) See Steinkellner [1984] p. 459.

6) See Hattori [1977] The Sautrāntika Background of the Apoha Theory, *Buddhist thought and Asian Civilization*, ed. by Kawamura & Scott, California, p. 48.

7) Cf. Durvekamiśra, *Dharmottarapradīpa*, ed. by Malvania, p. 112 : *yasya dharmasya vyāvṛttikalpitasya yo niyataḥ pratiniyataḥ sa eva svabhāvaḥ*/

8) See Steinkellner [1984] pp. 475–476.

9) As for the interpretation of the compound *tadātman*, I am inclined to take it as a *bahuvrīhi* against Steinkellner [1984] pp. 473–476. I have the impression that Tibetan translators do not always translate a *bahuvrīhi* compound ending with -*ātman* or -*svabhāva* by its explicit equivalent like -*bdag can* or -*rang bzin can*.

10) See Hayes [1984] On the reinterpretation of Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvahetu*, a paper read at the Sixth World Sanskrit Conference in Philadelphia.

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