

STUDIES OF THE VAIŚEṢIKADARŚANA (I)

On the Vaiśeṣikasūtra III, i, 13

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Although it has been known to scholars of Indian philosophy that the interpretation of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* given in the *Upaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra⁽¹⁾ is, in not a few places, obviously strained and irrelevant, the inaccessibility to an older and more reliable commentary has hitherto prevented them from clarifying uncertainties in interpretation and determining the original meaning with respect to some of the sūtras. The circumstance was certainly bettered by the publication of two commentaries which precede the *Upaskāra* by centuries, namely, the *Vyākhyā* by an anonymous author⁽²⁾ and the *Vṛtti* by Candrānanda⁽³⁾. Especially, the latter facilitates our study of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* a great deal by providing a *sūtrapāṭha* far better than the one commented upon by Śaṅkaramiśra or any other accessible to us, and giving, in general, plain and acceptable explanations to the sūtras. Evidently, the author Candrānanda bases his explanations upon the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, and, to our regret, he scarcely makes reference to different views held by earlier commentators, whose works are known to us either by name only or through scanty fragments.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Edition utilized: *The Vaiśeṣika Darśana, with the Commentaries of Śaṅkara Miśra and Jayanārāyana Tarka Panchānana*, ed. by Pandita Jayanārāyana Tarka Panchānana, Bib. Ind., New Ser. 4 etc., Calcutta 1861. (Abbr. Ś)

(2) *Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda, with an Anonymous Commentary*, ed. by A. Thakur, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1957. (Abbr. M)

(3) *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya, Gaekwad's Oriental Ser., No. 136, Baroda 1961. (Abbr. C)

(4) The *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* and the *Bharadvājavṛtti* have long been known by name, cf. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 306; Ui, *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, according to the Daśapadārthaśāstra*, London 1917, pp. 13-15. The *Kaṇḍī*, the *Vākya*, the *Bhāṣya*, the *Ṭika* of Praśasta (=Praśastapāda?), and the *Ātreyaabhāṣya* (=Rāvaṇabhāṣya?) are found quoted in the *Nayacakra* and its commentary or in other sources, cf. Thakur, Introduction to C, pp. 10-16.

Under the circumstance that the relation of Praśastapāda to his Vaiśeṣika predecessors is not clear, we are to be refrained, in interpreting the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, from granting the unconditioned authority to the *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda, even though we admit its supremacy to the other extant commentaries. An alternative interpretation put on a certain sūtra by a later commentator might be more faithful to the original idea, possibly reflecting a pre-Praśastapāda view. What was the thought contained originally in a certain sūtra should be determined through a careful examination of all the extant commentaries and of some relevant materials which are often found in philosophical works of other schools.

There are, at least, four different interpretations put on VS, III, i, 13 : *ātmendriya-mano'rtha-saṁnikarṣād yaṁ niṣpadyate tad anyat*. Before taking up them for examination, I shall quote here VS, III, i, 1-14 with my translation to make comprehensible the relation of the sūtra in question to the preceding and following sūtras.⁽⁵⁾

1. *prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ*.

Sense-organs and objects are universally known.

2. *indriyārtha-prasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntaratve hetuḥ*.

The universal apprehension of sense-organs and objects is a cause [proving the existence] of something different from sense-organs and objects, [*viz.*, the soul as the apprehender].

3. *so 'napadeśaḥ*.

(Objection :) It (=the universal apprehension of sense-organs and objects) is not a cause [proving the existence of the soul. Since sense-organs themselves are recognized as apprehenders, there is no need for postulating the soul].

4. *kāraṇājñānāt*.

(5) I have followed the text given in C. The comparison of the *sūtrapāṭhas* in Ś, M and C is made in C, p. 97 ff. Ś was translated into English by N. Sinha in *The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda*, S. B. H., vol. VI, Allahabad 1923. Cf. B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika-System*, Amsterdam 1918, pp. 249-252, pp. 300-302; H. Ui, *Indo-Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, vol. III, Tokyo 1926, pp. 513-517.

