

Bhavya's Critique of the Vaiśeṣika Theory of Liberation in the *Tarkajvālā*

Huanhuan He

Among the eleven chapters of the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ), not much scholarly work has been published on Chapter 7, “Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścayā” (TJ-V). This is probably due to the fact that the Sanskrit manuscript of the *mūla* text, *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK), lacks the corresponding folio (fol.18), which must have covered almost all the *kārikās* of this chapter, 29 in total. Only the last two *kārikās* are preserved in Sanskrit (19a1).¹ Apart from these, we have no choice but to rely on the Tibetan translations of the MHK and TJ.

1

The structure of the TJ-V may be shown in the following synopsis:

- I. Introduction: The theories of the Vaiśeṣika (D Dza 242a7–244a6)²
 - I.1. The characteristics of *ātman* (242a7–242b2)
 - I.2. The theory of six *padārthas* (242b2–243b4)
 - I.3. The theory of liberation (243b4–244a6)**
- II. *Pūrvapakṣa*: The Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation (k.1, 244a6–244b2)**
- III. *Uttarapakṣa*: Critique of the theories of the Vaiśeṣika (kk.2–28, 244b2–250a4)
 - III.1. Critique of the relationship between attributes, *manas*, and *ātman* (kk.2–14, 244b2–247a1)
 - III.2. Critique of the existence of *ātman* (kk.15–22, 247a1–248b7)
 - III.3. Critique of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation (kk.23–28, 248b7–250a4)**
- IV. Conclusion: The Vaiśeṣika view is erroneous (k.29, 250a4–251a1)

From the above synopsis, it can be seen that Bhavya's primary aim was to critique the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation by refuting the theories of *ātman* and six *padārthas* as propounded in Vaiśeṣika works. How did Bhavya understand the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation? Did he base his description of this theory exclusively on the VS? Was he influenced by other Vaiśeṣika works such as the PDS? Did he deliberately draw on Buddhist teachings to distort the Vaiśeṣika theory in order to facilitate his arguments? In this paper, I intend to provide some preliminary answers to these questions, with special attention being paid to the sources of the Vaiśeṣika thought handed down by Bhavya in the *pūrvapakṣa* (II) and his critique given in the *uttarapakṣa* (III.3).

¹ Jiang [1991], p.114.

² Concerning the structure of the TJ-V, the most striking feature is that, preceding the first *kārikā*, there is a lengthy paragraph describing the theories of the Vaiśeṣika. This paragraph, which hereafter is tentatively referred to as the “introduction”, is independent of the main text (*pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*) and should not be regarded as part of the *pūrvapakṣa*.

Before embarking on the topic in question, let me reiterate the conclusions of my previous discussion about the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation in the introduction of the TJ-V (I.3).³ The description of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation covers two-fifths of the entire introduction. Bhavya's description here is much more detailed and richer than that in Section 24 of Chapter 8 of the PDS (*Samśārāpavargaprakaraṇa*), which had been regarded as the most comprehensive text on the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation before attention was drawn to the TJ-V.

Bhavya's definition of liberation contains four main points: (1) the non-existence of *adr̥ṣṭa* (*dharma* and *adharmā*); (2) the non-combination of *ātman* and *manas*, namely, the non-existence of life (*jīva*); (3) the non-existence of the rebirth of bodies; and (4) the attainment of a state resembling “the light of a butter lamp which is about to go out”. Here, Bhavya pays close attention to the theory of *adr̥ṣṭa* and the relationship between *ātman* and *manas*. The influence of Candrānanda's commentary is discernible.⁴

The method to attain liberation as reported by Bhavya also includes four main points: (1) the preventing of the arising of future *dharma* and *adharmā*; (2) the extinguishing of previous *dharma* and *adharmā*; (3) the full understanding of the ultimate *ātman*; and (4) the full understanding of the truth of the six *padārthas*.

Bhavya's understanding of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation is mainly derived from the VS (VS.5-2-20, 6-2-2~3, 6-2-12~18 in VS-C). It covers most of the verses related to liberation in the VS. Furthermore, it is almost free of Buddhist coloring.

Finally, I also argue that it is inappropriate to trace the source of the TJ-V to the PDS, despite the fact that similar similes appear in both texts.⁵ Nor is it adequate to take Bhavya as the *terminus ad quem* of the dates of Praśastapāda.⁶ One strong piece of evidence supporting the above conclusion is that Bhavya's understanding of *manas* as an important factor in the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation is attested in the VS and VS-C, but missing in the PDS. Bhavya did not adopt the detailed and clear explanation of *dharma* and *adharmā* in the PDS either, which had a far-reaching influence on later Vaiśeṣika thought and is much better known than that of the VS. The Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation described in the introduction of the TJ-V closely agrees with that in the VS-C. It is conceivable that Bhavya used as his source some unknown early commentaries similar to the VS-C.

³ See He [2010].

⁴ See VS-C ad 5-2-20, p.43: *evaṃ rūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādinimittasyādr̥ṣṭasyābhāve jīvanākhyasyātmanāḥ saṃyogasyābhāvo 'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ//*

⁵ The attestation of two similes, “the light of a butter lamp which is about to go out” and “a fire without fuel”, seemingly shows that Bhavya might have had access to the PDS.

⁶ Professors Miyasaka and Hattori have suggested that the TJ-V was deeply influenced by the PDS, and both took Bhavya's dates as the *terminus ad quem* of Praśastapāda's dates. Cf. Miyasaka [1954a], pp.37–39.; [1954b], p.127; [1952], pp.175–176.; Hattori [1994], p.706.

3

There is only one *kārikā* (k.1) in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the TJ-V. All of its four *pādas* are concerned with liberation. According to the introductory prose passage placed before the *kārikā*, the Master Bhavya summarized in brief the truth (*de kho na nyid = tattva*) of Vaiśeṣika. K.1 reads:

When a *yogin* cuts off the attributes of *ātman* such as cognition (*buddhi*), etc., (a)
uproots [merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharmā*)], (b)
and *ātman* stays in the mind (*manas*), (c)
there is liberation as regarded by Vaiśeṣika. (d) ⁷

The first three *pādas* of k.1 contain three prerequisites of liberation, while the last *pāda* confirms that the fulfillment of these three prerequisites leads to liberation.

