

anumāna and *nyāya* of the Naiyāyikas

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1

In Naiyāyika manuals, such as the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *anumāna* is defined as *liṅgaparāmarśa* or more fully as *vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñāna*. These definitions are closely connected with *upanaya*, the fourth *avayava* (member) of *pañcāvayavāni*. *Upanaya* is considered to state, for example, that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire (*ayaṃ parvato vahnivyāpyadhāmavān*). While *liṅga* (smoke) itself is presented in the second *avayava*, namely *hetu*, as “because of smoke (*dhāmāt*)”, which is the statement of the seeing of *liṅga* (*liṅgadarśana*), *vyāpti* (smoke’s being pervaded by fire) itself is presented in the third *avayava*, namely *udāharaṇa*, as “anything that possesses smoke possesses fire (*yo yo dhāmavān so vahnimān*)”. Then these two elements, *liṅga* and *vyāpti*, are combined in *upanaya*, where *pakṣadharmatā*, or this *liṅga*’s being the attribute (*dharma*) of the locus (*dharmin=pakṣa*=this mountain), is confirmed. This forms a strong contrast to the Buddhist notion that *pakṣadharmatā* is confirmed in *hetu*, and that *upanaya*, the fourth *avayava*, is consequently of no use. Thus the Naiyāyikas succeeded in attaching a different value to *hetu* and *upanaya* respectively, and in acquiring the right to declare the validity of their *pañcāvayavāni*, at the same time denouncing that of the Buddhist *tryāvayavāni* advocated by Dignāga. Uddyotakara is thought to be the first Naiyāyika to introduce such an innovation¹⁾, and all the later Naiyāyikas accepted it.

In addition, *anumāna* became divided into *svārthānumāna* (inference for one’s own sake) and *parārthānumāna* (inference for others). Modern scholars are generally in accord in assuming that Dignāga was the first to make such a division²⁾. But some scholars argue that the very Vātsyāyana was already aware of it. This bold assumption, however, seems to be going too far, for,

as we will see below, although in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* are there some points which later Naiyāyikas, such as Uddyotakara, might have made use of and have considered as the basis for developing their new logical theory, this does not mean that he was *aware* of the division of *anumāna*. All that we can say is that some of the Vātsyāyana's descriptions permitted later Naiyāyikas to interpret them in accordance with their new logical theory.

While *parārthānumāna* is performed in the process of stating *pañcāvayavāni*, *svārthānumāna* is not connected explicitly with them. But, looking into details, we can safely assert that *svārthānumāna* is performed in accordance with the process of *pañcāvayavāni*, even if only implicitly. In other words, *svārthānumāna* is connected with an implicit form of *pañcāvayavāni*³⁾. This is also evident from the fact that *anumāna* is defined as *liṅgaṣarāmāśa*, which is clearly connected with the statement of the fourth *avayava*, *ūpanaya*.

Thus arguments on *anumāna* changed into those on *pañcāvayavāni*. Therefore it would not be so unnatural that many modern scholars have regarded the Naiyāyika *anumāna* as "a syllogism" or "a five-membered syllogism"⁴⁾. However, if we understand the Naiyāyika system of logic in accordance with any such an interpretation at all, we will be confronted, when reading early Naiyāyika texts, with many strange descriptions.

2

[1] Gautama enumerated sixteen *padārthas* starting from *pramāṇa* and ending with *nigrahasthāna* (*Sūtra* 1.1.1), and expounded them in the same order. As *anumāna* is one of the four *pramāṇas*, it is expounded under the item *pramāṇa*, the first *padārtha*. On the other hand, the *pañcāvayavāni* are expounded under the item *avayava* (component or member), the seventh *padārtha*. As regards definitions, for example, *anumāna* is defined in the *Sūtra* 1.1.5, and *pañcāvayavāni* in the *Sūtra* 1.1.32-39; that is, they are dealt with in quite different places. This fact makes us suspect that they are in no relation to each other.

[2] The definition of *anumāna* presented in the *Sūtra* 1.1.5 is as follows:
atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ

ca. Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* comments on these three kinds of *anumāna*, juxtaposing two ways of interpretation⁵). Curiously enough, Vātsyāyana does not refer to any criterium according to which one of them be selected as the orthodox, correct interpretation. This leads to a general notion that among Naiyāyikas by the time of Vātsyāyana the original meaning of the three kinds of *anumāna* was already beyond the realm of their understanding. It is also curious that both Gautama and Vātsyāyana do not mention anything in particular other than the three kinds of *anumāna*, and no references are found to *pañcāvayavāni*. Some scholars have construed the three kinds of *anumāna* as *svārthānumāna*, but they have no clear evidence on this point.