(Reply :) [Sense-organs are unconscious,] because of the unconsciousness of [their] causes, [*i. e.*, the elements].

5. *kāryājñānāt.*

[The elements are unconscious,] because of the unconsciousness of [their] effects [other than sense-organs].

6. *ajñānāc ca.*

And because of the unconsciousness [of sense-organs and elements, the view recognizing sense-organs as apprehenders proves untenable].

7. *anya eva hetur ity anapadeśaḥ.*

(Objection :) The cause [stated in sūtra 2] is indeed different [from what is generally accepted as cause, inasmuch as the universal apprehension belongs to sense-organs and objects, but not to the soul]: therefore it is not a cause.

8. *saṃyogi, samavāyi, ekārthasamavāyi, virodhi ca. kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya. kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya. virodhy abhūtaṃ bhūtasya, bhūtaṃ abhūtasya, bhūtaṃ bhūtsaya.*

(Reply :) (1) That which is conjoined with *x*, (2) that which is inherent in *x*, (3) that which is inherent in the same thing in which *x* is inherent, and (4) that which is in contradiction to *x*, [are inferential marks of *x*]. [Sometimes] an effect, [*e. g.*, colour,] is the inferential mark of another effect, [touch,] and [sometimes] a cause, [*e. g.*, hand,] is [the inferential mark] of another cause, [foot,] [because of their co-inherence in the same thing, *i. e.*, a pot and the body respectively]. [Sometimes] that which has not taken place, [*e. g.*, rain,] is in contradiction to that which has taken place, [the conjunction of wind and cloud]; [sometimes] that which has taken place, [*e. g.*, rain,] is [in contradiction] to that which has not taken place, [the conjunction of wind and cloud]; [sometimes] that which has not taken place, [*e. g.*, dark colour of a pot,] is [in contradiction] to that which has not taken place, [the conjunction of the pot with fire]; [and sometimes] that which has taken place, [*e. g.*, an effect,] is [in contradiction] to that which has taken place, [the conjunction

between its causes].

9. *prasiddha-pūrvakatvād apadeśasya.*

[These inferential marks are recognized as causes,] because the preliminary requirement for a cause is that it is universally known.

10. *aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ.*

That which is contradictory to what is universally known is not a cause.

11. *asan saṁdigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ.*

That which is absent [in what is to be proved], and that which is dubious [in respect to its presence and absence in what is to be proved and what is contrary to it] are not [true] cause.

12. *viśāṇī tasmād aśvo, viśāṇī tasmād gaur iti ca.*

‘[It] possesses horns, therefore [it is] a horse’; ‘[It] possesses horns, therefore [it is] a cow’, —[these are the examples of contradictory and dubious or inconclusive causes].

13. *vide supra.*

Translation is reserved for discussions below.

14. *pravṛtti-nivṛtti ca pratyag-ātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam iti.*

Activity and cessation of activity seen in the body are inferential marks [of the soul] in other persons.

The explanations given to sūtra 13 are as follows:

Ś: From the contact of soul, sense-organ, mind and object, there arises, at all events, a cognition. That [cognition] is, with respect to the soul, an inferential mark ‘other than’ inadmissible, contradictory and inconclusive [inferential marks]; that means, [a] true [inferential mark]⁽⁶⁾.

M: Immediately after [examining] inference, [the *sūtrakāra*] describes perception: “(sūtra 13)”...That which arises from the [contact of soul, sense-organ, mind and object] is ‘other than ⟨that⟩’, *i. e.*, different from inference, because of [its] being an immediate awareness. The expression ‘other than ⟨that⟩’ means here ‘a cause of ⟨that⟩’; ‘perception’ is to be

(6) Ś, p. 161: *atmēndriyārtha-saṁnikarṣāt tāvaj jñānam utpadyate tac cātmani liṅgam asiddha-viruddhānaikāntikebhyo 'nyad anābhāsam ity arthaḥ.*

supplied.⁽⁷⁾

C: That effect which arises from the contact of the four factors and which is called 'cognition' is 'something other', *i. e.*, a different cause which proves [the existence of] the soul. [The proof may be set forth in the following syllogism:]

(Thesis) A cognition depends upon its inherent cause.