After reading through the TJ-V, we find that kk.23–28 in the *uttarapakṣa* critique k.1 *pāda* by *pāda*. Namely, k.23 critiques *pāda* (a), k.25 critiques *pāda* (b), kk.24 and 26 critique *pāda* (c), and k.27 critiques *pāda* (d).

In order to fully understand Bhavya's description of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation, we shall discuss k.1 in conjunction with Bhavya's criticism of it.

3.1 *Pāda* (a)

Ātman is the eighth entity (*dravya*) in the *padārtha* system of Vaiśeṣika. Bhavya gives the complete list of *ātman*'s attributes in the commentary on k.1:

“Cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, aversion, effort, [merit,] demerit, knowledge, and the conditioned (*'dus byas*) are the nine attributes of *ātman*.” ⁸

All five Tibetan versions of the TJ-V end with the predicate “are the nine attributes of *ātman*”; however, P, N, and G add “*dharma*” to the list, thus making the number of attributes ten. In the commentary on k.23 of the TJ-V, all five versions list ten attributes: “Cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, aversion, effort, demerit, merit, knowledge, and mental impression.” ⁹

The VS, however, ascribes only six attributes to *ātman* of all 17 in total.¹⁰ On the other hand, Candrānanda listed eight attributes of *ātman* in his commentary on VS.3-2-17: “Cogni-

⁷ blo sogs bdag gi yon tan bcad// drungs (N drung) nas phyung ba'i rnal 'byor pa// yid la bdag ces gnas pa ni// bye brag pa yis (PK NK GK yi) thar par shes// (PNG om.//) (D 244a6–a7; P 274b7).

⁸ blo dang/ bde ba dang/ sdug bsngal ba dang/ 'dod pa dang/ zhe sdang ba (PNG om. ba) dang/ 'bad pa dang/ chos dang/ (DC om. chos dang/) chos ma yin pa dang/ shes pa dang/ 'dus byas zhes bya ba ni bdag gi yon tan dgu'o// (D 244a7–b1; P 274b7–b8).

⁹ blo dang bde ba dang/ sdug bsngal dang/ 'dod pa dang/ zhe sdang dang/ 'bad pa dang/ chos ma yin pa dang/ chos dang/ (PNG om. /) shes pa dang/ (PNG om./) byas pa'i shugs zhes bya ba bdag gi yon tan kun ni chos can no// (D 248b7–249a1; P 280a7–a8).

¹⁰ VS.3-2-4 in VS-C, p.28: prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogātīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni//; VS.1-1-5 in VS-C, p.5: rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṅkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ//

tion, pleasure, suffering, desire, aversion, effort, *adr̥ṣṭa*, and mental impression.”¹¹ They can be counted as nine if we take “*adr̥ṣṭa*” as “*dharma* and *adharmā*”. Both the PDS and DP listed 14 attributes of *ātman*: “Cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression, number, measure, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction,”¹² of which the first nine are proper only to *ātman*.

Dharmapāla, a contemporary of Bhavya, reported nine attributes of *ātman* in his *Dacheng guang bailun shilun* 大乘廣百論釋論: “These are the nine special attributes of *ātman*: suffering, pleasure, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression, and knowledge.”¹³

According to the above material, we can infer that the “conditioned (*'dus byas = saṃskṛta*)” in Bhavya’s list is probably a misinterpretation of “mental impression (*saṃskāra = 'du byed = byas pa'i shugs*¹⁴)”, and “*shes pa = jñāna*” may be a redundant repetition of “*blo = buddhi*”. Both D and C may have dropped “*dharma*”. The list of *ātman*’s attributes in the commentary on k.1, therefore, most closely agrees with that in the *Dacheng guang bailun shilun*, which includes “cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and mental impression”, nine in total.

The commentary on k.1 then explains *pāda* (a) as follows:

“Cutting off these (attributes of *ātman*) means that [the attributes] will not arise in the future and those accumulated are extinguished.”¹⁵

This shows that “cognition” and the other nine (or eight) attributes belong to *ātman*. Before *ātman* attains liberation, all the attributes must be cut off from it. In other words, the already accumulated attributes must be distinguished and those arising in the future must be stopped. Only in this way can *ātman* attain liberation, otherwise the attributes will bring about the endless transmigration of *ātman*.

The importance of cutting off the attributes from *ātman* is not mentioned in the VS and PDS. In the VS-C, however, there is a statement similar to *pāda* (a) of k.1: “The ultimate bliss is liberation, which has the nature of the non-existence of particular attributes related to *ātman*.”¹⁶

Furthermore, we find an almost identical statement in the VS-A: “Cutting off all the

¹¹ VS-C ad 3-2-17, p.31: tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadr̥ṣṭasaṃskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ//

¹² PDS, p.70: tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṃkhyā-parimāṇapr̥thaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ//; DP: 我由幾德說名有德？謂由十四：何者十四？一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離、六覺、七樂、八苦、九欲、十瞋、十一勤勇、十二法、十三非法、十四行 (T54, No. 2138, p.1264b13–b16).

¹³ 我不共德略有九種：一苦、二樂、三貪、四瞋、五勤勇、六法、七非法、八行、九智 (T30, No. 1571, p.195b15–b17).

¹⁴ Cf. TJ-V ad k.23 and Mvy. 4618.

¹⁵ de dag gi bcad pa ni (N na) ma 'ongas ba na mi 'byung ba dang/ bsags pa 'gog pa'o// (D 244b1; P 274b8–275a1).

¹⁶ Cf. VS-C ad 1-1-2, p.2: niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ//

particular attributes of *ātman* is liberation.”¹⁷ The fact that this work was written much later than the TJ-V¹⁸ leads us to the inference that Bhavya had at his disposal some early Vaiśeṣika works that have not come down to us.

