

## Qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) in Navya-nyāya Philosophy

Toshihiro Wada

1. In the analysis of language and philosophical issues in India, the concept of '*viśeṣaṇa*' plays an important role. Pāṇini uses this term in three sūtras of his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*: 1-2-52, 2-1-57, and 2-2-35. But he does not define it. The *Kāśikā* on 2-1-57 explains that '*viśeṣaṇa*' stands for *bhedaka* (distinguisher), and that '*viśeṣya*', which prefigures '*viśeṣaṇa*', stands for *bhedya* (that which is to be distinguished). For instance, in the expression '*nīlam utpalam*' (a blue lotus), '*nīlam*' (blue) is *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier or adjective), and '*utpalam*' (lotus) is *viśeṣya* (qualificand). The term '*utpalam*' functions as distinguishing 'blue lotus' from 'red lotus', and so forth. This explanation shows the function of '*viśeṣaṇa*' from a grammatical point of view. This type of function is often observed. The views of grammarians such as Pāṇini, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, and Kaiyata, and a Navya-naiyāyika Gadādhara on this concept are examined by S. D. Joshi, compared with the western concept of adjective<sup>1)</sup>. D. H. H. Ingalls, A. Uno, M. Tachikawa, and V. N. Jha<sup>2)</sup> briefly elucidate the Navya-nyāya concept of '*viśeṣaṇa*'.

According to these four scholars, Navya-nyāya makes use of '*viśeṣaṇa*' in ontological analysis, also. An example of this term appears when Navya-nyāya deals with the relation between the entity expressed by the term *x* and the entity expressed by the term *x* plus the possessive suffix '*mat*', '*vat*' or '*in*'. The example is '*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtaḥ*'<sup>3)</sup> (the ground is the possessor of the absence of a pot, or the ground possesses the absence of a pot). Here, Navya-nyāya interprets the absence of a pot as the qualifier of the ground, and the ground as the qualificand of the absence<sup>4)</sup>. It is a general rule in Navya-nyāya that if *x-vat* (the possessor of *x*) is *y*, *x* is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *y*, and *y* is the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) of *x*.

In the present example of '*viśeṣaṇa*', the absence of a pot makes it possible to discriminate its locus (i.e., a particular piece of the ground) from other

pieces of the ground. This is to say, when one recognizes that the ground is the possessor of the absence of a pot, his cognition refers to the ground particularized by the absence of a pot. Thus, one can explain the function of a qualifier as follows : a qualifier enables one to discern its qualificand from others.

In this example, the qualifier (the absence of a pot) is the superstratum (*adheya*) of its qualificand (the ground), because in Navya-nyāya absence is an entity which necessarily occurs in some locus<sup>5)</sup>. Generally in ontological analysis, a qualifier is the superstratum of its qualificand<sup>6)</sup>. But Ingalls' examples of a qualifier and its qualificand suggest that a qualifier can be the substratum (*adhāra*) of its qualificand. Uno also states that 'qualifier' and 'qualificand' are interchangeable, depending upon the Sanskrit expression<sup>7)</sup>. In the Navya-nyāya literature, free usage of the two terms, 'qualifier' and 'qualificand', is observed. The present paper tries to analyze how a qualifier and its qualificand (or an entity qualified by it : *viśiṣṭa*) are connected in Navya-nyāya.

2. The relation between a qualifier and its qualificand can be first classified into two : (1) direct (*sākṣātsambandha*) and (2) indirect (*paraṃparāsambandha*)<sup>8)</sup>. Direct relations are contact (*samyoga*), inherence (*samavāya*), self-linking relation (*svārūpasambandha*), and identity (*tadātmya*)<sup>9)</sup>. The relation of contact is the physical connection between two substances (*dravya*) which can exist separately. For instance, when there is a pot on the ground, the pot exists on the ground through contact. The relation of inherence is the relation between two entities which cannot exist separately<sup>10)</sup>. For instance, when there is a blue pot, blue color exists in the pot through inherence. A self-linking relation is one which is regarded as identical with one of its two relate<sup>11)</sup>. To give an example, when there is a pot, this pot is considered to exist in time because the pot exists for a certain period. In this case, Navya-nyāya regards the relation between the pot and time as time itself. Indirect relations are ones which comprise direct relations<sup>12)</sup>.

Case (1) can be further classified into three : (a) a qualifier which is the superstratum (*adheya*) of its qualificand, (b) a qualifier which is the sub-

stratum (*adhāra*) of its qualificand, and (c) a qualifier which is neither the superstratum nor substratum of its qualificand. Cases (1-a), (1-b), and (1-c) will be dealt with in this section and case (2) in section 3.

An example of case (1-a) is as follows : when one perceives a pot on a particular place, the Navya-naiyāyikas regard the potness in the pot as the qualifier and the entity called 'pot' as the qualificand<sup>13</sup>. Here potness (the qualifier) is superstratum of the entity (the qualificand). The relation between them is inherence, because generic properties (*jāti*) one of which is potness reside in substances through inherence<sup>14</sup>.

