

A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmāṅśvabhāvasiddhi of Kamalaśīla (1)

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Kamalaśīla as well as his teacher, Śāntarakṣita is said to belong the school of the Yogācāra-mādhyamikas.¹⁾

Sarvadharmāṅśvabhāvasiddhi [SDNS]²⁾ and Madhyamakālokanāma [Māl]²⁾ by Kamalaśīla were written for the purpose of proving by logic (yukti) and testimony (āgama) that all things lack substantiality (svabhāva). Although SDNS is approximately one fifth the length of Māl, these two texts contain many sentences that are exactly the same and other sentences that convey the same thought varying only slightly in wording.³⁾ Of course many subjects discussed in Māl are not directly referred to in SDNS.

Only a few sections between these two texts correspond. For example, the main subject of SDNS, the four kinds of non-arising, corresponds with P. 208a⁶-222a³, 232b²-238a⁶ of Māl.

Therefore a comparison of these texts is an effective means to translate, understand and make a revised edition of them.

Other corresponding sections between these texts are [1. b. 2. 2. 3. 1.] to [1. b. 2. 2. 3. 4.] of SDNS and [pp. 969-976] (Ogiwara edition) of Abhisamayālaṅkā-rālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyaḅhyā.⁴⁾

[1. b. 2. 2. 3. 5.] and [1. b. 2. 2. 3. 6.] of SDNS and "The non-origination of all things is ascertained by āgama and yukti" in the first chapter of Bhāvanākrama.⁵⁾

And in [II] proof by testimony (āgama) of SDNS we can find many parts that correspond with the same part of Bhāvanākrama and Nayatrayapradīpa of Triṣṭakamala.⁶⁾

Contents

Introduction.	P312a ⁵
I. Proof of logic (yukti)	
(1) Examination of Cause (hetu)	
1.	
The logical formulation (prayoga).	P312b ⁶
From the ultimate point of view whatever does not arise out of self, or non-self, or both, or lack of cause, does not possess substantiality e. g. the sky-lotus; These things set forth by some Buddhists and others do not arise out of self, or non-self or both, or lack of cause; [Therefore, these things do not possess substantiality].	
This inference is based on the principle of the non-perception of the pervader of the probans (vyāpakānupalabdhi).	P312b ⁸
1. a. 1	
Our thesis (pratijñā) is not contrary to a direct perception (pratyakṣa).	P312b ⁸
1. a. 2	
Our pratijñā is not contrary to our previous assertion (svavacana).	P314a ⁴
1. a. 3	
Our pratijñā is not contrary to inference (anumāna).	P314b ⁶
1. b	
The probans (hetu) of our inference is not illegitimate (asiddha).	P315a ⁷
1. b. 1	
That things arise out of self is illogical.	P315a ⁸
1. b. 1. 1	
The cause of things is not existence.	P315b ¹
1. b. 1. 2	
The cause of things is not non-existence.	P317a ⁵
1. b. 2	
That things arise out of non-self is illogical.	P317a ⁸
1. b. 2. 1	

- It is impossible for things to arise from the permanent.P317b¹
1. b. 2. 1. 1
Efficient operation (arthakriyāśakti) is not cause.P317b¹
1. b. 2. 1. 2
Inefficient operation is not cause.P318b⁸
1. b. 2. 2
It is impossible for things to arise out of the impermanent.P320a²
1. b. 2. 2. 1
If an effect arose from the impermanent, it would arise from a past cause.P320a⁴
1. b. 2. 2. 1. 1
If a past thing had function, its substantiality would not be destroyed.P320a⁶
1. b. 2. 2. 1. 2
If a past thing had function, its substantiality would be destroyed.P320a⁶
1. b. 2. 2. 1. 3
If a past thing had function, it would be different from function.P320b⁷
1. b. 2. 2. 1. 4
If a past thing had function, it would be identical to function.P321b¹
1. b. 2. 2. 1. 5
If a past thing had function, it would be neither identical to nor different from function.P321b⁸
1. b. 2. 2. 2
If an effect arose from the impermanent, it would arise from a future cause.P321b⁵
1. b. 2. 2. 3
If an effect arose from the impermanent, it would arise from a present cause.322a⁴
1. b. 2. 2. 3. 1
It is illogical that a single effect arises from multiple causes.P322a⁶