(Reason) Because [it is] an effect.

(Example) Like a pot.

[The inherent cause of cognition is nothing other than the soul.⁽⁸⁾]

⁽⁹⁾ PST: Whatever arises from a certain [cause] is 'different from' that [cause], as for example, a pot and the like [are different] from [their causes,] clay, etc. Likewise, cognition also arises from the soul and other factors [which are in contact with each other]: therefore it (=cognition) also is different from them (=the soul, etc.).

The word 'yad' is unanimously taken to imply a cognition, whereas 'anyat' is subjected to various interpretations: (Ś) a true inferential mark (*anābhāsam līngam*) in contradistinction to fallacious ones (*anapadeśa*) discussed in sūtras 10-12; (M) perception (*pratyakṣa*) as distinguished

(7) M, p. 37: *anumānānantaram pratyakṣam nirūpayati*: "(sūtra 13)"...*tasmād* (=ātmēndriya-mano-'rtha-saṁnikarṣād) *yaj jāyate tad-anyad anumānād vyatiriktam sākṣātkaratvat. tad-anyad ity atra tat-sādhanam pratyakṣam iti śeṣaḥ.*

(8) C, p. 27: *catuṣṭaya-saṁnikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānākhyam karyam tad anyad hetu-antaram ātma-jñāpakam astīti. jñānasya samavāyi-kāraṇāpekṣitvam karyatvād ghaṭavat.*

(9) The *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* of Jinendrabuddhi, Sde-dge ed., fol. 53a. 6, Pek. ed., fol. 59b. 8. The author refers to two alternative interpretations, of which the first one is quoted here. The second interpretation is identical with M. Skt. reconstruction of this passage by Jambuvijaya is as follows (cf. C, Appendix, p. 174¹⁻³): *yad yato niṣpadyate tat tato 'nyat, yathā mṛd-ader ghaṭādi. ātmā-dibhyo jñānam api tathā niṣpadyate, tasmāt tad api tebhyo 'nyat.* Ui's interpretation agrees with this, cf. *Indo-Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, p. 517. He seems to have adopted it from the *Candrakāntabhāṣya*, which was not accessible to me, cf. *The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 138, n. 2. VS, III, i, 13 is missing in the *Bharadvājajvṛttibhāṣya*.

from inference (*anumāna*), valid and invalid, treated in sūtras 8-12; (C) another cause proving the existence of the soul, in addition to the one mentioned in sūtra 2; (*PST*) a cognition as an effect distinct from its causes.

It is worth noting that the view recognizing, in concert with M, sūtra 13 as giving a definition of perception is referred to in a number of treatises, including the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga⁽¹⁰⁾. Since Dignāga lived prior to Praśastapāda⁽¹¹⁾, this view is acknowledged to have been set forth by a pre-Praśastapāda commentator. However, seeing that VS, III, i as a whole is intended to prove the existence of the soul, we can hardly accept this view. Although VS is not skilful in its arrangement of topics, there certainly is an order, which does not allow any arbitrary interpretation to be put on a sūtra. It is in chaps. VIII and IX that cognition in general is taken up for the subject matter. Perception of various types, inference (including the cognition derived from a word), recollection, dream, right and wrong cognitions, intuitive cognition of sages (*ṛṣi*), and vision of perfected ones (*siddha*) are explained one after another in these two chapters⁽¹²⁾. On the other hand, there is no reason for treating perception in chap. III, i, inasmuch as the soul cannot be perceived by an ordinary person except when it becomes the object of 'I'-consciousness

(10) *Pramāṇasamuccaya*vṛtti, Kanakavarman's version, Pek. ed., fol. 99b. 7-8, Vasudhararakṣita's version, Pek. ed., fol. 19a. 2=Sde-dge ed., fol. 19b. 1; *Yukti-dīpikā* (Calcutta Skt. Ser.), p. 39⁴⁷; *Dvādaśāra-Nayacakra* (ed. by Jambuvijaya, not yet published), p. 110¹; *Nyāyamañjarī* (Chowkh. Skt. Ser.), p. 100¹¹⁻¹².

