

SAKALAJAGADVIDHĀTRANUMĀNAM

(III)

—The Refutation by Bhāsarvajña against
the Criticism by Dharmakīrti—

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In the first paper¹⁾ of this series, we have seen the refutation of Bhāsarvajña on the 10th verse of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttikam. Now we would report his refutation against the criticism on Dharmakīrti's verses which follow the 10th verse.²⁾

Dharmakīrti explained his logics in reference to the Naiyāyika's proofs that "various forms (*sanniveśāḥ*)³⁾ etc. as the grounds to prove the government by the God Śiva can be allowed when they correspond to the existence and the non-existence of the rulers." (*siddham yārg adhiṣṭhātṛbhāvabhāvānuvṛttimat | sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumiyate || k. 11*)

The Naiyāyikas have asserted that the various forms prove that everything has been controled by an intelligent cause (*buddhimatkāraṇam*). But Dharmakīrti considered the intelligent cause to be a human being. That is, the proofs of the God Śiva are tautological for the Buddhists, or they have the faults of an unrecognized mediate term (*asiddho hetvabhasaḥ*). But Bhāsarvajña also acknowledges to recognize the concomitance between the "*sanniveśāviśiṣṭatvam*" and the "*buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitatvam*" from the man-made constructions only. He makes to recollect the case that stupid men cannot appreciate old constructions to be built by human constructors, and insists that the cases of the earth etc. also are same as it. He calls such a man the "*vyāptigrahaṇasmṛtivismā-dhaḥ*". Those who do not recognize the earth etc. to be constructed and controled by the Creator (*dhātā*)⁴⁾ fail the recognitions of the concomitance between the construction and the construtor (*kṛtabuddhiḥ*), Bhāsarvajña says.

Then he cites the 12th verse, "man cannot acquire the inference from the

common term of grounds, for instance, he cannot infer the fire on the grounds of seeing a white one (*pāṇḍuravyam*) (which cannot be discriminated between the smoke and the vapour). The mediate term must be originated from generally recognized characters of objects.” (*vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasamānyād abhedinaḥ | na yuktānumitih pāṇḍuravyād iva⁵ hutāsane ||*) Bhāsarvajña refutes saying that the Naiyāyikas did’nt use such grounds that cannot discriminate the details of remote ones. Then he cites the 13th verse of Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti commented the above mentioned misuse in the 13th verse. We will show the instance of the misuse according to Devendrabuddhi’s demonstrative expression.⁶⁾

(Assertion) An ant-hill is also constructed by a potter.

(Reason) Because it is a variation of clay.

(Case) Such as a pot.

If “a potter” means an intelligent cause (*cetanaḥ kartā = buddhimat-kāraṇam*), Bhāsarvajña says, the expression may be right because the ants are also intelligent causes, but generally speaking the concomitance between the mediate and the major terms should be thought among well known cases. Thus he rejects the notice of Dharmakīrti about the obscure use of the grounds.

Then Bhāsarvajña cites these verses of Dharmakīrti. “If you prove an object from a common word, you are not right, as if you prove a horned for the word etc. are *gauḥ*. The right usage of the word is founded on the strictly limited class.” (*jātyantare prasiddhasya śabdasamānyadarśanāt | na yuktam sādhanam gotvād vāgādinaḥ⁷ viśaṇivat ||* k. 15) The word *gauḥ* means “the stars”, “the sky”, “a diamond”, “heaven”, “an arrow”, (m.) “the earth”, “speech”, “the eye” (f.) etc. as well as “a cow”. (Apte’s *the Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*) Dharmakīrti made in fun using this word. “The words can express every object because of basing on the will of the narrator. If you can show an object from a word, you could show every object on everything.” (*vivakṣāparatantratvānna śabdāḥ santi kutra vā | tadbhāvād arthasiddhau tu sarvaṃ sarvasya sidhyati ||* k. 16)

Dharmakīrti argued that the words were founded on the will of the narrator and the social agreement (*saṅketah*) about the usage of the words, so that, they didn’t show the reality of the object (i. e. of the meaning). But in reference

to the Vedas as the sacred words, Bhāsarvajña asserts them to be the revelation seen by the Rishis. This conviction leads to the thesis of the eternity of the word.

Then Bhāsarvajña cites the following verses of Dharmakīrti, and does not refute them, but obviously he opposes the metaphysics of Dharmakīrti that an eternal and all-pervading one cannot effect at all as the ether.