Bhavya critiqued *pāda* (a) in k.23 of the TJ-V as follows:

Ātman cannot be apart from
attributes such as cognition, suffering, pleasure, and so forth,
because [they] are the attributes [of *ātman*], just like number [as an attribute of *ātman*].
Therefore, *ātman* without attributes does not exist.¹⁹

The first three *pādas* of k.23 form a complete argument that contains a statement, reason and simile.

An argument almost identical to k.23 appears in the *Dacheng guang bailun shilun*: “Furthermore, even in the state [of *nirvāṇa*] without remainder, attributes such as suffering, pleasure, and so forth cannot be apart from *ātman* on which [they] depend, because [they] are *ātman*'s attributes, just like number [as an attribute of *ātman*].”²⁰

From Bhavya's point of view, if Vaiśeṣika accepts that attributes such as “cognition,” etc., belong to *ātman*, then these attributes cannot be apart from *ātman*, for *ātman* without attributes cannot be *ātman*, and attributes that can be apart from *ātman* are not those belonging to *ātman*. In other words, *ātman*'s attributes cannot be cut off from *ātman*. As a corollary, liberation is unattainable. Therefore, *pāda* (a) of k.1 contradicts the Vaiśeṣika *ātman* theory.

Bhavya summarized the errors of *pāda* (a) in the commentary on k.23 as follows:

“Even in the state of liberation, due to the nature of *ātman*, [*ātman*] cannot be liberated from the number ‘one’. Likewise, it can in no case be liberated from cognition, etc., because *ātman* is not established without its attributes.”²¹

Therefore, according to Bhavya, *ātman* cannot attain liberation by cutting off its attributes such as cognition, etc.

It is noteworthy that in the *Dacheng guang bailun shilun*, Dharmapāla also considered the Vaiśeṣika idea of “cutting off the attributes of *ātman*” as one of the prerequisites for attaining liberation,²² which is quite similar to Bhavya's discussion.

This prerequisite (*pāda* (a)) seems to have been prevalent in early Vaiśeṣika circles and well-known to contemporary Buddhists scholars such as Bhavya and Dharmapāla. It empha-

¹⁷ Cf. VS-A ad 6-2-28, p.63: sakalātmaviśeṣaḡuṇecchedaś ca mokṣaḡ//

¹⁸ Cf. Thakur [1957], p.8.

¹⁹ bdag ni (DC gi) blo dang sdug bsngal dang// bde sogs yon tan dang mi 'bral// yon tan yin phyir grangs bzhin no// de phyir yon tan med bdag min// (D 248b7; P 280a6–a7).

²⁰ 又苦樂等無餘依中應不永離自所依我，是我德故，猶如數等 (T30, No. 1571, p.193b18–b19).

²¹ grol bar gyur pa na yang bdag nyid yin pas grangs kyi gcig las grol bar mi 'gyur ba bzhin du (NG ins. blo la sogs pa las kyang thams cad du grol bar mi 'gyur ba bzhin du) blo la sogs pa las kyang thams cad du grol bar 'gyur ba ma yin te/ bdag yon tan dang bral ba nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir ro// (D 249a2–a3; P 280b1–b2).

²² Cf. note 20 and 汝不可言苦樂等法，於涅槃處遠離於我 (T30, No. 1571, p.216b17–b25).

sizes the ontological properties of *ātman*, in sharp contrast with the basic Buddhist teaching of the “non-existence of *ātman*”.

3.2 *Pāda* (b)

There is only one sentence commenting on *pāda* (b) of k.1 as follows:

“[The *yogin*] uproots [merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*)]” means total renunciation, i.e., complete removal of both merits and demerits.”²³

We can find a similar definition of liberation in the introduction of the TJ-V, which also appears in VS.5-2-20.²⁴

Setting out *pāda* (b) as above, Bhavya refutes it in k.25 of his *uttarapakṣa*. The *kārikās* preceding and following k.25, i.e., kk.24 and 26, are a refutation of *pāda* (c) and do not concern *pāda* (b). The reason that k.25 is inserted here is that both k.24 and k.25 mention the concept of “space (*phyogs = diś*)” in order to refute the Vaiśeṣika theory of “*adr̥ṣṭa* (*dharma* and *adharma*)”.

After Bhavya’s introductory sentence “Also, because [*ātman*] is not divided into spatial parts,”²⁵ k.25 runs as follows:

The ascertainment of the unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) results in the same fault as before;
[therefore] here also is the same answer.

Because the arising of non-existence has been refuted,
the [unseen’s] combination [with *ātman*] is also not accepted.²⁶

According to the refutation given in the above verse and Bhavya’s comment on it, *adr̥ṣṭa* (*dharma* and *adharma*) cannot be combined with *ātman*. If *dharma* or “merit” were combined with *ātman*, *dharma* would be combined with a part of *ātman* or the whole *ātman*. However, either case contradicts the Vaiśeṣika theory of *ātman*. If *dharma* is combined with a part of *ātman*, then the partial *ātman* combined with *dharma* will be transient, just like a pot, etc. Or if *dharma* is combined with the whole *ātman*, then, when a [part of] *ātman* has *dharma*, the whole *ātman* will also have *dharma*; on the other hand, when a [part of] *ātman* has *adharma* or “demerit”, the whole *ātman* will also have *adharma*.²⁷ The same kind of error was pointed

²³ drungs nas phyung ba na (DC ba’i) chos dang (PNG ins. /) chos ma yin pa de dag gtan spangs pa ni drungs nas phyung ba ste/ thams cad du log (PNG logs) pa’o// (D 244b1; P 275a1).

²⁴ Cf. D 244a1–a5, P 274b3–b6; VS.5-2-20 in VS-C, p.43: tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo ’prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ//; VS.5-2-18 in VS-U, p.323: tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo ’prādurbhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ//

²⁵ phyogs cha dbyer med pa yin pa’i phyir na yang/ (D 249a5; P 280b6).