(11) Cf. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, p. 31, n. 58; Frauwallner, Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstra, *Studia Indologica, Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel*, Bonn 1955, pp. 71-73.

(12) Since perception in respect to substance (and some of the attributes) was explained, in connection with the discussion on the imperceptibility of an atom, in IV, i, 6 et seq., chap. VIII begins with '*dravyeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam*', and proceeds to deal with perception of attribute and the other categories, determinate perception, perception of non-existence, and *yogic* perception. Then follows the explanation of inference, etc.

(*ahamkāra*), which VS treats in the following *āhnika* (III, ii, 9 *et seq.*).

The view acknowledging III, i, 13 as a definition of perception is based on the understanding that the preceding sūtras (III, i, 8–12) are meant for explaining inference. There is, however, in chap. IX, a sūtra defining inference: *asyēdam kāryam kāraṇam sambandhy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca laiṅgikam* (IX, 18), which is similar to but subtly differs from the first sentence in III, i, 8 (*vide supra*). As is remarked by Candrānanda, ‘*sambandhin*’ in the former stands for ‘*saṃyogin*’ in the latter, and ‘*kārya*’ and ‘*kāraṇa*’ represent ‘*samavāyin*’ in general, including the other sorts of *samavāyin* by implication. What constitutes an essential difference between the two sūtras is the expression ‘*asyēdam*’ at the beginning of IX, 18, which signifies the relation between an inferential mark (*liṅga*) and its possessor (*liṅgin*), indispensable for characterizing inferential cognition (*laiṅgikam jñānam*). It is thus to be understood that III, i, 8, which lacks ‘*asyēdam*’, is not intended to describe inference, but that it simply mentions a variety of inferential marks, thereby showing that sense-organs and objects which are known as *sambandhins* of an apprehender are inferential marks of the soul.

For these reasons, we cannot consider M as giving an appropriate interpretation to VS, III, i, 13. Nor can we accept the view referred to in PST, because it isolates the sūtra in question from the preceding and following sūtras. The distinction between cognition and its causes, *i. e.*, the soul and the other factors, has nothing to do with the proof for the existence of the soul. Possibly this view misrepresents the idea that cognition as an attribute proves the existence of its inherent cause which is distinct from cognition.

Ś and C are in agreement insofar as they both read in the sūtra the thought that cognition is a true inferential mark of the soul. Difference between them consists in that, while Ś relates sūtra 13 only with sūtras 10–12, C regards it as being in parallel with sūtra 2 for proving the existence of the soul. It seems necessary to consider here the reason why true and fallacious inferential marks were taken up for discussion. The

incentive which gave rise to the discussion was the objection raised by an opponent against the view that sense-organs and objects, which are universally known, are inferential marks of the soul. The opponent regarded them as fallacious inferential marks. Therefore the *sūtrakāra* elucidated the distinctive features of true inferential marks and of fallacious ones. Thus following the sequence of discussion up to sūtra 12, we find no need for breaking it in the middle. The conclusion to be drawn is nothing other than the reaffirmation of the view set forth in the first two sūtras : sense-organs and objects are recognized as true inferential marks of the soul, inasmuch as they are universally known and are conjoined with the soul. Sūtra 13 is then unforcedly understood as mentioning another inferential mark of the soul, *viz.*, cognition, which, being an attribute, is thought to inhere in a substance, *i. e.*, the soul. If we were to construe III, i, 13 in accordance with Ś, we would have to admit that the discussion as to whether sense-organs and objects are inferential marks of the soul or not was brought to the conclusion at sūtra 9, since III, i, 13 is inseparable from sūtras 10–12 on the one hand, and deals on the other hand a new topic. The break in discussion at sūtra 9 seems unnatural, because it would make the mentioning of fallacious inferential marks redundant. Also the expression ‘other than fallacious inferential marks’ appears clumsy, for the explanation of true inferential marks just precedes that of fallacious ones. Taking these points in view, we may set aside Ś and find in C the most acceptable interpretation of III, i, 13.

