

Vyākhyāṅga and Parapratiṭipādanāṅga in *Yuktidīpikā*

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I

In *Yuktidīpikā* (Yd.) we can see ten members constructing a formulated statement of argument (vākya), while there is an instance with two members constructing a formulated statement of argument in the statement against the view of ten members. The former is the attitude of Sāṃkhya school; and as Mr. Pulinbīhari Chakravarti indicates in his *Origin and development of the Sāṃkhya system of thought* (1952), p. 193, there is a record that it was taught by the teachers such as Vindhyavāsin (Yd., p. 4, ll. 7-8). Both—the view that the members (avayava) constructing a formulated statement of argument are ten and the objection against it—are seen in the part commenting on Kārikā 9 (Yd., p. 47, l. 18-p. 51, l. 14), besides, we should refer to the statement on avayavopapatti “being made possible by the parts”, which is one of the tantraguṇa’s (or tantrasampad). (Yd., p. 2, ll. 13-18; p. 3 l. 11. --p. 5. l. 11)

When ten members are said, each member is included in a means of acquiring certain knowledge (pramāṇa) and it is not taught differently from pramāṇa, since these members are considered to form (each) *part of inference (which is included in pramāṇa)* (anumānāṅga). (See Yd., p. 4, ll. 5-7.)

The relationship between the parts and a formulated statement of argument, and each other’s relationship among the formulated statements of argument, and the relationship between a formulated statement of argument and the teaching (śāstra) can be also observed as follows. “It is defined that under the specified aim for each, each part is collected to make a formulated statement for argument. As many formulated statements of argument assist

aim of another formulated statement, each aim of these formulated statements of arguments becomes accordingly subordinate to aim of another one and these formulated statements are combined with another formulated statement. In that case a śāstra is insisted on 'to be one formulated statement of argument (ekamvākyam).'" (eṣām avayavānām viśiṣṭārthasamudāyovākyam ityatidiśyate vākyamapyanekaṁ yadā guṇībhūtaṁ svārtham arthāntaropakāritvā itareṇa saṁsṛjyate tadā śāstram apy ekaṁ vākyam ityavasīyate / Yd., p. 48, ll. 18-20)

It is stated that the members are divided into two parts; one is a subordinate division as comment (vyākhyāṅga) and the other, a division to make others understand (parapratipādanāṅga). The latter is also named a division as demonstration to others (parapratyāyanāṅga). The opponent raises objections to both of them saying "(The first five), the investigation etc., are not to be mentioned" (Yd., p. 48 l. 21) and "(The latter five), the proposition etc., are wrongly prescribed" (Yd., p. 49 l. 4), against which answers are made as uttarapakṣa. Through the process of the original statement, the objection against it, and the answers to the objection, we can know each of the ten members; especially the meaning of the subordinate division as comment (vyākhyāṅga). The word "the investigation etc." (ijñāsādi), which is found in the objections mentioned above, may be considered as vyākhyāṅga. The following are the objection to vyākhyāṅga and the answer to it. The opponent says, "(The first five,) the investigation etc., are not to be mentioned, because without it (the investigation etc.) one understands for himself and he can make others understand just as his own ascertainment. It is right to say that a person, who ascertains, understands for himself (svayam, without any helps from others), and that another person is made to understand as he understands. In that case, however, the person, who is understanding for his own sake, does not employ the investigation etc. Therefore it is unthinkable for him to use the investigation for others, either. (āha..... ijñāsādyanabhidhānam, tadvyatirekeṇāpi svayam arthagateḥ svaṁścayavacca parapratipādanāt / yathā hi svayam utpadyate niścetuh pratyayas

tathaivānyaḥ pratyāyya ityetannyāyyam na ca svayamevārthaṁ pratipadyamānasya jijñāsādīnāṁ tatra vyāpāraḥ / tasmāt parārthaṁ apyeṣāṁ upādānaṁ na kalpyate / Yd., p. 48, ll. 21-24) The answer to this is as follows. “(Uttarapakṣa) is said.....The following is said (by the opponent). As (the first five) get to form a division (aṅga) as understanding for oneself, it is unnecessary to use investigation etc. in order to convince others. Against this objection stated in Pūrvapakṣa we answer: (What the opponent said) is not right, because it was already said before. It means.....it was said in the previous part that (the parts) investigation etc. form a division as comment (vyākhyāṅga). The wise men make it clear that there is a comment on the instruction in order to favour everyone. (The comment on the instruction) is neither for his own sake nor for others’ sake, who have the same opinions (as his). Thinking about the comment in this way, we can say that those who are confused in the investigation etc. are to get explanations from the comment. If this conclusion can not be approved, (we further explain as follows:) It is said that for the sake of those who have the confused, upset and ignorant intellect, wise men make determination or mention the teaching. A comment is concerned with this (view) [R. C. Pandeya points that ‘vyākhyāna’, instead of ‘vyākhyāta’, would be meaningful.] (The second reason) further, because (the parts) investigation etc. are not admitted to be necessary. We do not say that the statement of the investigation etc. is necessary, but when a questioner asks what you want to investigate, (the investigation etc.) should be necessarily expressed.” (ucyate.....yaducyate svanīścayenāṅgabhāvagamanāt parapratyāyanārthaṁ jijñāsādyanabhidhānam iti/ atra brūmaḥ.....na, uktatvāt / uktametad purastāt vyākhyā’ṅgaṁ jijñāsā”dayaḥ / sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ityevam arthaṁ ca śāstra-vyākhyānaṁ vipaściddbhiḥ pratyāyyate, na svārthaṁ svasadṛśabuddhyarthaṁ vā/ tatraivam kalpyamāne ye vyutpādyās tām prati vaiṣāṁ ākulyam/ athaitadaniṣṭam / yaduktaṁ sandigdhaviparyastāvvyutpannabuddhyanugrahārtho hi satām viniścayaḥ śāstrakathetyasya vyākhyātaḥ / kiñ ca.....niyamānabhyupagamāt / na hi vāyam eṣāṁ āvaśyakam abhidhānam ācakṣ-