²⁶ ma mthong nges pa’ng sngar bzhin du// thal ’gyur lan yang ’di la yin// med pa’i skye ba bkag pas na// de yi sbyor ba’ng mi ’dod do// (D 249a5–a6; P 280b6–b7).

²⁷ ma mthong ba’i nges pa ni nges par (PNG om. nges par) chos la mngon par sbyor ba na chos ma yin pa spangs pa’o// de ni phyogs cha med pa’i bdag la mi rigs so// chos dang bdag gnyis sbyor bar ’gyur na yang (PNG ins. /) ci phyogs gcig gis sbyor ram (PND ins. /) ’on te bdag nyid thams cad kyis yin/ de la phyogs gcig gis (P gi) sbyor ro zhe na ni/ phyogs gcig pa yin pa’i phyir bum pa la sogs pa bzhin du mi rtag pa nyid yin no// bdag nyid thams cad kyis sbyor ba yin na ni gcig chos dang ldan par gyur pa na/ (PNG om. /) kun kyang chos dang ldan par ’gyur la/ gcig chos ma yin pa dang ldan par gyur pa na

out by Bhavya in Chapter 6 of the TJ ad kk.20 and 21.

Thereafter, Bhavya concludes that neither *dharma* nor *adharma* can be combined with *ātman*, in other words, *adr̥ṣṭa* cannot be combined with *ātman*. Being non-existent, [the un-seen = *adr̥ṣṭa*] does not arise. How could it be without any faults that mind or *adr̥ṣṭa*, which does not arise, be combined with *ātman*?²⁸

3.3 *Pāda* (c)

Pāda (c) is difficult to understand. Bhavya comments on this *pāda* are as follows:

“When those [pointed out in *pādas* (a) and (b)] come true, the mind stops its activities. Because [*ātman*] is so designated, [therefore] when, in [the mind] itself, *ātman* reaches the stage of non-conception of its objects, there is liberation. This is so regarded by the followers of Ulūka (Aulūkyā = Vaiśeṣika).”²⁹

According to Vaiśeṣika, mind (*manas*) and *ātman* are two independent entities (*dravya*). *Ātman* cannot perceive objects directly. It needs the help of *manas*. That is to say, *manas* is the tool of cognition. *Manas* itself does not have consciousness, whereas *ātman* does, because *ātman* has the attribute *buddhi* that equips *ātman* with consciousness.

In the above commentary on k.1c, Bhavya uses “non-conception (*rnam par mi rtog pa*)” to describe the stage of *ātman* staying in *manas* (*pāda* (c)), which corresponds to liberation. This explanation is different from, if not contradictory to, the description of “non-combination of (*ātman* and *manas*)” in VS.5-2-20, which also appeared in the introduction of the TJ-V.³⁰ Is *pāda* (c) a faithful description of Vaiśeṣika theory or Bhavya's own interpretation of this point? To answer this question, we have to turn to kk.24 and 26, two *kārikās* that directly argue against *pāda* (c).

In the introductory prose passage of k.24, Bhavya quotes a verse from a Vaiśeṣika work:

“When mind (*manas*) stays in [its] own *ātman*, there is liberation [attained].”³¹

The above sentence, “mind (*manas*) stays in [its] own *ātman*” (*yid rang gi bdag la gnas pa*), is regarded as more or less a citation from the first part of VS.5-2-17: *ātmasthe manasi*.³²

However, it seems obvious that the expression “*manas* stays in [its] own *ātman*” contradicts the assertion found in k.1c: “*ātman* stays in *manas*”. Let me here focus on this issue of an apparent difference between k.1 and k.24. The relationship between *ātman* and *manas* in

thams cad kyang chos dang mi ldan par 'gyur ba la sogs pa ji ltar grangs can gyi de kho na nyid la 'jug par smras pa de bzhin du 'dir yang sbyar bar bya'o// (D 249a6–b2; P 280b7–281a2).

²⁸ med pa la ni skye ba yang med par bdag gis sngar bsgrubs zin pas skye ba med pa'i phyir (DC om. phyir) yid ma mthong ba'i skyon med pa ji ltar bdag dang sbyor bar 'gyur/ (D 249b2; P 281a2–a3).

²⁹ de ltar gyur pa na (C ni) yid la byed pa la 'jug pa las ldog pa gang gi phyir btags (DC brtags) pa yin pas rang (PNG rab) nyid la bdag ces bya ba'i yul du rnam par mi rtog pa'i gnas skabs su gyur pa na thar pa yin no zhes 'ug pa pas shes pa yin no zhe na/ (D 244b1–b2; P 275a1–a2).

³⁰ See He [2010], pp.402–403.

³¹ gang yang yid rang gi bdag la gnas pa na thar pa yin no zhes zer ba/ (D 249a3; P 280b3).

³² VS.5-2-17 in VS-C, p.42: *ātmasthe manasi saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogah*//; VS.5-2-16 in VS-U, p.320: *tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkhābhāvaḥ saṃyogaḥ (sic; read sa yogah)*//

the context of *yoga* in VS.5-2-17 is, indeed, not very clear.³³ However, as far as our present knowledge goes, we may understand Bhavya’s different descriptions of the relationship between *ātman* and *manas* in the following two ways:

(1) According to VS.5-2-17 and TJ-V ad k.24, the sentence “*yid la bdag ces gnas pa ni*” of k.1c may be a misinterpretation of “*yid bdag la gnas pa ni*”; in other words, “*ātman* stays in *manas*” should be emended to “*manas* stays in *ātman*”.

(2) If we regard the relationship between *ātman* and *manas* in both k.1c and TJ-V ad k.24 as a special form of the combination of the two, as in VS.5-2-20 relating to liberation, then the apparent contradiction between both verses can be reconciled.