So far we have advanced our discussion under the supposition that sūtra 2 represents the Vaiśeṣika *siddhānta*. However, Candrakānta, a modern commentator, regarded sūtras 1–2 as the opponents’s statement and sūtra 3 as the *siddhāntin*’s objection to it. H. Ui accepted this view of Candrakānta’s, and conjectured that the opponent was a Sāṃkhya, perceiving in sūtra 2 the similarity to the Sāṃkhya argument for proving the existence of the soul (*puruṣa*) as expressed in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* with the phrase ‘*saṃghāta-parārthatvāt*’ (k. 17: [The soul exists,] because composites [are seen to] serve the purpose of something other [than

their components⁽¹³⁾]]. The idea contained in this brief expression in the *Kārikā* is explained by the Sāṃkhya commentators as follows: for example, a bed, which is the composite of pieces of wood, does not serve the purpose of its components, but it is meant for a person who lies on it; likewise, the body as the composite of sense-organs, etc. (or of five elements,) serves the purpose of something other than its components, that is, the soul. Ui conceives that 'indriya' and 'artha' in VS, III, i, 2 stand for 'saṃghāta' in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. But this seems unlikely, inasmuch as sense-organs are recognized as components of the body, but not as composites. It is improbable either that bed, chariot, house, etc., should be implied by the word 'artha', because they are mentioned by the Sāṃkhyas as examples of composite, but not as objects of sense-organs.

Ś, M and C are unanimous in regarding sūtras 1-2 as the *siddhātī*'s proof of the existence of the soul, but they put interpretation on these sūtras in different manners as summarized below:⁽¹⁵⁾

(13) Cf. Ui, *Vaiś. Phil.*, p. 137, n. 2; ditto, *Indo-Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, III, pp. 513-516.

(14) The commentaries differ from each other slightly, without effecting any essential discordance. The *Yuktidīpikā*, the *Maṭharavṛtti* and the *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* are in agreement in explaining that the composite which serves the purpose of the soul is the body (*śarīra*). In place of the body, the *Tattva-kaumudī* mentions the primordial matter and its effects as the composites of the three *guṇas*.

(15) Ś, p. 140: ...*tathā hi prasiddhiḥ kvacid āsṛitā, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat, guṇatvād vā, kriyatvād vā. sa ca prasiddhiḥ karaṇa-janyā, kriyatvāt, chidi-kriyāvat. yac ca prasiddheḥ karaṇam tad indriyam tac ca kartṛ-prayojyam, karaṇatvāt, vāsyādīvat. tathā yatrēyam prasiddhir āsṛitā, yaḥ ghrāṇādīnām karaṇānām prayoktā sa ātmā.*

M, p. 34: *indriyārtha-prasiddhir iti dharmiṇi kvacid āsṛitatvam sādhyam, kāryatva-guṇatvādāyaś ca hetava iti tātparyam. prayogas tu—pratitih kvacid āsṛitā, kāryatvāt, guṇatvāc ca, rūpavad iti. śarīra-tad-avaśyavā na pratiter āśrayāḥ, gandhavattvāśrayatvāt, rūpavattvāt, sparsavattvāt, ghaṭavat. nēndriyaṇi pratiter āśrayāḥ, karaṇatvāt, kuṭhāravat...*

C, p. 25: *grahyaṇām arthānām śabdādīnām yēyam prasiddhiḥ tayā ca śrotrā-*

Ś₁ and M: The universal apprehension depends upon something. Because it is an effect (/ an attribute / an action). Like a pot (/ colour / act of cutting)⁽¹⁶⁾. Neither body and its constituents nor sense-organs can be the seat of the universal apprehension, because they are considered respectively as material products which are unconscious and as instruments of apprehension to be used by somebody. Therefore, that which is the seat of universal apprehension must be something different from them, namely, the soul.

