

On “*sāmānya*” introduced in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*

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In the chapter ‘*sāmānya-parīkṣā* (the examination of universality)’ of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Buddhists¹⁾ criticize *sāmānya* (universality) which is regarded as one of the six categories (*padārthas*) by the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika. Before entering into criticism, first they make the essence of *sāmānya* clear by reason that until the essence of *sāmānya* is understood the criticism of *sāmānya* is not possible. The following deals with *sāmānya* that they introduce and explain about in the text.

According to their explanation, *sāmānya* is of two kinds; *para-sāmānya* (the higher universality) and *apara-sāmānya* (the lower universality). *Para-sāmānya* is called *sattā* (being-ness), because it subsists in its substrata, i. e., *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (action) and it is the cause of only the inclusive notion in regard to all its substrata, three categories. It is, therefore, *sāmānya* proper, not *viśeṣa* (particularity) at all.²⁾

This above-stated view is in accord with Praśastapāda’s, or seems to be the gist of his view in regard to *para-sāmānya*. According to his work, with respect to each one of the mutually different categories, i. e., *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*, we have the inclusive, unlimited notion ‘being being (*sat sat*)’ and it should be due to something different from these categories. This ‘something different’ is *sattā*; therefore the inclusive notion ‘being being’ is due to *sattā* (beingness).³⁾

Apapa-sāmānya contains *sāmānya* except *sattā*, namely, *dravyatva* (substance-

1) Śāntarākṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla.

2) TSP (=Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā; Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. 30) 709: tac ca samasteṣu triṣu dravya-guṇa-karmasv anuvṛtti-pratyayasyāiva kāraṇatvāt sāmānyam eva na viśeṣaḥ.

3) PBh (=Praśastapādabhāṣya; Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6) pp. 311-312.

ness), *guṇatva* (quality-ness), *karmatva* (action-ness), *gotva* (cow-ness), *ghaṭatva* (pot-ness) and so on. Kamalaśīla explains, “As in regard to *dravya*, etc., which are its substrata it is the cause of the inclusive notion, it is called *sāmānya*, while it serves also as the cause of the exclusive notion in regard to its substratum which is distinguished from things subsisted in by other *sāmānya*, so that it is also called *viśeṣa* (particularity), though being *sāmānya*.”⁴⁾ Inasmuch as *apara-sāmānya* can bring about both of these two kinds of notions, it is also *viśeṣa*, though being *sāmānya*. With respect to earth, water, fire and wind, *dravyatva* brings about the inclusive notion, so it is *sāmānya*, but since with respect to things except *dravya* it is the cause of the exclusive notion ‘not-substance’, it is also *viśeṣa*.

Further, according to the text, it is due to *dravyatva* that in regard to *guṇa* (quality) we have the exclusive notion ‘*adravya* (not-substance)’; and it is due to *guṇatva* that in regard to *dravya* (substance) we have the exclusive notion ‘*aguṇa* (not-quality)’; because there are no such universalities as *adravyatva*, *aguṇatva* and so forth.

Thus here we can know exactly that there are no such universalities which are expressed by negative words as *adravyatva* (not-substance-ness), *aguṇatva* (not-quality-ness) and others; in other words, *sāmānya* should be the object of affirmative words. This view is not referred to in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya*.

Now that this *sāmānya* which is the object of only an affirmative expression brings about not only the affirmative phenomenon of the inclusive notion but also the negative phenomenon of the exclusive notion, there should be a manifest absurdity found in this view.

As to this absurd point it is explained in the text that there is no absurdity in the same thing being both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, which have the diametrically opposite function to each other, because we can take different view-

4) TSP 710-711: tac ca svāśrayeṣu dravyādiṣv anuvṛtti-pratyaya-hetutvāt sāmānyam ity ucyate, svāśrayasya ca vijātiyebhyo vyāvṛtti-pratyaya-hetutayā viśeṣaṇāt sāmānya api sad viśeṣaḥ.

5) TSP 711: apekṣā-bhedāc cāikasya sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvo na virudhyata eva.

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points to recognize the same thing.⁵⁾ When we see *dravyatva* in regard to only its substratum *dravya*, *dravyatva* serves as *sāmānya*, but when we see *dravyatva* relatively to other things than *dravya*, it serves as *viśeṣa*. This idea is derived from the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, “It depends upon notion whether it is regarded as universality or particularity.”⁶⁾

How is the existence of *sāmānya* proved? It is proved by means of *pratyakṣa* (direct perception). The text relates that being-ness, cow-ness and others are proved by *pratyakṣa*, because the notions ‘being’, ‘a cow’ and so forth appear only when sense organs are functioning. The fact that the appearance of these notions follows the presence and absence of the function of sense organs shows that these notions are produced by sense organs just like any other sense perception; and this shows that *sāmānya* is proved by *pratyakṣa*. If the above notions could not be regarded as the sense perceptions, the other sense perceptions, for example, the perception of color also would not be regarded.

It is related in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* also that *sāmānya* can be proved by *pratyakṣa*. “Being-ness, substance-ness, quality-ness, action-ness and others, which are inherent in their perceptible substrata, are perceived by those sense organs that perceive their substrata,”⁷⁾ says Praśatapāda.

In the *Tattvasaṃgraha* there is the sense perception of *sāmānya* explained by means of formulating the argument as follows: when the appearance of A follows the presence and absence of the function of B, A proceeds from B; and the appearance of the inclusive notions ‘being’, ‘a cow’ and others follows the presence and absence of the function of sense organs.