Apart from inherence, one can find examples in which contact and a self-linking relation are the relations between a qualifier and its qualificand (or the qualified). Let us see first an example in which contact is the relation between them. When one perceives a man holding a stick, he has the cognition of the man with the stick (*daṇḍīti jñānam*). Here the stick is considered as the qualifier, and the man as the qualified<sup>15</sup>. The stick is considered to exist in the hand of the man, and the reverse is not true. Hence, the stick is the superstratum of the man, and the man is the substratum of the stick. The relation between them is contact.

The following is an example in which a self-linking relation connects a qualifier to its qualificand. When one does not perceive a pot on the ground, he recognizes the absence of a pot there. As mentioned in section 1, the absence can be treated as the qualifier of the ground. The absence of a pot is the superstratum of the ground. The relation between them is a self-linking relation in Navya-nyāya<sup>16</sup>.

An example of case (1-b) in which a qualifier is the substratum of its qualificand is as follows : When one perceives the absence of a pot on a particular piece of the ground, the absence of a pot can be treated as the qualificand, and the ground as the qualifier<sup>17</sup>. This is because the ground serves to distinguish the absence of a pot from the other absence of a pot on other loci. Thus the qualifier and its qualificand here are just the reverse of those in the last example. The relation between them in the present example is a self-linking relation as well.

The following is an example of case (1-c) in which a qualifier is neither the superstratum nor substratum of its qualificand. When one recognizes that there is a blue lotus, the object of this cognition is analyzed in the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* as follows: the entity (*a*) denoted by the word 'blue' is the epistemic qualifier (*prakāra*) of the entity (*b*) denoted by the word 'lotus' because of the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) or non-difference (*abheda*)<sup>18</sup>. Epistemic qualifier is one kind of qualifier<sup>19</sup>. Here the word 'blue' refers to an entity which has blue color and not to blue color itself. The entity *a* (the qualifier) is neither the superstratum nor substratum of the entity *b* (the qualificand). This is because any entity is not said to exist in itself through the relation of identity<sup>20</sup>.

3. An example of case (2) in which there exists an indirect relation between a qualifier and its qualificand will be illustrated here. When Navya-nyāya refers to the highest universal qualified by the difference from a quality and [the difference from] action (*guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā*), the two differences are regarded as the qualifiers of the highest universal<sup>21</sup>. This universal is simply called the qualified highest universal (*viśiṣṭasattā*) in Navya-nyāya<sup>22</sup>. The Sanskrit text which refers to the qualified highest universal purports that this universal resides only in a substance<sup>23</sup>. In order to make this purport possible, let us examine what kind of relation should be assumed between the highest universal (the qualified) and those differences (the qualifiers).

The highest universal (*sattā*), which is a generic property, resides only in a substance, a quality, and action. The difference from a quality resides in a substance, action, a generic property, a particular (*viśeṣa*), inherence, and absence<sup>24</sup>. The difference from action resides in a substance, a quality, a generic property, a particular, inherence, and absence. Hence, both the differences can exist in the highest universal which is a generic property. If 'the highest universal qualified by the two differences' means the highest universal wherein the two differences exist, then it can also exist in a substance, a quality, and action. This is because the highest universal exists in those three. This outcome does not agree with the

purport of the text, because according to the text, the qualified highest universal must reside in a substance only.

There is another possible way to interpret the connection among the highest universal and the two differences. Those three entities can altogether reside in a substance alone. In this case, the highest universal qualified by the two differences is nothing but a combination of the highest universal and the two differences. This interpretation of 'the qualified highest universal' accords with the purport of the Sanskrit text which refers to the qualified highest universal. Those three entities can have a substance for a common locus, so the relation among them is coexistence (*sāmānādhikarānya*). The relation of coexistence is indirect, because it includes two direct relations : (1) the relation between the highest universal and a substance (inherence) and (2) the relation between the substance and the difference (a self-linking relation).

4. The examination carried out above has demonstrated that the terms 'qualifier' and 'qualificand' are used freely in ontological analysis. When a direct relation exists between a qualifier and its qualificand, a qualifier can be the superstratum or substratum of its qualificand. Otherwise, a qualifier may be neither the superstratum nor substratum of its qualificand. An indirect relation may connect a qualifier with its qualificand as well. Therefore, it will be concluded that when one recognizes any type of relation between two entities, he can freely choose one of the two entities as the qualifier and the other as the qualificand. But in a particular context, one entity which enables one to discern another entity from others must be the qualifier. That another entity to be discerned must be the qualificand.