(10) A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmāṅśvabhāvasiddhi (1) (S. Moriyama)

1. b. 2. 2. 3. 2

It is illogical that multiple effects arise from multiple causes.P323a⁷

1. b. 2. 2. 3. 3

It is illogical that multiple effects arise from a single cause.P323b⁸

1. b. 2. 2. 3. 4

It is illogical that a single effect arises from a single cause.P323b⁷

1. b. 2. 2. 3. 5

It is illogical that cause and effect occur simultaneously.P324a²

1. b. 2. 2. 3. 6

It is illogical that cause and effect occur randomly.P324a⁵

1. b. 3

That things arise out of both is illogical.P326a⁴

1. b. 4

That things arise out of lack of cause is illogical.P326a⁶

1. c

The probans of our inference does not cause the impossibility of the basis (āśrayāsiddha).P326b⁸

1. d

The probans of our inference is not inconclusive (anaikāntika). ...P327a⁵

(2) Examination of related conditions (pratyaaya).P327b¹

2. 1

If a thing were manifested out of related conditions, its individuality (svalakṣaṇa) would be limitless.P327b⁵

2. 2

If a thing were manifested out of related conditions, its manifestation (prakāśa) would not be prevented by related conditions.P327b⁸

2. 3

If a thing were manifested out of related conditions, its manifestation would be perceived by disciplined sense organs.P328b⁸

2. 4

If a thing were manifested out of related conditions, knowledge corresponding to the object would arise.

A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmāṇiṣvabhāvasiddhi (1) (S. Moriyama)	(11)
(3) The probans of our inference is neither inconclusive (anaikāntika) nor incompatible (viruddha)	P329a ⁶
(4) Conclusion	P329a ⁷
II. Proof by testimony (āgama)	P330a ⁸

(continued)

Abbreviations

C: The Co ne edition, USA, IASWR.

D: The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, edited by Hayashima, Takasaki, Yamaguchi and Ejima.

Māl: Madhyamakālokanāma of Kamalaśīla.

N: The sNar thañ edition, preserved at the Kyoto University, Toyobunko.

P: The Peking edition 『影印北京版西藏大藏經』 edited by Daisetz Suzuki.

SDNS: Sarvadharmāṇiṣvabhāvasiddhi of Kamalaśīla.

Notes

1) T. R. V. Murti; *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* p. 102.

Katsumi Mimaki; *Le Grub mtha' rnam b'zag rin chen phreñ ba de dkon mc-hog 'jigs med dbañ po (1728-1791) Texte tibétain édité, avec une introduction.* Zinbun: *Memoirs of The Reseach Institute for Humanistic Studies.* Kyoto University, Number 14, 1977, p. 97.

袴谷憲昭「中観派に関するチベットの伝承」『国訳一切経』三蔵集第三輯, 東京, 大東出版社 p. 200.

2) SDNS: P. No. 5289. Vol. 101, Sa 312a⁴-338a⁵, D. No. 3889. Sa 273a⁴-291a⁷, N. No. 3280. Sa 301a⁶-323a⁴, C. Tanjur. Vol. 28. Sa 269a⁵-288a⁷.

Māl: P. No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa 143b²-275a⁴, D. No. 3887. Sa 133b⁴-244a⁷.

Cf. Yasunori Ejima, *Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India, Studies on Bhāvaviveka* 『中観思想の展開』 pp. 227-239.

3) For details see the "Translation and Text of Kamalaśīla's Sarvadharmāṇiṣvabhāvasiddhi" by S. Moriyama in the "Memoirs of the Postgraduate Research Institute Bukkyo University (仏教大学大学院研究紀要)" No. 9, 1981 and No. 10, to be published in March of 1982.

4) cf. 天野宏英, 因果論の一資料——ハリバドラの解釈——『金倉博士古稀記念印度学仏教学論集』 pp. 323-350.

5) Giuseppe Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts Part I & II*, Rinsen Book Company, Kyoto, 1978, pp. 509-512.

6) cf. Hirofumi Isoda, *A Study on the Nayatrayapradīpa*, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, December 1979, pp. 98-101.

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