Moreover, the view of the other party that *sāmānya* is proved by *anumāna* (inference) also is introduced as follows: when A is different in form from B, A must be due to a cause other than that of B, like the notion ‘red color’ in regard to the cloth, the leather and the blanket; and similarly appears the notion ‘being’ in regard to *dravya*, so that the existence of being-ness is estab-

6) VS (=Vaiśeṣikasūtra; G. O. S., No. 136) I-ii-3: *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*.

7) PBh p. 187: *bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādinām upalabhyādhāra-samavetanām āśraya-grāhakair indriyair grahaṇam*.

lished. A specific notion must proceed from a specific cause other than those of the other notions and since the inclusive notion of 'being' is a specific notion which has its own form and is different from the other notions, we can infer that being-ness exists as the cause of the notion. This inference that from a specific notion (effect) we can infer the existence of *sāmānya* (cause) is based on the theory that a notion always must have a corresponding object to itself.⁸⁾

The arguments propounded by Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara are shown as a further proof of *sāmānya*. Bhāvivikta argues as follows: the specific name and notion 'a cow' in regard to a cow must be due to a specific cause corresponding and relating to its form other than the body, color and others of the cow, because when appertaining to the cow,⁹⁾ the above-stated name and notion 'a cow' is different from the name and notion of the body, color and others of the same cow; just as such peculiar name and notion relating to the cow as 'the cow with the calf' is different from the name and notion of the body, color and others of the same cow. It is the universality cow-ness that brings about this specific name and notion 'a cow' in regard to a cow.

Uddyotakara states three kinds of arguments. First he argues as follows: the inclusive notion in regard to a cow proceeds from a cause other than the body, color and others of the cow, because the notion differentiates just like the notion of the blue color. This argument has the same kind of view as Bhāvivikta's. His second argument is as follows: cow-ness *gotva* is something different from an individual cow *go*, because it is the object of a different notion; just as the color, touch and others of a cow are something different from the cow. His third argument is as follows: we can express '*tasya gotvam* (it has cow-ness=it is a cow)' and in this case, cow-ness can be expressed as belonging to the cow, because cow-ness is something different from the cow;

8) This is one of the most fundamental theories in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy as we can know through the term *padārtha* (the object of a word).

9) The qualification 'when appertaining to the cow' is aded in order to avoid the fallibility that, otherwise, the reason 'being different from the name and notion of the body, etc., of the same cow' applies to the nonentities like a hare's horn, etc., also.

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just as in the expression ‘Chaitra’s horse (*Caitrasyāśva*)’, the horse is expressed as belonging to Chaitra and as something different from him.

Well, the instance ‘Chaitra’s horse’ has been used as that of the proof that substance (*dravya*) is something different from quality (*guṇa*). The relation between substance and quality is argued about in the chapter ‘*dravya-padārtha-parīkṣā* (the examination of the category substance)’, where as the vindication of the difference between substance and quality, Uddyotakara’s view is shown as follows: the lotus (substance) is something different from its color (quality), because as ‘*indīvarasya rūpaḥ* (the lotus’ color)’ the color can be expressed as belonging to the lotus. In other words, the fact that the lotus can be expressed in the sixth case (genitive case) as ‘*indīvarasya*’ suggests that the lotus’ color belongs to the lotus and is different from it. This is just as when we express ‘Chaitra’s horse’, the horse is distinguished from other riders’ horses and is different from him. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika this ‘Chaitra’s horse’ can be used as the instance for the proof of the difference between the substratum and dependant.

The Buddhists introduce *viśeṣa* also which is regarded as one of the six categories by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This *viśeṣa* is the cause of only the exclusive notion in regard to eternal substances, so it can not become *sāmānya*. The eternal substances where *viśeṣa* subsists are atoms (*paramāṇus*), ether (*akāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dis*), soul (*ātman*) and minds (*manases*) and as they are ultimate, *viśeṣa* also which subsists in them is eternal and ultimate; therefore it is called ‘ultimate particularity (*antya-viśeṣa*)’. The particularities subsist in each one of those eternal substances, with respect to which they bring about the ultimately excluded notions.

Antya-viśeṣa can not be perceived by a common man, but can be proved by only *pratyakṣa* of an excellent yogin. In regard to a cow we can have the notion excluded from the notions of a horse, etc., through such shape, quality, action, components and conjunction as ‘the shape of a cow, white, fast moving, fat-humped, with a big bell’; in the same manner, in regard to each one of atoms the excellent yogin has the exclusive notion ‘this is different from that’ through the shape, quality and action and it is the ultimate particularity (*antya-*

viśeṣa) that bring about the notion in him.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it has been stated that, by transcendental faculties born of yogas, superior yogins to ourselves common men can perceive precisely atoms, ether, time, space, soul and minds; qualities, actions, universalities and particularities inhering in these substances; subtle, hidden and distant object.¹⁰⁾

With the exception of Bhāvikta and Uddyotakara’s view above-stated, the theory of *sāmānya* introduced in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is based, in the main, on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. As we have seen it is stated in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* that the existence of *sāmānya* can be proved by both of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, while *Praśastapāda* does not state precisely that it can be proved by *anumāna* also.¹¹⁾ The theory of *viśeṣa* introduced here is in full accord with *Praśastapāda*’s.

10) PBh p. 187.

11) The words ‘*sāmānyādīnāṃ trayāṇāṃ buddhi-lakṣaṇatvam*’ (PBh p. 19) may suggest that *sāmānya* can be proved by *anumāna* also.