Both interpretations share a problem. As a matter of fact, “*ātmasthe manasi*” refers to a stage of *yoga*. In the TJ-V, however, both “*yid la bdag ces gnas pa ni*” of k.1c and “*yid rang gi bdag la gnas pa*” in the introductory prose passage of k.24 refer to liberation (*mokṣa*), though *yoga* and liberation are in fact two distinct concepts in the Vaiśeṣika system.

Yoga is a special combination of *ātman* and *manas*. A typical Vaiśeṣika definition of *yoga* is found in the VS where Candrānanda explains *yoga* in a more detailed manner.³⁴ As explained in VS-C ad 5-2-17, *yoga* internally makes *manas* stay in *ātman*, resulting in the non-existence of pleasure and suffering. Externally speaking, *yoga* is a meditation which controls the activities of *manas*. On the other hand, as found in VS.5-2-20,³⁵ liberation is the non-existence of the combination (*saṃyogābhāva*) of *ātman* and *manas*. The VS gives separate definitions of *yoga* and liberation (*mokṣa*) in VS.5-2-17 and 5-2-20 respectively, but unfortunately it does not elaborate on their relationship. In the PDS and DP, there is no clear definition of *yoga*.³⁶

Taking into consideration the above situation concerning Vaiśeṣika theories of *yoga* and liberation, it is not unlikely that Bhavya understood *yoga* as liberation when he introduced the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation in *pāda* (c) of k.1 and refuted it as such in kk.24 and 26.

In his commentary on k.24, Bhavya analyzes the sentence “When mind (*manas*) stays in [its] own *ātman*, there is liberation [attained]” from the following two perspectives.

First, *manas* can stay only in spatially restricted *ātman* and cannot stay in *ātman* without any spatial restriction. However, Vaiśeṣika holds that there is no space in *ātman*, because otherwise *ātman* cannot maintain its characteristics such as omnipresence, etc. For this reason, Bhavya concludes that the statement “when mind (*manas*) stays in [its] own *ātman*” contradicts the definition of *ātman*; in other words, the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation is logically

³³ Cf. Wezler [1982], pp.649–655.

³⁴ VS-C ad 5-2-17, p.42: *yadā hi ātmani mano ’vasthitam nendriyeṣu tadā catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣasyānārambhāt tatkāryayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor abhāvarūpo vidyamānaśarīrasyātmano vāyunigrahāpekṣa ātmano manasā saṃyoga yogaḥ//*

³⁵ In the introduction of the TJ-V, Bhavya also introduces this idea as the Vaiśeṣika definition of liberation. Cf. de med pas yang ’byung ba nyid mtshams sbyor ba yang med pa’i phyir thar pa yin te/ (D 244a1–a2; P 274a8).

³⁶ Cf. Wezler [1982], pp.670–671.

flawed.³⁷

Second, if *manas* can be combined with *ātman*, that is to say, if *manas* can stay in the whole *ātman*, then it will contradict the following thesis asserted by Vaiśeṣika: “At the time of transmigration, memory and knowledge are produced, while in liberation is produced non-conceptual knowledge.”³⁸

In Bhavya's understanding, “non-conceptual knowledge (*rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes, *nirvikalpa-jñāna*)” is only produced in the stage of liberation. However, if *manas* is connected with the spatial *ātman* itself, both conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge will be produced, regardless of transmigration or liberation. Then there would be no difference between liberation and transmigration. Therefore, it is concluded that *manas* cannot be combined with *ātman*.

However, the statement “in liberation is produced non-conceptual knowledge” is not attested in any Vaiśeṣika literature such as the VS and PDS. In fact, “non-conceptual knowledge” is a well-known Buddhist term. Why did Bhavya take “non-conceptual knowledge” as a keyword to refute the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation? The reason may lie in the fact that Bhavya regarded the Vaiśeṣika six-*padārtha* theory as “conceptual knowledge”, as manifested in kk.27 and 28 of the TJ-V (see below).

Furthermore, in k.26 of the TJ-V, Bhavya criticizes *pāda* (c) of k.1 from another angle:

If *manas* and *ātman* do not exist,
the depended and the depending cannot be accepted;
if *ātman* and *manas* exist,
the depended and the depending cannot be accepted, either.³⁹

In this verse are found two layers of meaning. First, if *manas* and *ātman* do not exist, then they cannot form the relationship of the depended and the depending, because non-existent entities do not depend on each other.⁴⁰ Second, even if *manas* and *ātman* exist, they cannot form the relationship of the depended and the depending, because both *manas* and *ātman* then

³⁷ bdag gzugs dang ldan par gyur na ni phyogs dang yang ldan par 'gyur la/ phyogs dang ldan pa'i bdag (PNG ins. rang) nyid yid rang nyid gnas par gyur na (PNG ins. /) phyogs dang mi ldan pa'i bdag la ci ltar yid rang nyid la gnas par 'gyur/ (D 249a4; P 280b4–b5).

³⁸ gang gi tshes bdag nyid phyogs kyi rang gi gnas la yid sbyor bar gyur na ni 'khor ba'i dus na ni dran pa dang/ shes pa 'byung bar 'dod la/ thar pa'i dus na ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes 'byung bar 'gyur ro (PNG ins. //) zhes bya ba'i 'dod pa nyams pa yin no// (D 249a4–a5; P 280b5–b6). Also cf. de ltar gyur pa na (C ni) yid la byed pa la 'jug pa las ldog pa gang gi phyir btags (DC brtags) pa yin pas rang (PNG rab) nyid la bdag ces bya ba'i yul du rnam par mi rtog pa'i gnas skabs su gyur pa na thar pa yin no// (D 244b1–b2; P 275a1–a2).

³⁹ yid dang bdag ni (DCPNG DKCKPKNGK gi, cf.k.26c) med pa la/(PNG om. //) rten dang brten(C rten) par mi 'dod do// bdag dang yid ni yod na'ang (DKCKPKNGK na yang)// rten dang brten(C rten) par mi 'dod do// (D 249b2–b3; P 281a3–a4).

