

SAKALAJAGADVIDHĀTRĀṆUMĀNAM (II)

—The Intellect of the God Śiva argued by Bhāsarvajña—

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Bhāsarvajña begins to argue the intellect of the God Śiva by way of suggesting the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad III, 19 a :¹⁾

apānīpādo javano grahitā paśyatyacakṣuḥ sa śṛṇotyakarnaḥ |

(He, Rudra, runs without feet or grasps without hands, and He sees without eyes or hears without ears.)

Opponents like Buddhists, Bhāsarvajña says, might find fault with our psalm because of psalming the God as seeing without eyes, but we praise Him so metaphorically (*upacārat*). For, the God knows everything so as it exists by His eternal intellect (*yad yathāvasthitaṃ kiñcit tat tathā veti nityenaiva jñānena*). If He experiences tastes etc. with His organs, He would feel happiness, misery etc. But He is free from them, for He knows all things without organs. The word “see (*paśyati*)” represents same clearness (*parisphuṭatvam*)²⁾ of the God’s knowledge as our senses of sight (*cakṣuṣaṇi jñānam*).

Bhāsarvajña says, thinkers might argue that the body of the God with the organs is also eternal, but they could not find the proof or reason for it. The body is said to be the place of enjoyment (*bhogāyatanam*). But the God is free from it. You might appoint the difference between our thought and our canon which preaches the body of the earth etc. (*kṣitīyādīmūrtipratīpādakāgamavirodha iti cet*). For example, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 5, 1 runs like this, “this shining, immortal Person who is in this earth, and, with reference to human self (*adhyaत्मam*), this shining immortal Person who is in the body, is just Ātman, this Immortal One, this Brahman, this All.”³⁾ But these passages indicate only that the God can controle the world as He likes it as if the world is His body (*śartravad icchāmātrānuvidhāyi*). Praśastapāda prayed the Maker Śiva (*praṇamya hetum īśvaram.....*) at first in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and setted up the metaphysics that the God Śiva only can controle the world just by His will (*maheśvara-icchā*,

-*abhidhyānam*, -*buddhiḥ*)⁴).

Uddyotakara who declared himself the “*pāśupatācāryaḥ*” insisted that people acknowledge the God Śiva to be the Maker of the world (*nimittakāraṇam iśvara ityupagatam bhavati*)⁵). In the Pāśupata sect, Kaundiṇya represented at first that the God Śiva was the Maker (*iśvaro nimittam*)⁶). Uddyotakara is considered to rely on the theological theories of Kaundiṇya and Praśastapāda, but he is the first thinker who argued on the intellect and the body of the God. If the God has the intellect (*buddhiman*), he said, how is His body? In case His body is non-eternal, the God would have the good and bad karma, then He will be denied to be God (*iśvaraḥ*). If the body of the God is eternal, it will be contradictory to our experience, (that is, the visible world is non-eternal and the body of the God also is included in it)⁷). As to the intellect of the God, in case it is non-eternal, you might consider the continuity (*santānaḥ*) of it or multitude of it. But in the former, you could not explain the phenomenon that plants etc. arise at once, and in the latter, you would have contradictory experience, (that is, we have one intellect and no plural intellects). Thus Uddyotakara concluded the eternity of the God’s intellect.

Bhāsarvajña made this theological theory develop to epistemological one. According to his argument, the intellect of the God is higher than our perceptual knowledge on account of begetting no effect of sense (*pramājanakābhāvāneśvarajñānam mukhyam pratyakṣam*). In other words, it is no more than mind (*manah*) and not non-eternal knowledge (*buddhiḥ*). The eternal intellect of the God doesn’t depend upon any organ. It is due to the eternity of the intellect of the God. Then Bhāsarvajña demonstrates this proposition by way of proofs according to the logical concomitance (*vyāptiḥ*) suggested by positive case (*sādharmya-drṣṭāntaḥ*) and negative case (*vaidharmya-drṣṭāntaḥ*). The former is:⁸

Assertion: The intellect of the God is eternal (*nityam paramēśvarajñānam*).

Reason: Because it is a qualifying quality of an eternal substance which is other than material causes of smell, demerit and sound. (*gandhādharmadhvanisamavāyikāraṇārthantarānityadravyavišeṣaḡuṇatvāt*).

Case: As is the color of an atom of waters (*toyādīparamāṇurūpādīvat*).

The material cause of smell is an atom of the earth, that of demerit (*adhar-*

maḥ) is a lower soul (*aparātma*) such as we ourselves, and of an sound is ether (*akāśaḥ*). The God does'nt rely upon them, so He is also eternal and solitary substance. The instance means that the color of the waters is eternally pure (*śukla-*), the taste of it is eternally sweet, and the touch feeling is eternally cool etc. in accordance with the word of Praśastapāda⁹. "A qualifying quality (*viśeṣaḡaḥ*)" means the quality which distinguishes its depending substance from other substances, so interpretes Śrīdhara in his Nyāyakandālī¹⁰.