- 
- 1) S. D. Joshi, *Adjectives and Substantives as a Single Class in the Parts of Speech* (Poona : Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, 1966).
  - 2) D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series 40 (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 42-43; A. Uno, "Indo Ronrigaku ni okeru Genteishi no Yōhō" (The use of Determinants in Indian Logic), (*Monograph Series for the Institute of Oriental & Occidental Studies* 38, 1960), pp. 4-6; M. Tachikawa, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism*, Studies of Classical India 4 (Dordrecht : D. Rei-

(12)

Qualifier (*viśeṣana*) in Navya-nyāya Philosophy

- del Publishing Company, 1981), p. 4; V. N. Jha, "Language and Reality," (*Acta Indologica* 6, 1984), p. 75.
- 3) "abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ saṃnikarṣo ghaṭābhāvaved bhūta-  
lami atra cakṣuṣaṃyukte bhūtale ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣanatvāt." *Tarkasaṃgraha*,  
Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 55 (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research  
Institute, 1974), pp. 31-32.
- 4) See n. 3.
- 5) Dharendra Sharma, *The Negative Dialectics of India* (East Lansing, Mich. :  
Michigan State University, 1970), pp. 24-25.
- 6) This is pointed out by Uno, Tachikawa, and Jha. See the works referred to  
by n. 2.
- 7) A. Uno, "Shin-shōrigaku no Jutsugo (3)" (Technical Terms in Navya-nyāya  
[3]) (*The Hiroshima University Studies, Faculty of Letters* 39, 1979), p. 43.
- 8) These are the traditional divisions of relation in Navya-nyāya. See *Navya-  
nyāya-Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ*, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series 79 (Calcutta :  
Sanskrit College, 1973), p. 10.
- 9) *Navyanyāya-Bhāṣāpariccheda*, pp. 10-11.
- 10) The relation of inherence is accepted by Navya-nyāya in only five cases: (1)  
the whole and its parts, (2) a quality and a substance, (3) action and a sub-  
stance, (4) a generic property and a manifested entity (*vyakti*, i.e., a substance,  
a quality, and action), and (5) a particular and an eternal substance (i. e., an  
atom, space, time, direction, a soul, or mind). (*nityasambandhaḥ samavāyo  
'yutasiddhāvṛttiḥ. yayo dvavayor madhya ekam avināśyad aparāśritam evāva-  
tiṣṭhate tāv ayutasiddhau. avayavāvayavināu guṇaguṇināu kriyākriyāvantau  
jātivvyakti viśeṣanīyadravye ceti.*) *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 61.
- 11) B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental  
Series 46 (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 41-44.
- 12) *Navyanyāya-Bhāṣāpariccheda*, p. 13.
- 13) "tatratmani jñānaṃ prakāribhūya bhāṣate, jñāne ghaṭas tatra ghaṭatvam.  
yaḥ prakārah sa eva viśeṣaṇam ity ucyate." *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktavali*, Kashi  
Sanskrit Series 212 (Varanasi : Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1972), p. 196.
- 14) See n. 10.
- 15) "gaur iti viśiṣṭajñānaṃ viśeṣaṇajñānaṇanyam viśeṣaṇajñānatvad dāṇḍiti  
jñānavad ity anumānasya pramānatvāt." *Tarkatīpikā* (included in *Tarkasa-  
ṃgraha op. cit.*), p. 30.
- 16) Ingalls, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
- 17) See n. 3 and the following sentence "bhūtale ghaṭo nāstīty atra ghaṭābhā-  
vasya viśeṣyatvaṃ draṣṭavyam." *Tarkatīpikā* (included in *Tarkasaṃgraha, op.  
cit.*) p. 32.

- 18) "nilotpalam ityādāv abhedasambandhena nilapadārtha utpalapadārthe prakārah." *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, pp. 336-337.
- 19) See n. 13. In Navya-nyāya, an epistemic qualifier is quite often the superstratum of its qualificand. That *x* is the epistemic qualifier of *y* implies that *y* is recognized as the possessor of *x* (*x-vat*).
- 20) The relation of identity is traditionally classified into non-occurrence-exacting relation (*vr̥t̥tyānīyamakasambandha*). D. C. Guha, *Navya Nyāya System of Logic* (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Matilal Banarsidass, 1979), pp. 56-60. A non-occurrence-exacting relation is one through which one entity does not exist in or on another entity.
- 21) "itthañ ca idaṃ dravyaṃ guṇakarmānyatve sati sattvād ityādaṃ sattvādyad-hikaraṇagunādinīṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitve 'pi dravyatvāder nāvyaṅgiḥ. sādhanasya viśiṣṭasattāder guṇādāv avṛtteḥ." *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* (included in *Gadādhari*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 42 [Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1970]), p. 314. "... ayaṃ guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattāvān jāteḥ..." *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti*, p. 331.
- 22) See n. 21.
- 23) Raghunātha, the author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti*, thinks that the definition of *vyāpti* must apply to the probans of the inference '*idaṃ dravyaṃ guṇakarmānyatve sati sattvaḥ*'. See n. 21. This means that the inference is valid. Hence, the probans of this inference ('*guṇakarmānyatve sati sattā*' or '*guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā*') resides only in a substance which is the locus of the probandum (i.e., *dravyatva*).
- 24) The categories are only seven : substance, quality, action, generic property, particular, inherence, and absence, *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 2.
- \* I express my gratitude to Professor Vashishtha Narayan Jha, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, who read my manuscript of this article and gave me valuable suggestions. My thanks are due to Doctor Anne Feldhaus, Arizona State University, who rendered great help in improving my English.
- ⟨Key Words⟩ Navya-nyāya, viśeṣaṇa, viśeṣya.

(Assistant, Nagoya University, Ph. D.)