⁴⁰ re zhig bdag (PNG ins. med) ni med de/ dmigs par ma gyur pa'i phyir ro// yid kyang med de/ ma skyes pa'i phyir ro// yod pa ma yin pa'i bdag dang yid dag rten dang brten par ji ltar 'gyur/ (D 249b3; P 281a4–a5).

are [separate], eternal and unchangeable subjects.⁴¹ Here, Bhavya does not directly refer to a spatial relationship between *ātman* and *manas*.

Therefore, whether *ātman* and *manas* exist or not, they cannot form the relationship of the depended and the depending. Without this relationship of the depended and the depending, neither “*ātman* stays in *manas*” nor “*manas* stays in [its] own *ātman*” are possible. From the above discussion, Bhavya draws the conclusion that the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation has no logical basis.⁴²

3.4 *Pāda* (d)

Pāda (d) summarizes the three *pādas* preceding it. It is interesting to note that in his commentary on k.1, Bhavya calls Vaiśeṣika (*bye brag pa*) “‘*Ug pa pa*”.

“‘*Ug pa* (Ulūka)”, meaning “owl”, is the sobriquet of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school. “‘*Ug pa pa*” and “‘*Ug pa*” also appear in TJ-V ad k.4, k.27 and TJ-V ad k.27.

This sobriquet “‘*Ug pa*” is amply attested in Chinese sources. Kuiji 窥基 explains the etymology of “Kaṇāda” and “‘*Ug pa*” in detail.⁴³ Since the owl symbolizes Athena, the goddess of wisdom, some scholars have suggested that Ulūka reflects the influence of Greek philosophy on the Vaiśeṣika school.⁴⁴

In kk.27 and 28, Bhavya criticizes the content of *pāda* (d). Focusing on the question of whether Vaiśeṣika’s knowledge related to liberation is conceptual or non-conceptual, he points out a logical flaw within the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation in a conclusive manner.

K.27 reads:

Just as Ulūka’s liberation is unacceptable
because, when he saw [six *padārthas*] such as entity (*dravya*) and so forth,
he had the cause of conceptualization,
likewise, the liberation of Ulūka’s disciples is also unacceptable.⁴⁵

This *kārikā* not only refutes the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation but also attacks the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school.

In Bhavya’s commentary on the above k.27, the Vaiśeṣika standpoint is described as follows:

“You (Vaiśeṣika) accept that complete overcoming (**atikrama*) [of sufferings] is regarded as keeping away from all conceptual knowledge, just like a fire whose fuel has

⁴¹ yang gal te bdag dang yid ni yod do zhe na/ de lta na yang ’di dag rtag (DC ins. pa med) par mi ’gyur ba’i chos can yin pas/ rten dang brten pa’i ngo bor ji ltar ’gyur/ (D 249b4; P 281a5).

⁴² des na thar pa rgyu med par bstan pa yin te/ (D 249b4; P 281a4–a5).

⁴³ Cf. Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記, T43, No. 1830, p.255b19–b29.

⁴⁴ Cf. Kanakura [1971], pp.9–13.

⁴⁵ mam rtog rgyu mthsan bcas pa’i phyir// rdzas sogs mthong bas grol bar ni// ji ltar ’ug pa mi ’dod pa// de bzhin ’ug pa pa mi ’dod// (PNG om. de bzhin ’ug pa pa mi ’dod//) (D 249b4–b5; P 281a6).

been exhausted.”⁴⁶

“Conceptual knowledge” here is a contradictory concept of “non-conceptual (knowledge)” found in kk.1 and 24. It seems quite likely that these two concepts were introduced to the above Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation by Bhavya. The simile of a fire without fuel can also be found in the introduction of the TJ-V and PDS.⁴⁷

According to Bhavya, on the one hand, Vaiśeṣika holds that liberation is “keeping away from all conceptual knowledge” (TJ-V ad k.27). In liberation, *ātman* reaches the stage of “non-conception” (TJ-V ad k.1), and “non-conceptual knowledge” arises (TJ-V ad k.24), “just like a fire whose fuel has been exhausted” (TJ-V ad k.27). On the other hand, Vaiśeṣika asserts that “non-conceptual (knowledge) also grasps the [six] *padārthas* such as entity and so forth” (TJ-V ad k.27).⁴⁸ However, according to Bhavya, grasping the *padārthas* is a conceptual process and not non-conceptual. Therefore, there cannot be a “non-conceptual (knowledge)” that grasps the *padārthas*. Consequently, it is unacceptable that Vaiśeṣika attains liberation by such “non-conceptual (knowledge)” as strictly speaking it is conceptual.

Ulūka (Kaṇāda), the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school who claims to have obtained the “knowledge of everything”, also founders on this difficulty. Since he claims to have grasped the *padārthas* such as entity and so forth, it is unacceptable that he has non-conceptual knowledge, let alone his disciples.⁴⁹

K.28 is one of the *kārikās* that has come down to us in Sanskrit. Its Tibetan translation is close to the Sanskrit text except for one word. “*Mi 'dzin*” in *pāda* (c) is most probably a misunderstanding of “*dzin pa (āgrhīta)*”. K.28 may be rendered as follows:

Vaiśeṣika's knowledge of principles (*tattvadhī*)
such as earth and so forth is not accepted as liberation,
because it grasps the particularities,
just like [Digambara's] knowledge of principles
such as life (*jīva*) and so forth.⁵⁰

It merits noticing that Bhavya adopts as a simile the Jaina theory of nine *padārthas* in his

⁴⁶ nnam rtog thams cad dang bral ba shing zad pa'i me bzhin du yongs su 'da' bar 'dod pa ni khyad kyi (PNG khyis) 'dod pa yin no// (D 249b5; P 281a6–a7).

⁴⁷ Cf. He [2010], pp.399–405.

⁴⁸ nnam par mi rtog pa de yang rdzas la sogs pa tshig gi don 'dzin par byed pas yod pa ma yin no// (D 249b5; P 281a7).

