THREE KINDS OF INFERENCES IN THE COMMENTARIES ON SĀMKHYAKĀRIKĀ (PART I)

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ABBREVIATIONS

BL.	H. Ui: Bukkyo Ronrigaku (Buddhist Logic, in Japanese) 1944, Tokyo.
Cand.	Candrikā
CS.	Carakasaṁhitā
CSS.	Carakasaṁhitā Sūtrasthāna
GBh.	Gauḍapādabhāṣya
JM.	Jayamaṅgalā
MBh.	Patañjali: Mahābhāṣya
MV.	Māṭharavṛtti
MVP.	Mahāvyutpatti
NS.	Nyāyasūtra
NSBh.	Nyāyabhāṣya
PC.	Paramārtha's Chinese version of the commentary on Sāṁkhya-kārikā
Śaṅkara ad BS.	Śaṅkara: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
SK.	Sāṁkhyakārikā
SV.	Sāṁkhyavṛttiḥ(An unpublished commentary on Sāṁkhyakārikā)*

* SV. is one of such early commentaries on SK. as Suvarṇasaptati and MV. and GBh. SV. may be, the author of the present article supposes,a later work than Suvarṇasaptati (on which Paramārtha's Chinese version is basing), since SV. rejects seven means of knowledge following the similar way as seen in Yd. and MV. but on the other hand Suvarṇasaptati seems to rejects only six means and this increase of the number of the rejected means from six to seven in Yd., MV. and SV. can be supposed as the sign of the later addition and accordingly as the sign of their being later than Suvarṇasaptati.

UH.　　　　方便心論（Upāyahrdayaśāstra）

Yd.　　　　Yuktidīpikā

I. *On anumāna in Carakasaṁhitā Sūtrasthāna 11.*

Introduction

The logical portion in the theory of Nyāya shool is considered to have been composed by collecting and systematizing the theories of the logicians which have appeared in CS. & UH. Hence, the Nyāya school is considered to have been established after CS. & UH. in ca. 100–150 A. D.[1]

The time of composition of NS. can not be before 150–250 A. D. that is Nāgārjuna's period; therefore it is considered to be of the period between ca. 300–350 A. D. Vātsyāyana, author of NSBh., belonging to 350–400 A. D.[2]

Anumāna in CSS. can be properly examined in comparison with the inferences in NS., NSBh., and PC.

The objects to be inferred in CSS.

*The real and the unreal (saccāsacca) can be inferred.[3]

The unreal can include not only the past and the future but also the mirage etc.[4]

But it is not clear whether exclusively the past and the future are

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（1）　BL. p. 78.　　（2）　BL. pp. 78–79.

（3）　dvividham eva khalu sarvaṁ saccāsacca; tasya caturdhāparīkṣā……āptopadeśah, pratyakṣam, anumānaṁ, yuktiśceti //17// Text of CS. ed. by Vaidya Jādavaji Trikamji Āchārya, Bombay, 1941 is used. eṣā parīkṣā nāstyanyā yayā sarvaṁ parīkṣyate/ parīkṣyaṁ sadasccaivaṁ tayā cāsti punarbhavah //26//

（4）　The unreal as mirage etc. is seen in (MBh. 4-1-3),, asattu mrgatrṣṇāvat// ……, "& in (Yuktidīpikā 28 a)" ucyate……prativiṣayagrahaṇam asadvyudāsārtham// adhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam itīyaty ucyamāne mrgatrṣṇikā' lātacakragandharvanagarādiṣu yo'dhyavasāyas tad dṛṣṭam iti syāt." There is an article investigating on the real & the unreal through the history of Buddhist Philosophies. That is "Kogen Mizuno: On Paññatti (Skt. Prajñapti), (Studies in Indology and Buddhology, Presented in Honour of Professor Gisho Nakano on the occasion of his Seventieth Birthday; October 5, 1969, Koyasan University, pp. 31–51. Through his work we can also see an attituds of mind, which thinks the past and the future and so on as unreal, in some Buddhist texts, (viz. yogācārabhūmi and 成實論).

meant by the unreal (as in NSBh.[5]) or not.

*The objects in the three times are inferred[6]; and there are three inferences, which, according to Cakrapāṇidatta's commentary, can be characterized by causality and non-causality.

Comparison with others.

The oldest view of Nyāya-school on the three inferences can indicate that the objects at three times are inferred from the present things.[7] The three objects can be observed in the order of *past, future,* and *present.*[8]

In NSBh. on 1–1–5, the three inferences are explained in two ways; and one of the two is standing on causality and will be discussed in this article, but the other not.

Apart from these two explanations by examples, the two ways of classifying the objects of inference——by *real and unreal* and by *the three times*——are mentioned together in NSBh. 1–1–5, and past and future are unreal.

This order of arrangement of the unreal, viz. *past and future,* concords with that observed in the three inferences of the oldest view of Nyāya-school observed in NS., therefore this may be the old way of classification preserved in NSBh.

But if the examples of inferences by causality in NSBh. are classified by the three times also, this old order *past and future* is not observed and replaced by another order as *future and past,* since the classification by causality is much more powerful than the one based upon the old order of arrangement of the three times.

Table of the order of time to which the inferred objects belong. (Observed through the examples but not through the definition).

(5)   asacca khalv atītamanāgataṁ ceti. (NSBh. 1–1–5)

(6)   Each member of pramāṇa in CSS., except pratyakṣa, can work at three times. See CSS. 18, 21–22, 25. (21–22 for the inferences.)