“The month of Caitra is said to be relative to the arms and the drugs, so that, to the injury and the cure. Then why don’t you think that a pillar which is not relative to effects is the cause of them?” (*śāstrauśadhābhisambandhāccaitra-sya vṛṇarohāṇe | asambaddhasya kiṃ sthānoḥ kāraṇatvaṃ na kalpyate || k. 22*)

“It is not rational to think that the objects having the non-proper characters can effect. An eternal one cannot show his works from his creatures. So we cannot accept its ability.” (*svabhāvabhedaṇa viṇā vyāpāro’pi na yujyate | nityasyāvya-tirekitvāt sāmartyhīca duranvayam || k. 23*)

“If a cause exists, the effect exists. But if you think any other object than the cause to be a cause, you would commit the fault of the regressus ad infinitum.” (*yeṣu satsu bhavatyeva yat tebhyo’nyasya kalpane | taddhetutvena sarvatra hetū-nām anavasthitih || k. 24*)

At another page Bhāsarvajña cites the 25th and 28th verses of Dharmakīrti.

“In budding forth, the earth etc. become causes by effecting with their proper characters. Because the budding forth is various in correspondence with effecting of the proper characters.” (*svabhāvaparīṇāmena hetur ankurajanmani | bhūmyādī-tasya saṃskāre tadviśeṣasya darśanāt || k. 25*)

“Therefore, those which can effect by coalescing other factors have the ability of the cause. But the God etc. do not have such an ability because of its immutability.” (*tasmāt pṛthag aśakteṣu yeṣu sambhāvyaṇe guṇaḥ | saṃhatau hetuā teṣāṃ neśvarāder abhedataḥ || k. 28*)

Whereas Bhāsarvajña refutes Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics showing the following instances. When yogins, stopping his standing, sitting or walking, fix their minds at one object or yoke them fast, and show the wisdom of the yoga, they will have the omnipotence. That is, the inflexibility of the mind can play the motive cause. Or, an unchangeable gem will make men’s and women’s

minds joyful.

Conclusively speaking, Bhāsarvajña's refutation against Dharmakīrti's criticism on the Naiyāyika's proofs of the God Śiva may be summarized in these way.

(1) The necessary confirmation of the major premise between the mediate and the predicate term can be made in the cases which the Buddhists acknowledge. The unacknowledged cases are ascribed to the lack of the memory of the stupid men, as if they look at old temples as not man-made.

(2) It can be obviously perceived that everything in the world is created and controled by the God Śiva, but for the impious and stupid men the Naiyāyikas tried the proofs of the God.

(3) He does not approve the thesis of Dharmakīrti that the proper objects only have the ability to effect. But his counter-evidences are weaker than the evidences shown by Dharmakīrti.

(to be continued)

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- 1) Kimura, SAKALAJAGADVIDHĀTRĀṆUMĀNAM (I) —The Proof of the God Śiva by Bhāsarvajña— (JIBS. Vol. 28 No. 1)
 - 2) Nyāyabhūṣaṇam ed. by Yogīndrānanda (Vārāṇasī 1968) pp. 480-483; 486.
 - 3) See the grounds of Aviddhakarṇa cited in the Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjikā ad Ts.-Kārikā 47 (BBS. ed.), "*svārambhakṣvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāi*".
 - 4) We recollect the term "*dhātā*" in the Ṛgvedaḥ 10, 18, 5 "*yathāhānyanupūrvam bhavanti yatha ṛtava ṛtubhir yanti sadhu | yathā na pūrvam aparo jahātyevā dhātāryūṣi kalpayaiṣām ||*" As days in order follow one another as seasons duly alternate with seasons, As the later never forsakes the earlier, so fashion thou the lives of these, Ordainer. (A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature., London 1909 p. 127) or in the Ṛgvedaḥ 10, 85, 47 "*samañjantu viśve devāḥ samāpo hṛdayāni nau | sam mātariśvā sam dhātā sam u deṣṭri dadhātu nau ||*" May all the gods us two unite, may Waters now our hearts entwine, may Mātariśvan and Dhātri, may Deshtri us together join. (ibid. p. 124)
 - 5) Bhāsarvajña cites the kārikā correctly in stead of "*pāṇḍuravyādivad*" seen in the manuscripts of the Pramāṇavārttikam.
 - 6) Pramāṇavārttika-Pañjikā, Tibetan version (Derge ed., Tōhoku Catalogue no. 4217) 9b, 5-6.
 - 7) I corrected the cited passage "*gotvacchagādīnām*" by Bhāsarvajña according to Manorathanandin and the Tibetan version.

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