⁴⁹ des na gang thams cad mthong bar 'dod pa'i thub (PNG thug) pa 'ug pa pa (PNG om. pa) yang re zhig grol bar gyur pa ma yin te/ rdzas la sogs pa rtogs pas mam par rtog pa'i rgyu mtshan dang bcas pa'i phyir na/ yang de'i gzhung gi rjes su 'brang 'ug pa pa (PNG ins. pa) mams rdzas la sogs pa'i tshig gi don de kho na nyid du goms par byas pas thar ba grub par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba ni srid pa ma yin no zhes bya bar bsams pa yin no// (D 249b5–b7; P 281a7–b1).

⁵⁰ kāṇādasyeṣyate ① muktau na pṛthivyāditattvadhī/ āgrhītavīśeṣatvād ② yathā jīvādītattvadhī// (28) (①=Ms, SG; L kāṇādair iṣyate; ②= Ms, SG; L agrhīta-). sa sogs de nyid 'byung ba'i blo// thar pa min par gzegs zan 'dod// khyad par dag ni mi 'dzin phyir// 'tsho ba'i de nyid blo bzhin no// (D 249b7; P 281b1–b2).

commentary on the above-cited k.28. He lists nine *padārthas* as enumerated in the Digambara school of Jainism (*gcer bur spyod pa rnams*) as follows:

*jīva, āsrava, saṃvara, nirjāra, bandha, karman, pāpa, puṇya, mokṣa.*⁵¹

The above list of *padārthas* is quite similar to that of Kundakunda (ca.4–5 cent.) as found in his *Pañcāstikāyasāra*. In his list, “*ajīva*” replaces “*karman*” and the other eight *padārthas* remain the same.⁵²

In the *Dacheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論, Bhavya also mentions the *padārthas* proclaimed by the Digambara school of Jainism. Unfortunately, he did not bother to enumerate them.⁵³

4 Conclusion

In the introduction of the TJ-V, Bhavya faithfully describes the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation found in the VS. He may have referred to early VS commentaries such as the VS-C. There is a possibility that the PDS was at his disposal, whereas no influence of the DP can be detected.

In the *pūrvapakṣa* (II), Bhavya formulates three prerequisites of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation: (a) the *yogin* cuts off the attributes of *ātman* such as cognition, etc., (b) the *yogin* uproots both *dharma* and *adharmā*, and (c) *ātman* stays in *manas*. The first two are quite clear and their source can be traced back to the VS and other Vaiśeṣika works such as the VS-C, etc. The third prerequisite, namely, the relationship between *ātman* and *manas*, is difficult to understand. Bhavya may have regarded *yoga* as the liberation of Vaiśeṣika and criticizes it as such.

In the *uttarapakṣa* (III.3), Bhavya criticizes the *pūrvapakṣa* one *pāda* at a time, focusing on the concept of “non-conceptual knowledge”. However, unlike his faithful description in the introduction and *pūrvapakṣa* of the TJ-V, it may safely be said that Bhavya describes the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation from a Buddhist viewpoint while building his argument within the framework of Buddhist philosophy. For instance, Bhavya argues that knowledge of the six *padārthas* is incompatible with liberation, since the former is characterized by “conceptual knowledge” as opposed to the latter, liberation, which should be characterized by “non-conceptual knowledge”.

Bhavya’s description and critique of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation not only enrich our knowledge of early Vaiśeṣika thought but also provide us with a glimpse into Buddhist opinions of the Vaiśeṣika theory of liberation at his time.

Abbreviations

⁵¹ dper na 'tsho ba dang/ zag pa dang/ sdom pa dang/ rgas pa med pa dang/ 'chi (=DCPNG; read 'ching) ba dang/ las dang/ sdig pa dang/ bsod nams dang/ thar pa zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don dgu la dmigs pa gcer bur spyod pa rnams kyi (PNG kyis) de kho na nyid kyi blo bzhin no// (D 250a3–a4; P 281b5–b7).

⁵² Cf. Chakravartinayayar and Upadhye [1975], p.90ff.

⁵³ 無衣等論所執句義，亦隨所應當立為空 (T30, No. 1578, p.276a01–a02).

- C *dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rTog ge 'bar ba*, Co ne Bstan 'gyur, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.
- CK *dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, Co ne Bstan 'gyur, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.
- D *dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rTog ge 'bar ba*, sDe dge Bstan 'gyur, No. 3856, Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985.
- DK *dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, sDe dge Bstan 'gyur, No. 3855, Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985.
- DP *Daśapadārthī, Shengzong shijuyi lun* 勝宗十句義論, T54, No. 2138.
- G *dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rTog ge 'bar ba*, 《金寫<丹珠尔>影印本》, 中國民族圖書館整理, 天津古籍出版社, 1988.
- GK *dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, 《金寫<丹珠尔>影印本》, 中國民族圖書館整理, 天津古籍出版社, 1988.
- L Lindtner's edition of MHK; see Lindtner [2001].
- MHK *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.
- Mvy *Mahāvvyutpatti*, ed. by Sakaki [1981].
- Ms Manuscript; see Jiang [1991].
- N *dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rTog ge 'bar ba*, sNar thang Bstan 'gyur, No. 3247, Library of Tibetan House, New Delhi, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.
- NK *dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, sNar thang Bstan 'gyur, No. 3246, Library of Tibetan House, New Delhi, scanned at Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York City, 2003.
- P *dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rTog ge 'bar ba*, *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking edition*— kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto, reprinted under the supervision of the Otani University, No. 5256, edited by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1954–1963.
- PK *dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking edition*— kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto, reprinted under the supervision of the Otani University, No. 5255, edited by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1954–1963.
- PDS *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, ed. by Dvivedin [1984].
- SG V. V. Gokhale's copy of MHK; see Bahulkar [1994].
- TJ *Tarkajvālā*.
- TJ-V “Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścayā”, Chapter 7 of *Tarkajvālā*.
- VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, see VS-C.
- VS-A Anonymous commentary on VS, ed. by Thakur [1957].
- VS-C Candrānanda's *vṛtti* on VS, ed. by Jambuvijayaji [1982].
- VS-U Śāṅkara Mīśra's *upaskāra* on VS, ed. by Mīśra [1969].