mahe, kimtarhi prativādī paryanuyunkte kiṁ jijñāsasa iti/ avaśyam abhi-
dhāniyam iti / Yd. p. 49, l. 24—p. 50, l. 2). «Compare the underlined with
the underlined in the quotation from Praśastapādabhāṣya (p. 231) men-
tioned below.»

Through the criticism against vyākhyāṅga and the answer to the
criticism, we can not only know the characteristics of vyākhyāṅga but
also find out such things as remind us of svārthānumāna & parārthānumāna.

* “...svayam evārthaṁ pratipadyamānasya...” and “...svayam art-
hagateḥ ...” remind us of svārthānumāna. Further, “svaṇīścayavat,”
“yathā hi svayam utpadyate niścetuh pratyayas ...” remind us of “
svaṇīścitārtham anumānam” (Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 206).

* On the other hand, such expressions as “parapratyāyanārtham,”
“parapratipādana” and “parārtham” remind us of parārthanumāna.

The following can be observed from the same point of view: “A-
mong them, a direct reason (vīto hetuḥ) first leads to establish on the
side of a speaker the characteristic of understanding appeared in the in-
telligence of the speaker himself who impresses others’ intelligence; and
this direct reason is led into the state of a formulated statement of argu-
ment, since without the formulated statement it is impossible for him
to lead the meaning into others’ intellect. Then the formulated statement
of argument is supposed to have the parts.” (tatra yadā vīto hetuḥ sva-
buddhāv avahitavijñānasvarūpaṁ vijñānāntaram ādadhānena vaktrā pra-
tipādyādaḥ vākyabhāvam upanīyate vākyamantareṇārthasya buddhyantare
saṁkrāmāyitum aśakyatvāt, tadā’vayavi vākyam parikalpyate/Yd. p. 47, ll.
18—20) The following definition in Praśastapādabhāṣya (p. 231) can be com-
pared with this. “pañcāvayavena vākyena svaṇīścitārthapratipādanaṁ parār-
thānumānam/ pañcāvayavenaiva vākyena saṁśayitaviparyastāvvyutpannānām
pareṣām svaṇīścitārthapratipādanaṁ parārthānumānam vijñeyam ||”

Further, the description in Māṭharavṛtti (p. 13, ll. 1-2) can be con-
sidered to be similar to preceeding one. “evaṁ pañcāvayavena vākyena
svaṇīścitārthapratipādanaṁ parārtham anumānam.”

Now we can find some expression, which is parallel to “parapratyā-

yanārtham” and “parapratipādana” mentioned above, in a quotation of Sāmkhya-view given in Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti.

Ser-skya-ba-rnamis na-re gshan-la-bstan-par-bya-baḥi-don-du rnam-par-ldan-pa dañ bsal-te-ḥoṅs-paḥi bye-brag-gi rjes-su-dpag-pa rnam-pa gñis-te/de-la rnam-par-ldan-paḥi ṅag-gi dños-poḥi yul rnam-pa lña ste / dam-bcaḥ-ba la-sogs-paḥi dbye-bas so shes zer-ro. (Sde-ge, 54 a 2-3)

This is translated by Prof. Ryocho (呂澂) in his “集量論釋略抄” Prof. H. Hadano takes the underlined as indicating “parārthānumāna” in his work, “數論學派の論理說, ヴィー塔, アヴィータについて” Bunka vol. 11, No. 3. 1944, pp. 205-6. It is quite noteworthy that here gshan-la-bstan-par-bya-baḥi-don-du, instead of gshan-gyi don, is used.

From the point of view admitting something which are palallel to svārthānumāna & parārthānumāna, the opponent critisized vyākhyāṅga. Compare this with the way of the criticism on the first five members, jijñāsā etc., found in Vātsyāyanas commentary on Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 32^{*}. The criteria by Vātsyāyana is whether “the investigation” etc. fit as the part of the formulated statement of argument or not.