The second proof is tried by a negative case.

Assertion: the God has the eternal intellect (*nityajñānāśrayo bhagavān*).

Reason: Because He is the most excellent Maker (*niratiśayakartṛtvai*).

Case: A contrary instance is we ourselves (*voidharmyadṛṣṭānto 'smadādih*)¹¹.

We cannot find the same case as the subject of the assertion, therefore Bhāsarvajña adopts the case standing on the contraposition of the major premise, i. e. we have non-eternal intellects and therefore cannot the most excellent Maker. We cannot beget all effects in every time as we like it.

"To be the most excellent Maker" cannot accompany with misery (*duḥkham*), repugnance (*dveṣaḥ*) etc. This reason suggests a pure negative concomitance which is grounded on positive and negative concomitances (*anvayavyatirekiketumūlakevalavyatirekietuḥ*)¹².

Dharmakīrti asserted the theory that the cognition is non-eternal (*nityam pramāṇam naivāsti*) in his Pramāṇavārttikam, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, kārikā 8-9¹³. Because, he said, real objects are non-eternal. Its cognition must be non-eternal. Any eternal cognition cannot become non-eternal by every non-eternal factor. If the cognition of the God be non-eternal, we cannot assent the correctness of it because of the God's eternality.

Bhāsarvajña defends his theory saying that the apperceptual organ is mind (*antahkaraṇam=manaḥ*), and it is a substancial principle to be eternal along with the soul (*ātma*), but the cognition will be non-eternal when meets non-eternal objects. The intellect of the God is, he says, neither cognition nor the mean of cognition (*na ceśvarajñānam añjasā pramāṇam phalaṃ ca*).

Therefore Dharmakīrti is criticized by him for asserting tautologically (*siddhasadhanam*). The intellect of the God directs every object in full space and

time, and is autogenous (*svābhāviko dharmah*). So that, it cannot be compared with the means of cognition of peoples (*lokasya pramāṇam*)¹⁴.

Then opponents might appoint the contradiction that, if the perpetual and same intellect of the God grasps all objects, past and future objects will become present one as if the lunar mansion Kṛttikā etc. go around in eternal now no matter how the sun or the moon passes through it. But you should recollect the intellect of Yogins which contemplate past or future objects as if they exist in front of them by concentrated meditational power (*samādhibalat*)¹⁵.

Or, he says, the highest universality (*parasāmānyam*), i. e. the universality named existence (*sattā*) is connected to all objects, but they differ their positions (*deśāḥ*) and natures (*svabhāvāḥ*) according to the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. In the same way, all objects connect with the intellect of the God (*paramēśvara-jñānam*), but they do'nt give up the natures to be past or future.

Dharmakīrti asserted that the mean of cognition for being delivered from the misery was the Buddha who taught the four noble truths (*āryasatyacatuṣṭayam*), and denied any omniscient to be the mean of cognition because of its uselessness for being delivered. Why can the cognition of numbers of all insects be useful for us? (*kiṭṣasamkhyāparijñānam tasya naḥ kvopayujyate*)¹⁶.

Thus Bhāsarvajña cites the following two verses of Dharmakīrti.

*heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ| yaḥ pramāṇam aśaviṣṭo na tu sarvasya
vedakaḥ|| dāram paśyatu vā mā vā tattvam iṣṭam tu paśyatu| pramāṇam dūradarśi
ced etā gṛdhrān upāsmahe||*¹⁷

On the kārikā II, 33 of his Pramāṇavārttikam, Dharmakīrti played a joke on theists saying that he shall make his bow to eagles if any remote-seeing-one be the mean of cognition. The Pāśupa-sūtram I, 21 preaches that sinless ascetics can attain the intellect to be able to see, hear and contemplate remote objects (*dūradarśanaśravaṇamananavijñānāni cāsya pravariante*). The Mimāṃsist Śābarasvāmin also commented that their authority i. e. Vedāḥ called “the Instruction (*codanā*)” can let persons know remote objects etc¹⁸). Pāśupatic logicians attributed the function to yogin’s perceptions caused by meditation, Whereas they thought that the God had that ability by nature as well as the character of the Maker of the world. But Dharmakīrti esteemed the four noble truths which are found

and taught by the Buddha as the most important principle for “lost sheeps.”

Bhāsarvajña criticizes Dharmakīrti’s religious theory as follows. According to you, Dharmakīrti, the Buddha should be allowed to be the authority because he found and taught the truths to be left and taken together with their causes (*heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedako yaḥ pramāṇam asaviṣṭaḥ*), and the principle to be left is that of misery (*duḥkhasatyam*). Then, if the Buddha was free from greediness (*ragah*), why he could find the principle of misery? The misery is caused by greediness etc. as Buddhists also think. If the Buddha found the principle of calmness (*nirodhasatyam*), he did’nt find that of misery. Because he was free from greediness etc. In that case, why can he teach all the principles for us? If you deem that he teaches them by step (*kramaṇa*), do you think that he can teach the principle of calmness while preaching that of practice (*mārgasatyam*)? If he can, then he could’nt preach the practice of meditation (*mārgabhyāsaḥ*). Whereas if he dare not teach the principle of calmness, people would have no interest of the practice because of failing its purpose. The God Śiva, he says to settle the paragraph, can find the greediness of others, but He fails it in himself¹⁹).