Ś₂ and C: From the universal apprehension of objects, one can infer the existence of the instruments of apprehension, *i. e.*, sense-organs. The instruments of apprehension must be used by a certain agent, just as an axe as the instrument of cutting down a tree is used by a wood-cutter. The agent who uses sense-organs as the instruments of apprehending objects is nothing other than the soul.

These two interpretations are found to be based upon the *Praśasta-pādabhāṣya*⁽¹⁷⁾. Of these two, the first is virtually identical with C on VS, III, i, 13, which we have admitted as most acceptable. As it is unreasonable

dinām karaṇānām, anayā indriyārtha-prasiddhyā ebhyo grāhya-grahanebhyā indriyārthebhyah paro grahitā ātmā anumīyate.

Two alternative interpretations are given in Ś, which I have distinguished from each other by Ś₁ and Ś₂.

(16) Example corresponding to the third alternative of Reason is not mentioned in the texts.

(17) *PBh* (Chowkh. Skt. Ser.), p. 360¹⁻⁴ (=Ś₂ and C): *tasya (=ātmanah) sau-kṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādy-upalabdhy-anumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate, vāsyādinām iva karaṇānām kartr-prayojyatva-darśanāt. ibid., p. 360⁴⁻¹¹ (=Ś₁ and M): śabdādiṣu prasiddhya ca prasadhako 'numīyate. na śarirēndriya-mānasam, ajñatvāt. na śarirasya caitanyam ghaṭādivat bhūta-kāryatvāt, mṛte cāsamābhavāt. nēndriyānām karaṇatvāt, upahateṣu viśayāsam-nidhye cānumṛti-darśanāt. nāpi manasaḥ karaṇāntarānapekṣitve yugapad ālocana-smṛti-prasaṅgāt, svayam karaṇa-bhāvāc ca. pariśeṣād ātma-kāryatvāt tenātmā samadhigamīyate.*

Faddegon did not make distinction between these two types of proof, cf. *op. cit.*, p. 528. U_i made no reference to the above-cited passages of *PBh*.

to expect in VS the same reasoning being set forth twice with different wordings, we are inclined to consider the second interpretation to be more appropriate to sūtras 1-2.

The first interpretation, which is put forward by taking the word 'prasiddhi' in the sense of 'cognition', is perhaps intended to make the proof of the soul fit to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of 'inherence' (*samavāya*) between substance and attribute. Cognition is one of the attributes peculiar to the soul, and therefore it is recognized as an inferential mark of the soul. However, attention should be paid to VS, III, ii, 4 which mentions, besides the attributes peculiar to the soul, the following as inferential marks of the soul: the breathing out and in, the opening and closing of the eyes, life, motion of the mind, and affectio of another sense-organ [than the one on which the impression is made]⁽¹⁸⁾. Activity and cessation of activity seen in the body (III, i, 14) are also to be added to the above-mentioned. All these are not inhered in the soul. In respect to these inferential marks of the soul, Praśastapāda gives the following explanation: —“From activity and cessation of activity, which reside in the body and which has the capacity of obtaining desirable objects and averting undesirable objects, we infer [the existence of] a superintendent (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) of the body who has volition, just as [we infer the existence of] a charioteer from the motion of the chariot. Also from the breathing out and so on,” we infer the existence of the superintendent who has volition to change the direction of the wind in the body, to open and close the eyes, to grow the body and cure it of wound, to relate the mind with the sense-organ corresponding to the intended object, and to identify the object of one sense with that of another.⁽¹⁹⁾ The thought that the soul superintends body, sense-organs, mind and so on may be traced back to

(18) VS, III, ii, 4: *prāṇāpāna-nimeṣḍanmeṣa-jitvana-manogatīndiyāntara-vikārāḥ sukha-duḥkhe icchā-dveṣau prayatnāś cēty ātma-līṅgāni*.

