JITĀRI AND ŚĀNTARAKŚITA

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A

Jñānaśrīmitra frequently adduces arguments from Dharmakīrti¹ and Prajñāka-aragupta² in support of his own, and cites many passages from Bhāsarvajña in the role of pūrvapakṣin.³ On the other hand, he quotes only one kārikā that conveys Śāntarakṣita’s own view.⁴ Jñānaśrīmitra’s successor Ratnakīrti quotes fifteen kārikās from the Pramanavārttika, fifty-three passages from Jñānaśrīmitra and five from Prajñākaragupta, whereas he quotes only three and a half kārikās of Śāntarakṣita’s own.⁵ Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti are disinclined to cite Śāntarakṣita, showing favour instead to Prajñākaragupta.

Jitāri quotes seventeen kārikās from the Tattvasamgraha in the Sugatamata-vibhaṅgabhāṣya,⁶ five kārikās and two half-kārikās in the Jātinirākṛti,⁷ three in the Anekāntavādanirāsa,⁸ and one and half in the Bhālavāratarka.⁹ Besides, Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita / Kamalaśīla quote the same passages from the following sources: The Daśabhāmikasūtra, the Samādhirājasūtra, the Laṅka-vatārasūtra, the Abhidharmakośa, the Viṃśatikā and the Ślokavārttika.¹⁰ On the other hand, Jitāri does not quote a single passage from Prajñākaragupta. Like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Jitāri quotes a large number of kārikās from Dharmakīrti.¹¹

Judging from the favoured sources of quotation, we can see that two groups are in contrast to each other: Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti come under one group (School A), and Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Jitāri come under the other (School B).

B

When Jitāri deals with epistemological topics in the Sugatamata-vibhaṅgabhāṣya,¹² he closely follows Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In the first chapter,
he thus argues in favour of “universal momentariness” (ksanabhanga) and refutes atman, God as the “permanent agent” (nityasahakarin) and “recognition” (pratyabhijna). 13) His exposition of the Sautrantika doctrine in the second chapter is very brief.14) This light treatment is consistent with the critical attitude of Santaraksita toward the Sautrantika aspect of Dharmakirti’s theory of “self-recognition” (svasamvedana).15) Jitari and Santaraksita who belong to School B are more critical of the Sautrantikas than people of School A.16)

In the third chapter where the Yogacara doctrine is expounded,17) Jitari adduces Viṃśatika 1218) and Tattvasaṃgraha 1989–199019) in support of his criticism of the Vaiśeṣikas, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas, who hold in their respective ways that external objects participate in the formation of knowledge.20) Here he takes the Yogacārin position that the world is nothing but a reflection brought about from our dormant consciousness (citta) which has been preserved since the infinite past.

Santaraksita exhibits his Yogacārin standpoint in the bahirārtha chapter of the Tattvasaṃgraha. On the other hand, he professes his Mādhyamika belief in the first kārikā of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra.21) In this double system of epistemology, the Yogacārin doctrine of idealism is after all considered to be a step to reach the Mādhyamika truth: “There is nothing real and the world is empty. The cognition which the Yogacārins admit as real is not ultimately real.”22)

Jitari too takes this Yogacāra-Mādhyamika position. In the third chapter of the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhaṣya, his exposition of the Mādhyamika doctrine centres on Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā 7,23) the purport of which is essentially the same as that of Madhyamakālaṃkāra.

C

There are ten and a half kārikās of Dharmakirti which both Jitari and Santaraksita/Kamalaśīla respectively quote.24) Apart from these, fifty-six are quoted from the Pramanavārttika in the Tattvasaṃgraha and the Pañjikā, and thirty-eight in the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhaṣya. This indicates that both Jitari and Santaraksita/Kamalaśīla are highly dependent on Dharmakirti.
While adducing the same authority, however, Jitāri is more positive than Śantarākṣita in defending his Mādhyamika standpoint. At the end of the fourth chapter of the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya, Jitāri enumerates five Mādhyamika-oriented kārikās of the Pramāṇavārttīka.25 There he considers Dharmakīrti to be a Mādhyamika master and even says that the Mādhyamika doctrine was established by Dharmakīrti.26 This positive attitude seems more to reflect a personal idiosyncrasy than a sectarian position different from Śantarākṣita's.