(to be continued)

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- 1) Śrīmadācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñaṃ vyākhyānaṃ Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, ed. by Yogīndrānanda (Śaḍdarśanaprakāśanagranthamālā 1) p. 463. This verse is cited also by Vācaspatimiśra in his Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatikā (Kashi S. S.) p. 605 and by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāyamañjarī (Kashi S. S.) p. 183. By the way, the caption of our series was composed from these passages, “.....*īsvarānumānapraṭiṣedhārīham.....*” (p. 457), “.....*jagadvidhātṛtvādharmakātmajñānam.....*” (p. 460), “*sarvasya jagata eka eveśvaraḥ kartā*” (p. 476) etc.
 - 2) The representation “(*pari-*) *sphuṭa-*” is borrowed from Dharmakīrti school. See the Pramāṇavārttikam, Pratyakṣa chapter, k. 298 (Bauddha Bharatī S.); T. Vetter, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam p. 76 fn. 3; the Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara on the Nyāyabinduḥ I, 11 (TSWS.) etc.
 - 3) “*kṣityadīmūrtipratipādakāgamah*” suggests, we think, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 5, 1 where it is declared that the Soul (*puruṣaḥ*) in the earth and body, in the waters and semen, in the fire and speech, in the wind and breath, in the sun and eyes etc. is Ātman or Brahman.
 - 4) Cf. Praśastapādabhāṣyam (Kashi S. S.) p. 19–23 (*sr̥ṣṭisamhāravidhiḥ*).

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- 5) Nyāyavārttikam (Kashi S. S.) p. 457.
- 6) Pañcārthabhāṣyam ad Pāśupatasūtram I. 23 (Tribandrum S. S.).
- 7) These supplementary explanation is our supposition. The Nyāyavārttikam as well as the Nyāyavārttika-tātparyāṭikā fails the concerned explanation. About non-eternality of the visible world, see p. 12 etc. of the Praśastapādabhāṣyam.
- 8) Nyāyabhūṣaṇam p. 465.
- 9) Praśastapādabhāṣyam p. 14.
- 10) Nyāyakandalī (Gaṅganātha Jhā Granthamālā Vol. 1) p. 230-231.
- 11) Nyāyabhūṣaṇam p. 464.
- 12) Cf. Dr. G. Chemparathy's diss. Aufkommen und Entwicklung der Lehre von einem höchsten Wesen in Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika (Univ. Wien 1963) p. 94 & 109. I am indebted to Dr. Prof. Ernst Steinkellner for the utility of the dissertation.
- 13) *nityam pramāṇam naivasti pramāṇyād vastusaṅgateḥ| jñeyānityataya tasyadhrauvyāt kramañamanah|| nityād utpattivīṣeṣād apekṣayā ayogataḥ| kathañcinnopakāryatvād anitye'pyapramāṇatā||* cited on p. 467 of Nyāyabhūṣaṇam. "*anitye'pya-pramāṇatā*" means "*anitye'pīṣvare nāsti pramaṇatā*" according to the Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam (Tib. Skt. Work S. Vol. 1 p. 34 Tibetan Version, Derge-ed. 29b, 4). But Bhāsarvajña reads better thus, "*anitye'pīṣvarajñāne na pramaṇatā*". Perhaps the Kāśmir manuscript of the Bhāṣyam would be better than Tibetan one. His refutation against Prajñākaragupta will be reported on the next volume of this journal.
- 14) Nyāyabhūṣaṇam p. 467-468.
- 15) Op. cit. p. 468. On the theory of the yogi-pratyakṣam, see op. cit. p. 170-171.
- 16) Pramāṇavārttikam, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter k. 30b. (JBORS. Vol. 24 pt. 1)
- 17) Ib. k. 32-33 cited in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇam p. 469. Bhāsarvajña's citing passage "*hānyupāyasya*" should be emended as "*sābhyupāyasya*" along with the text of the Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series Vol. 1. according to other recensions and Tibetan version.
- 18) Śābarabhāṣyam (Kashi S. S.) p. 3
- 19) Nyāyabhūṣaṇam p. 470. According to Dharmakīrti, the principal practice of Buddhists is the meditation of unselfishness (*nairātmyadarśanam*). See the English synopsis of my monograph 'Literal Study of the Religious Philosophy of Dharmakīrti' (in Japanese) which will be published from Mokujiisha, Tōkyō, in this spring.

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