(7)   NS. 1–1–5.

(8)   BL. pp. 83–84; NS. (and NSBh.) 2–1–38 and 39.

The oldest view in NS.	NSBh. (as found in Example)	
past	future (inference of effect from cause)	pūrvavat
future	past (inference of cause from effect)	śesavat
present	present	sāmānyato drsta

Table of the objects of inference and sense-perception described in NSBh. on 1–1–5, (as found in Definition)

The objects to be inferred—(=trikāla-yuktāvarthāḥ).
- The real
- The unreal—
  - past objects
  - future objects

The object of sense-perception. ——The real

The old way of classification preserved in NSBh. can be found in respect of its similarity in the inference in CSS. since the objects of inference in CSS. are not only especially connected with the three times[9] but also classified as the real and the unreal like that in NSBh.

The old order of arrangement of the three times as preserved in NSBh. is found *even in verses* of CSS. without essential difference. It may be observed that each object of the inferences in the verses is mentioned according to such an order as the real (the present) and the unreal (the past and the future); and each of them in NS. is mentioned according to such an order as the unreal (the past and the future) and Inferences in PC. are of the same nature as those in NSBh.[10]

They are accompanied by the description[11] which concords with that

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(9) pratyakṣapūrvaṁ trividhaṁ trikālañcānumīyate/ yahnirnigūḍho dhūmena maithunaṁ garbhadarśanāt /21/ evaṁ vyavasyantyatītaṁ bījāt phalam anāga tam/ dṛṣṭvā bījāt phalaṁ jātam ihaiva sadṛśaṁ budhāḥ /22/

(10) H. Ui: Studies in Indian Philosophy, Vol. V. (Tokyo, 1929) p. 291.

(11) 能別此三境及三世. Cp. SK. 33, (trikālam＝三世塵).

the real (the present).

Table of concordance of the classifications:

CSS.	NS.	NSBh.(as found in Example)

in CSS——"trividhaṁ trikālaṁca." But strictly spsaking they can not be of the same nature as those of CSS., since the difference between the inferences in NSBh., with which those of PC. are compared, and those in CSS. is observed above.

Therefore the description on the inferences in CSS. mentioned above can not be an interpolation of later time by Dṛḍhabala in spite of its clear concordance on „trividhaṁ trikālaṁca" with PC.

II. *Two types in classification of inferences in the commentaries on SK.*
Type-A.

In I it is pointed out that, concerning the inferences called pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmanyatodṛṣṭa, the inferences of PC. and those in NSBh. are of the same nature from the view points of causality & time.

From the view point of causality or time, the parallels are found in JM. & Cand. (on Kā. 5).

The objects of the inferences in JM. ara as follws : ——

Pūrvavat : The object in future (Inference of the rain from the raised cloud)

Śeṣavat : The object in past (Inference of the rain from the muddy water of the river)

Sāmānyato

dṛṣṭa : The object at present (Inference of the movement of the sun, which changes its place, from the fact that as Devadatta moves, he arrives at another place)

The examples shown in JM. are of the same kind as those in NSBh., therefore inspite of the absence of the description of causality, the inferences in JM. can be considered as of the same nature as those in NSBh.

The objects of the inferences in Candrikā are as follows :——

Pūrvavat : Inference of *effect* by cause

Śeṣavat : Interence of *cause* by effect

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa :

Inference of the thing of whidh the characteristic is other than that of the causality.

Although there is no reference to the classification by time, they are on the same line as the inferences of NSBh.; since they are classified according to whether they are the inferences based upon causality or not, and usage of the standard of causality for classifying the objects of the inferences is common to both NSBh. & Cand.

Type-B.

Among the commentaries on SK., SV., GBh. and MV. have the common aspect concerning the examples of three kinds of inferences.

The common examples for all of SV., GBh. and MV., the uncommon removed here, are as follows : ——

pūrvavat : Inference of the rain from the raised cloud.

śeṣavat : Inference of the saline taste of other sea water from tasting one drop of the sea water.

sāmānyato dṛṣṭa : It is known from seeing the mango trees in bloom at one place that the mango trees have bloomed at the other place too.

(For śeṣavat, all these three commentaries mention the example of the taste of sea water only.)

On the difference between Type A and Type B.

Type A is similar to the three kinds of inferences in CSS. mentioned at I and it can be supposed that the former has developed from such source as CSS. that has the inferences mentioned at I.

How Type A differs from Type B is that the example of śeṣavat given by the latter can not be explained by the classifying principle——made from the view point of causality and three times——which is observed in the examples indicated as belonging to the former, therefore the latter can not be classified so well by this principle as the former.

On the three kinds of inference in Yd.

A series of the examples on the three kinds of inferences in Yd. can be known to belong to Type A, and the example of śeṣavat belonging to Type B is included in sāmānyatodṛṣṭa in Yd. together with the example of the inference that taking a lump of boiled rice out of a cooking vessel, one can reason the rest being boiled, and also together with some other examples.

We can find an example, which is not basing on the classifying principle mentioned above, among some examples on śeṣavat inference. It is found in the description that it is śeṣavat to know the moon rising or the sun rising when the sky is coloured.

(To be continued.)

Correction : Vol. 13, No. 2, p. (57), 1. 3 from bottom, of this Journal. Correct Prof. M. Hattori to Prof. A. Uno.