(19) PBh, p. 360: *śarīra-samavāyinibhyāṃ ca hitāhita-prāpti-parihāra-yogyābhyāṃ pravṛtti-nivṛttibhyāṃ ratha-karmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vighrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate. prāṇādibhiścēti...*

the famous parable of the soul in a chariot in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, III, 3-4, and perhaps reflects the primitive notion of the soul that was carried through from the Vedic ages and sometimes represented as a thumb-measured person dwelling in man's heart.⁽²⁰⁾ In the *Mahābhārata* we come across some verses in which the soul is characterized as 'superintender'⁽²¹⁾ (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*). Thus we may understand that the soul theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is rooted in the archaic notion of the soul.

We have now enough reason to accept the second interpretation given above on VS, III, i, 1-2. There must be in the body a superintender, who, at his will, uses sense-organs as the instruments to apprehend objects. Sense-organs which are inferred from the fact that objects are universally known proves as positively the existence of the soul as do the breathing out and in and so on. At the beginning of the section of 'examination of the soul' (*ātma-parīkṣā*), the *Nyāyabhāṣya* takes up the problem as to whether instrument and agent stand in the relation of part and whole, as in the case of a tree standing *with* its root, or in the relation between two separate things, as in the case of a man cutting down a tree *with* his axe.⁽²²⁾ This also may indicate that sense-organs as the 'instruments' to be used by the soul, but not cognition as an 'attribute' of the soul, was conceived of as inferential marks of the soul in VS, III, i, 1-2.

The relation between instrument (*karaṇa*) and agent (*kartr*) is not that of 'inherence' (*samavāya*). As instrument and agent are two separate things, they come to be related with each other through 'conjunction' (*saṁyoga*). Both that which is conjoined with *x* (*saṁyogin*) and that which is inherent in *x* (*samavāyin*) are recognized as inferential marks of *x* in VS, III, i, 8. However, while the latter never fails to prove *x*, the former is not always a true inferential mark of *x*, inasmuch as it

(20) Cf. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, 3 und 4 Aufl., Stuttgart und Berlin 1923, pp. 524-525; Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, II. Bd., p. 62.

(21) Cf. *MBh* (Critical ed.), XII, 294, 35-36; 204, 8. In XIV, 51, 2 (Calcutta ed.), the mind (*manas*) is called the 'superintender'.

(22) Cf. *NBh*, introd. to NS, III, i, 1.

can also be conjoined with *y*. It was perhaps for this reason that some commentators tried to interpret VS, III, i, 1-2 as mentioning a *samavāyin* of the soul for proving its existence. Candrānanda also seems to have been tempted to do so. After giving his explanations to III, i, 8, he states: "Therefore, here, the instrumentality and the objecthood of universally known sense-organs and objects, which are inherent [in the soul], are inferential marks of the soul." But, he accepts the objection which denies their inherence in the soul, and then sets forth the alternative statement: "Sense-organs are to be used by an agent. Because they are instruments. Like an axe and the like."⁽²³⁾

We have come to the conclusion that VS, III, i, 2 was originally intended to infer the soul from its instruments, which, in their turn, are inferred from the apprehension of objects. This conclusion allows us to reconfirm our interpretation of VS, III, i, 13: "That which arises from the contact of soul, sense-organ, mind and object, [*i. e.*, cognition,] is something other [than what has been stated in sūtra 2, that is, another cause proving the existence of the soul]."

(23) C on VS, III, i, 8; ...*tasmād iha prasiddhānām indriyārthanām karaṇatā karmatā ca samavāyini ātma-līṅgam. na te ātmani samavāyini iti cet, evam etat. anyathā tu prayogaḥ—indriyāṇi karṭṛ-prayojyāni, karaṇatvāt, vāsyādivad iti.*