Both Jitāri and Śantarākṣita / Kamalaśīla quote from the Yuktisāṭikā and the Ratnāvalī.27 Whereas Kamalaśīla and Śantarākṣita quote from the Mādhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna the Mādhyamika,28 Jitāri quotes from the Bodhicittavivarana of Nāgārjuna the Tāntrika. This might reflect the general trend at the end of the tenth century when Tantrism flourished. In fact, Jitāri himself composed fourteen Tāntrika works.29

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1) Thirty-one kārikās are quoted. 2) Thirty passages are quoted.
3) Thirty passages are quoted.
4) TS 395. A kārikā identical with TS 2871 is also quoted. But this originally from the Brhaṭṭīka. Cf. JNA 162.
5) RNA 1=TS 3128. RNA 51=TS 93ab. RNA 38=TS 122. RNA 51=TS 93ab. Thirty-three more kārikās are identical. But they are originally from the Ślokavārttīka and the Brhaṭṭīka. Cf. E. Frauwallner, “Kumārila’s Brhaṭṭīka,” WZKSO, Bd. 6, 1962.
7) TS 1744, 1746, 1776. TS 1744 is composed of ŚV Ākṛti 57cd and 58ab. This fusion is original with Śantarākṣita.
8) TS 1776, 1777b, 1778abc. Jitāri has fused the last two into one kārikā. See K. Shirasaki, op. cit., p. 25. Also see K. Shirasaki, “Jitāri no anekāntavāda hīhan” (Jitāri’s criticism of the anekānta theory), JIBS, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1974, pp. 999–1003.
9) TS 1999, 2000ab.

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10) JITĀRI AND ŚANTARĀKṢITA (K. Shirasaki)
JITĀRI AND ŚĀNTARAKṢITA (K. Shirasaki) (11)

11) Forty-eight kārikās are quoted. 12) SVBh, P, No. 5868; D, No. 3900.
15) PV Pratyakṣa 349ab, 450.
16) People of School A are the Sākāravi jñādins. Both the Sautrāntikas and the Sākāravi jñānavādins hold that a cognition assumes a form, though the two parties differ in opinion as to whether an external object effect such a form. Jitāri criticises the sākāra theory in SVBh (P, 330b–331a), but he does not criticises the nirākāra theory, according to which a cognition in its ultimate state is formless.
17) SVBh 323a2–330b5.
18) V 12: śaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ śaḍāmśatā / śaṇḍām śamānadesatvāt pinḍah syād anumātram // (SVBH, P. 324a)
20) SVBh 324a4–7.
21) MA 1: nihsvabhavā amī bhāvā sattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekāṇekasvabhāvena viyo-gāt pratibimbavat // In his Mādhyamika position, he denies even the nirā-kāra theory. Cf. MA, P, 53a.
22) The logic behind this is as follows: Cognition can be neither singular nor plural and therefore it hos no svabhāva. Whatever has no svabhāva is not real.
23) SVK 7: nesṭam tad api dhīrānaṁ vijñānaṁ pāramārthikam / ekāṇekasvabhāvena viyo-gād gaganābjavat //
24) PV Pramāṇasiddhi 22 (SVBh, P, 314a; TSP, p. 147), 270 (SVBh, P, 292a; TSP, p. 229), Pratyakṣa 8 (SVBh, P, 329b; TSP, p. 8), 22 (SVBh, P, 323a; TSP, p. 317), 208 (SVBh, P, 354a; MA, P, 65b), 212 (SVBh, P, 338b; MA, P, 54a), 360 (SVBh, P, 354a; MA, P, 65b), Svārthanumāna 24 (SVBh, P, 289a; TSP, p. 1032), PV In 1. 55ab (SVBh, P, 355a; TSP, p. 691).
27) Yṣ 6, RĀ 1. 54 (SVBh). Yṣ 12, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 45, 46, RĀ 1. 60, 4. 79 (MA).
28) MK 3. 12 (MA, P, 71b), 15. 5 (MA, P, 72a), 15. 6 (MA, P, 72b).