THE CONCEPT OF *PARYĀPTI* IN NAVYANYĀYA

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1.1 Navyanyāya concept of *paryāpti* is generally explained by scholars as: It is a relation by which numbers higher than one occur in the collection rather than the particulars of the collection[1]. That is to say, such numbers as two onwards, namely *vyāsajyavṛtti*-properties, are to occur in their loci by the relation of *paryāpti*, whereas the *avyāsajyavṛtti*-properties, e. g., the potness etc., are to occur in their loci by the relation of inherence.

1.2 However, this explanation does not cover the exact idea behind the concept of *paryāpti* which Navyanaiyāyikas intended. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the necessity of postulating the relation termed *paryāpti* in the system of Navyanyāya.

2.1 The basic idea of *paryāpti* may be explained as follows.

2.2 In case that we have a perceptual cognition 'This is a pot', we are perceiving a number 'one' as well as the potness in the object 'pot'. Such a number occurs completely in the pot, not in some part of the pot; the potness, of coucse, also occurs completely in the same pot. It is such a 'complete occurrence' which causes us the same cognition. Similarly, when we have a perceptual cognition 'These are two pots', we are perceiving a number 'two' in the object 'pots'. Such a number occurs completely in the two pots at the same; not only in one pot but in another pot also. Such a 'complete occurrence' of the number in the two pots causes us the same cognition. This 'complete occurrence' is nothing but a relation called *paryāpti*.

2.3 Accordingly, even *avyāsajyavṛtti*-properties which have complete occurrence could be considered to occur in their locus or loci by the relation of *paryāpti*.

3.1 There will naturally arise a question concerning the necessity of postu-

lating such a relation '*paryāpti*' independent of inherence. Why not can it be included in the category 'inherence'? To this, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi simply says in his *Anumānadīdhiti* that the relation '*paryāpti*' is established as an independent relation, the proof of which is our direct experiences, viz., 'This is one pot', 'These are two' and so on[2]. The problem concerned is elaborated by Jagadīśa in some more detail.

3.2 Jagadīśa says as follows: The sentence "This is one pot" is presented (as an instance of direct experiences) in order to show the *paryāpti*-relation of the potness (whose counter-relatum-ness conditions the base-relatum-ness) delimited by a property existing in one pot only. The sentence "These are two (pots)" is presented in order to show the *paryāpti*-relation of the two-fold-ness (or the number 'two') (whose counter-relatum-ness conditions the base-relatum-ness) delimited by a property existing in the two objects. Otherwise (i. e., unless it is accepted that the *paryāpti*-relation exists), there will be no difference between the two distinct experiences, namely, 'two (pots)' and 'each (of the two) possessing a number tow'[3].

4.1 Inherence (*samavāya*) is a relation which connects an (inherent) property with each individual locus. By virture of this relation we do have such a cognition as "This is one pot" (*Ayam eko ghaṭaḥ*), which thus can be analyzed as "This has potness by inherence" (*Samavāyena ayaṃ ghaṭatvavān*) and "This has a number one by inherence" (*Samavāyena ayam ekatvavān*). So far as this example is concerned, such properties as potness and the number one could also be said to occur by the relation of *paryāpti* in one and the same object pot.

4.2 Let us, now, analyse the cognition which involves a number 'two' (*dvitva*: 'two-fold-ness') existing in two things, say, two pots. The following sentences are both correct.

(a) This (i. e., each of the two) has a number two.

(b) These have a number two.

The difference between (a) and (b) is apparent. In (a), each particular occupies the position of a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) where the two-fold-ness appears as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), whereas in (b) the collection of the particulars occupies the position of a qualificand where the two-fold-ness appears as a qualifier.

That is to say, the base-relatum (*anuyagin*) of the relation by which the two-fold-ness occurs is each particular pot in the case of (a), and it is the collection of the two particular pots in the case of (b). To be more precise (in Navyanyāya languge), the base-relatum-ness (*anuyogitā*) in the case of (a) is delimited by the particularity or the individuality (*tadvyaktitva*), whereas the base-relatum-ness in the case of (b) is delimited by the two-fold-ness.

4.3 In fact, each individual locus alone can be a base-relatum of the relation of inherence, and the collection of the particulars cannot be. In other words, the state of being the base-relatum possessing its property (e. g., potness) by inherence is always delimited by the individuality (i. e., this-pot-ness or that-pot-ness) only. Thus, by virture of this relation we can have the cognition expressed as (a). However, we cannot have the cognition expressed as (b) by virture of the same.

4.4 Therefore, some other relation should be postulated in order to explain the cognition expressed as (b). It is in this context that the relation '*paryāpti*' is definitely required. The relation termed '*paryāpti*', which means literally 'fulfilness' or 'completeness', acts as a connector, in this case, between the two-fold-ness and the collection of the two particulars. Here, the base-relatum-ness existing in the collection of the two pots which possesses the two-fold-ness is delimited by the same two-fold-ness.

4.5 It can be noted that the sentence of (a) could also be explained in terms of the *paryāpti*-relation. Because, Jagadīśa says: "If a property cannot occur by the *paryāpti*-relation in each particular, it cannot occur by the same relation in the collection of the particulars also."[4]

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1) Cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials faf the Study of Navyanyā Logic*, p. 76. I prefer 'collection' to 'whole'.

2) The present topic is especially discussed in the connection of tha definition of *vyāpti*. See the *Avacchedakatvanirukti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Benares 1948, p. 38.

3) *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

4) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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