Uddyotakara, in his comment on *Bhāṣya* 1.1.5, summarized the three kinds of *anumāna* under the notion that they are nothing but “knowing *liṅgin* from *liṅga*”, or nothing but *liṅgaparāmarśa*. In other words, he neglected at the last stage the difference between these three.

[3] As is well known, Vātsyāyana identified each of the *pañcāvayavāni* with each of the *pramāṇas* and the totality of the four *pramāṇas*. According to him, *pratijñā* (the first *avayava*) is *āgama*, *hetu* (the second) is *anumāna*, *udāharana* (the third) is *pratyakṣa*, *upanaya* (the fourth) is *upamāna*, and *nigamana* (the fifth) is a statement to show that the above four *pramāṇas* can be closely connected with one matter (*artha*); in other words, it is a synthesis of the four *pramāṇas* (ad *Sūtra* 1.1.1). As Karl Potter has pointed out, in stating thus Vātsyāyana might have intended to demonstrate the appropriateness of “five (*pañca*)” in the *pañcāvayavāni*, but this idea was ignored by later Naiyāyikas, who ensured “five” by emphasizing *liṅgaparāmarśa* as connected with the fourth *avayava*⁶).

Furthermore, judging at least from the above passage, Vātsyāyana’s *anumāna* has relation positively only to the second *avayava*. This argument seems to be quite different from that of later Naiyāyikas, who advocated the division of *anumāna* into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, and are likely to have amalgamated *anumāna* and *pañcāvayavāni*.

[4] Vātsyāyana himself performed *anumānas* with intent to confirm his own interpretations, saying “*iti anumīyate*”, “*iti anumānam*” or “*iti gamyate*”. But, in such cases, where Naiyāyikas would have been wont to utilize *pañcāvaya-vāni* (or *tryavayavāni*, the abbreviated form of *pañcāvayavāni*), he did not utilize them to clarify his *anumānas* for others.

3

These strange, but curious points suggest a great gap between early and later Naiyāyikas. This gap arose at the time of Uddyotakara (or some Naiyāyikas before him and after Dignāga), who, confronted with “bad logicians (*kutārīkika*)” whose chief master was Dignāga, the establisher of the Buddhist system of logic, must have felt very deeply the crisis of the Naiyāyika system of logic. Urged by necessity, Uddyotakara modified or neglected some important aspects of the system of the *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, particularly in the field of *anumāna*.

However we cannot assert that the Naiyāyika theory of *anumāna* has fundamentally changed since the time of Uddyotakara. It is true that it has changed to much extent, but then does not there exist anything unchanged during the whole history of the Naiyāyikas? The key to clarify such a question is the word “*nyāya*”.

4

[I] Vātsyāyana called the Naiyāyika tradition “*nyāyavidyā*”, “*nyāyaśāstra*” or “*ānvikṣiki*”⁷⁾. According to him, *ānvikṣiki* is that which is promoted by *ānvikṣā*. *Ānvikṣā* is *ānvikṣaṇa* (*anu-ikṣaṇa*), which is the re-cognition of something cognized (*ikṣita*) with the help of *pratyakṣa* or *āgama*. In other words, *ānvikṣā* is *anumāna* dependent upon *pratyakṣa* or *āgama*. He also says, “*Nyāya* is an examination (*parikṣā*) of matters with the help of *pramāṇas*”, and “*Nyāyabhāsa* (fallacious *nyāya*) is *anumāna* contradictory to *pratyakṣa* or *āgama*”⁸⁾. From these statements we can infer that *nyāya* is in close relation to *anumāna*.

[II] But, in another place, Vātsyāyana says, “This is the most excellent *nyā-*

ya (*paramo nyāyah*)⁹⁾. The word “this” indicates *pañcāvayavāni* or *pañcāvayavasamūha*. Thus *nyāya* is equal to *pañcāvayavāni*. This notion was accepted by later Naiyāyikas. The content of all the published versions of the *Sūtra* is divided into eighty-four sections (*prakaraṇas*). This division follows directly that of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* written by Vācaspatimiśra. A section which deals with definitions of *pañcāvayavāni* (the *Sūtra* 1.1.32-39) is named *nyāyalakṣaṇa-prakarāṇa*. In Navya Naiyāyika texts, too, a section which deals with *pañcāvayavāni* is named *nyāyaprakarāṇa*¹⁰⁾.