Bibliography

- Bahulkar, S. S. [1994] “The *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* of Bhāvaviveka: A Photographic Reproduction of Prof. V.V. Gokhale’s Copy,” *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism (Saṃbhāṣā)* 15, pp.i–iv, pp.1–49.
- Chakravartinayayar, A., and A. N. Upadhye
[1975] *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, New Delhi, Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication.
- Dvivedin, V. P. [1984] *The Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Commentary Nyāykandaī of Śrīdhara*, Delhi, Sri Satguru Publications (reprinted from Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras).
- Hattori Masaaki 服部正明
[1994] “The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* as Referred to by Bhāvaviveka in his *Tarkajvālā*,” *Asiatische Studien, Etudes Asiatiques* 48-2, pp.699–706.
- He Huanhuan 何歡歡
[2010] “The Vaiśeṣika Doctrine of Liberation as Reported by Bhavya in the Introduction of Chapter 7 of the *Tarkajvālā*” 清辯所傳之勝論派解脫思想——基於藏譯〈思擇炎·入抉擇勝論之真實品〉的翻譯與解讀, *A New Feast for Scholars: Festschrift in Commemoration of Prof. Wang Yao’s 80th Birthday* 《賢者新宴——王堯先生八秩華誕藏學論文集》, Beijing, Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe 北京中國藏學出版社, pp.392–415.
- [2011] *A Study on the Critique of the Non-Buddhist Schools in the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā* 《〈中觀心論〉及其古注《思擇炎》對外道思想批判的研究》, Ph.D. dissertation, Peking University 博士学位請求論文, 北京大學.
- Jambuvijayaji [1982] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, Baroda (second edition).
- Jiang Zhongxin 蔣忠新
[1991] 梵文〈思擇燄經〉抄本影印版, 《季羨林教授八十華誕紀念論文集(上)》, 江西人民出版社, 附錄.
- Kanakura Enshō 金倉圓照
[1971] *Indo no shizen tetsugaku* 『インドの自然哲学』, Kyoto, Heirakuji Shoten 平樂寺書店.
- Lindtner, Chr. [2001] *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā of Bhavya*, Adyar Library and Research Centre, India.
- Miyasaka Yūshō 宮坂宥勝
[1954a] “Shōben shoin no Vaishēshika tetsugaku setsu” 「清弁所引のヴァイシェシカ哲学説」, *Bunka* 『文化』 18-3, pp.24–40.

- [1952] “Bhaviya to Vaishēshika gakuha” 「バヴァイヤとヴァイシェーシカ学派」, *Shūkyō Kenkyū* 『宗教研究』 133, pp.173–177.
- [1954b] “Vaishēshika gakuha ni okeru ātoman kan to gedatsu” 「ヴァイシェーシカ学派におけるアートマン観と解脱」, *Chizan Gakuhō* 『智山学報』 1, pp.112–128.
- Miśra, N. [1969] *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra of Śrī Śaṅkara Miśra with the ‘Prakāśikā’ Hindī Commentary by Ācārya Dhuṇḍhirājaśāstrī* (Kashi Sanskrit Series 195).
- Sakaki, L. [1981] *Bon-Zō-Kan-Wa shiyaku taikō Hon'yaku myōgi taishū* 『梵藏漢和四譯對校翻譯名義大集』, Tokyo, Kokusho Kankōkai 国書刊行会.
- Thakur, A. [1957] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with an Anonymous Commentary*, Darbhanga, Mithila Institute.
- Wezler, A. [1982] “Remarks on the Definition of ‘yoga’ in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra,” *Indological and Buddhist Studies*, Canberra, pp.643–686.

2011.3.3

Department of Philosophy, Peking University

『思釈炎論』におけるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論に対するバヴィヤの批判

何 歆歆

『思釈炎論』 *Tarkajvālā* を構成する全 11 章の中で、第 7 章「ヴァイシェーシカ派の真実 [説] の確定」に関しては、従来、比較的研究が乏しかった。その主な理由は、同論が注釈対象とする根本偈、すなわち『中観心論』 *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* のサンスクリット写本が、同章のほぼ全体を収める第 18 フォリオ（葉）を欠いているからである。総計で 29 偈からなる同章の中では、最後の 2 偈のみは第 19 フォリオの第 1 行目に置かれるため、サンスクリット語で入手可能であるが、それ以前の 27 偈は、残念ながらチベット語訳のみに拠らざるを得ないのが現況である。

『思釈炎論』の第 7 章における著者バヴィヤの主要な意図は、初期ヴァイシェーシカ派の典籍で主張されるアートマンおよび六原理 (*padārtha*、句義) に対する批判的な分析を通して、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を考察、批判することにあつた。バヴィヤは、序説および第 1 偈においてヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を紹介し、その前主張、とくに第 1 偈にとりまとめた解脱論を、第 2 偈以降に置かれた後主張の中の第 23 偈から第 28 偈において、句 (*pāda*) ごとに批判を加える。バヴィヤによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介と批判は、初期ヴァイシェーシカ派の主要な思想を伝えるばかりでなく、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論に対する当時の仏教徒による批判の一端を示している点できわめて興味深く、貴重な資料である。

バヴィヤは、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論をいかに理解したのか。かれによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介は、はたして『ヴァイシェーシカ・ストトラ』のみに依拠したのであろうか。あるいは、プラシャスタパーダ作の『パダールタダルマサングラハ (諸原理と法の綱要)』 (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*) 等のヴァイシェーシカ派の他の著作の影響があつたのであろうか。さらにまた、かれは議論に際して、意図して仏教の教理を援用し、結果としてヴァイシェーシカ学説を歪曲するようなことはなかったと言えるであろうか。

本論文では、とくにバヴィヤに伝えられたヴァイシェーシカ学説の典拠を探り、かれの批判の内容に分析を加えながら、以上のような関連する複数の問いに対する基礎的な回答を提示したい。