[Additional remark 1]

Among the explanations about Vyākhyāṅga, there are such words as “svanīścayavat” and “yathā hi svayam utpadyate niścetuḥ pratyayaḥ” which can be compared with “svanīścītārtham anumānam” in Praśastapādabhāṣya. See Randle’s view on “svanīścītārtham anumānam” as “inference in which the object or conclusion is established (infered) by oneself” (Randle: *Indian Logic in the early schools*, 1930, p. 160.) The second Sanskrit quotation from Yd. here may support his opinion.

[Additional remark 2]

As for the critical remark against the investigation etc., which is quoted again in uttarapakṣa, there is some difference between the critical remark and the quoted one. In the former case the investigation etc. are pallalel neither to svārthānumāna nor parārthānumāna, while in the

* See G. Overhammer: Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen indiens WZ KSO. Bd. VII.

latter they are made as “svaniścayenāṅgabhāva.” However the answer makes it clear that the former is right and the latter a wrong quotation. According to the answer, the investigation etc. are vyākhyāṅga, and the comment on the teaching is not for one’s sake and for those who have the same opinion with him but for those who are confused on the investigation etc., therefore the investigation etc. do not belong to what is parallel to svārthānumāna. We may say that the critical remark was quoted wrongly in uttarapakṣa(answer).

II

In Yuktidīpikā, p. 48, ll. 5-18; p. 49, ll. 4-24; p. 50, l. 12—p. 51, l. 14, the five parts such as proposition, etc. are explained, criticized, and against this critical remark the answer is made. It is made known by Prof. E. Frauwallner that the five parts mentioned here are those of Vārṣaṅga. (E. Frauwallner: Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-systems. WZKSÖ. Bd. 2 (1958) SS. 94, 125)

An opponent who criticizes the proposition etc. depends on Dignāga’s definition of the proposition and he is of the opinion that the two parts—the proposition and the reason—are enough to make syllogism.

Giving answer to the criticism, uttarapakṣa is said concerning the reason (Yd., p. 50, ll. 18-27). “It is said by the opponent that our definition of the reason (hetu) is unfit since “sādhana (=the reason)” is not referred. We reply: This is not right. Why? Because sādhana is well established among the public. It is just like that while saying the definition of proposition you have said “pakṣa is desired to have the characteristic of sādhya. Why? Because it is well known among the people that sādhya is that which to be proved.” (yadapy uktam sādhanānupadeśāddhetulakṣaṇāyoga iti, asad etat / kasmāt? lokaprasiddhatvāt / yathā sādhyaṭvenepṣi-taḥ pakṣa iti. pratijñālakṣaṇam ācakṣāṇo bhavān na sādhyalakṣaṇamācaṣṭe / kasmāt? sādhanīyam sādhyam iti loke siddhatvāt / Yd., p. 50, ll. 18-22). The text underlined can be traced back to Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論^{*}). So the person who is called “you” here is one who uses Dig-

nāga's definition.

“There is no difference for each of the exemplification, the application and the conclusion. Because they are to express the aim of the reason and the proposition. It is proved that the characteristic of *sādhana* (=reason) which is inseparably connected with *sādhya* (=probandum) is known in both the exemplification and the application. It is not proper for the proposition to need the conclusion as another parts than the proposition. (*kiñcānyat—dr̥ṣṭāntopanayanigamanābhedaśca hetupratijñārthābhīdhanāt / sādhanatvam eva sādhyāvinābhāvitvalakṣaṇaṁ dr̥ṣṭāntopanayaḥ pratyāyyate/pratijñārthaṅca nigamanasya nāvayavāntaratvaṁ yujyate* / Yd. p. 49 ll. 22–24). This criticism is made from the standpoint that the formulated statement consists of two parts.^{**}

I am deeply indebted to prof. Y. Kajiyama in getting information on prof. Overhammer's work mentioned above and getting suggestion to refer to Prof. Frauwallner's work mentioned above. Prof. Overhammer has treated ten members in his work and already introduced *vyākhyāṅga*. I have tried to see the same in comparison with *svārthānumāna* & *parārthānumāna*. On getting another chance I would like to treat *parapratipādanāṅga* in comparison with *parārthānumāna* again. The former differs from the latter, since the former is included in *vīta* and excludes *vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta* included in *āvīta* (Yd. p. 48, ll. 9–12.). (cf. Chapter 7 of Prof. Hadano's work mentioned above.) I have to thank to Dr. R. C. Pandeya of Delhi University who has read the material concerned of Yd. for me by consulting with manuscript, on which is based the published text, in order to correct the misprints.

* See “字井・印度哲學研究第五 p. 545; 國譯一切經・因明入正理論疏 p. 39.

** We can find the same stand point in a chinese commentary on *Nyāya-mukha* (因明入正理論疏 p. 78). In criticism of *Dignāga*'s opinion, it is said by an apponent 《古師》 that (two exemplifications are not necessary and) the first two members are enough (to form syllogism). cf. *parīkṣāmukha-alghuvṛtti* No. 32 ff. (pp. 20 ff.) I am indebted to Prof. M. Hattori for finding this reference and to prof. H. Nakamura for finding a reference in a Chinese commentary.