5

On the basis of [I] and [II] we can say that *nyāya* has the greatest power in the field of argumentation and is called “*paramo nyāyah*” when it takes the form of *pañcāvayavāni*, and, although all the *pramāṇas* partake in *nyāya*, *anumāna* is the core. From this fact we can assume that *anumāna*, as the core of *paramo nyāyah*, was reinterpreted as *parārthānumāna* by later Naiyāyikas. Thus the Naiyāyika theory of *anumāna* has, in this sense, been maintained almost unchanged¹¹⁾.

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- 1) In the period between Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara there must have existed those Naiyāyikas who elaborated or criticized Vātsyāyana’s system of logic. Recent studies are gradually completing the picture of the period around Uddyotakara. Cf. E. Frauwallner, “Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya. I: Jayanta und seine Quellen”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für der Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. XLIV, 1937; E. Steinkellner, “Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, Bd. 5, 1961; G. Oberhammer, “On the Sources in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Uddyotakara”, *ibid.*, Bd. 6, 1962.
 - 2) There remains a possibility that some pre-Dignāga logicians (Buddhists or Naiyāyikas) had been preparing such a division, which Dignāga accepted. I am now preparing another paper which deals with this possibility.
 - 3) *svārthaṃ svānumītihetuḥ| tathā hi| svayam eva bhūyo bhūyo darśanena yatra yatra dhāmas tatrāgnir iti mahānasādu vyāptiṃ grhītvā parvatasamīpaṃ gatvā tadgate cāgnau sandihānaḥ parvate dhūmaṃ paśyan (→hetu) vyāptiṃ smarati yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir iti (→udāharaṇa)| tadanantaram vahnivyāpyadhūmavān ayam parvata iti jñānam utpadyate (→ūpanaya)| ayam eva līngaparāmārśa ity ucyate| tasmāt parvato vahnimān iti jñānam anumītir utpadyate (→pratiñā, nigamana)| tad etat svārthānumānam| (Tarkasaṃgraha, ed. Athalye, § 43)*

- 4) The careless usage of the term "syllogism" which has developed in the Western tradition of logic will be harmful for the study of Indian logic.
- 5) *pūrvavat*: 1. cause→effect, 2. to see one of the two things seen before→another thing; *śeṣavat*: 1. effect→cause, 2. *pariśeṣa*; *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*: 1. to see the same thing in different places in different moments→a transfer of that thing, 2. *liṅga*→*liṅgin*.
- 6) K. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II: Nyāya Vaiśeṣika*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, p. 186.
- 7) *ānvikṣiki* is one of the four *vidyās*, the Brāhmaṇical orthodox traditions of learning. The other three *vidyās* are: *trayī* (on the three Vedas), *vārta* (on agriculture or commerce), *daṇḍanīti* (on law or policy). Cf. *Manusmṛti* 7. 43, 12. 103. *śāstras* are also the Brāhmaṇical traditions of learning: for example, *dharmaśāstra*, *arthaśāstra*.
- 8) Ad *Sūtra* 1. 1. 1.
- 9) Loc. cit.
- 10) An explanation of *nyāya* in the *nyāyaprakaraṇa* of the *Manikāṇa* is as follows: *animitir dvividhā—svārthā parārthā ca| parārthānumītau nyāyajanyaḥ paramarśaḥ kāraṇam|| ucitāunpūrvikapratijñādīpañcakasamudāyo nyāyah| tasya pratijñāhetūdāharāṇopānayanigamanāni avayavāḥ||* (ed. E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, The Adyar Library Series, Vol. 88, 1960, p. 44) [Inferential knowledge is of two kinds: that which is for one's own sake, and that which is for others. Reflecting consideration which originates from the *nyāya* is the cause of the inferential knowledge which is for others. The *nyāya* is a collection of the five [components], proposition, etc., which are arranged in the appropriate order. Its components are: proposition, reason, example, application, conclusion.]
- 11) But later Naiyāyikas must have felt it inconvenient that *anumāna* and *nyāya* are expounded in different places. Thus some of them dissolved the old system of sixteen *padārthas* and reconstructed a new system, construing *nyāyaprakaraṇa* as merely one component of *anumānapariccheda*.

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