

Kamalaśīla's Theory of the Yogācāra

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Śāntarakṣita (710—792~) united the Madhyamaka doctrine and the Yogācāra in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā & vṛtti, 91•92. Kamalaśīla (730—794~) explained Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-theory and commented on the three gāthās of the Laṅkāvatāra quoted in the Vṛtti in his Pañjikā. If we collate these commentaries with the explanations of the same three gāthās in his Bhāvanākrama, we can understand Kamalaśīla's theology more clearly. Then, what a situation holds Kamalaśīla, being heir to Śāntarakṣita, in Indian Buddhism of the 8th century ?

ABBREVIATIONS:

- BhK Kamalaśīla, "Bhāvanākrama", Minor Buddhist Texts, II. ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1958.
- Laṅk The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, 1923.
- MAK Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā, The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition Reprinted (=PER) Tokyo-Kyoto, Vol. 101, No. 5284.
- MAV Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti, PER, Vol. 101, No. 5285.
- MAP Kamalaśīla, Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā, PER, Vol. 101, No. 5286.
- MVṬ Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭikā, ed. S. Yamaguchi, 1934.
- SDV Jñānagarbha, Satyadvayavibhāga-vṛtti, Tohoku., No. 3882.
- SN Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra

I. from MAV, 91—Cittamātra as the law of cause-effect (mutual immanent attribute of cause-effect) in the world. Although the law of cause-effect as the origination of the world is mere citta-caitta substantially, but there are two theories: (1) one attaching weight to caitta, and (2) one giving priority to citta (called "the two Madhyamaka doctrines" in MAP). (1) is one who contend "that which is preached cittamātra is for the sake of setting apart a kartṛ and a bhokṛ" in the śāstra (MAP appoints Madhyamakahr̥daya of Ācārya Bhavya⁽¹⁾). Śāntarakṣita, in Bhāvaviveka's Madh-

yamakahṛdaya understood that the word «cittamātra» in the Daśabhūmika was not used for the purpose of denying caitta. (2) Others think that citta (=jñāna) is reasonable :

Causality and effectiveness are the very sole cognition,

that which is self-evolved (svasiddha) is attributed to cognition. (MAK, 91)

According to Śāntarakṣita, the thought of "others" who explained the Madhyamaka doctrine is following: the essence of cognition lies in a construct in mind, the self-evolved without any object, such as dreams and māyā etc., nothing else fictitious assuming (kalpanā). If one thinks any experienced thing really exists in the outer world, recognizance (samvedana) is not reasonable because it has no intimate-cause (rab-tu ñe-baḥi rgyu).

pratijñā...perception is to perceive a form of blue and the like of no particularity.

hetu.....because (recognizance) is substant of perception.

dṛṣṭānta...such as dreams and māyā etc.

Śāntarakṣita comments: if ("others") would insist that sole cognition exists apart from effect (an object in mind), because it is utpāda in another meaning, so cognition alone appearing without effect is anumāṇa, but not ⁽²⁾pratyakṣa. (Cognition) consisting of anumāṇa is non existing. Cittamātra means that "citta" contains samanantara-pratyaya which is objectivity itself, and the word of "mātra" put the outer aside as being no objective such as paramāṇu, the ultimate substance in the outer world (MAP: according to SN, Vijñānavādins explained so.). This thought of mine is accordanced with the traditions of Ghanavyūha and SN. (I think "others" so mentioned by Śāntarakṣita, were Sthiramati⁽³⁾). Quoting Lañk as a conclusion, he says:

⁽⁴⁾The outer form is not existing; but svacitta manifests itself in the outer world. (X, 489)

Because cittamātra has no essential element in the first principle, it is not a substance in truth (satyato 'sti). Having criticized both Bhāvaviveka, the founder of Mādhyamika-Svātantrika and a Madhyamaka theologist (Sthiramati) who asserted jñānākāra existing alone, Śāntarakṣita traced

along to the cittamātra-theory most classical and orthodox as to the origination of experience. To add to, Kamalaśīla gave historical lights upon him.

II. from MAV, 92—the theoretical union of Madhyamaka and Vijñaptimātra (Yogācāra-Mādhyamika as Citta-paramārtha-vāda). Śāntarakṣita summerized the three gāthās of Laṅk into one concise kārīkā. On the one hand, Kamalaśīla commented the three gāthās directly.

MAV, 92	Laṅk, x
Refuting on cittamātra, (a)	cittamātraṃ samāhya
one should be cognizant of non-existence of the outer world. (b)	{ bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet/ tathatālabhane sthitvā cittamātraṃ atikramet// 256
Resting on this principle, here in (c)	{ cittamātraṃ atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet/ nirābhāse sthito yogi
one should acknowledge nirātmaka really. (d)	{ mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati// 257 (anābhogagatiḥ śāntā prapñdhānair viśodhitā/) jñānaṃ nirātmakaṃ śreṣṭhaṃ nirābhāsena paśyati// 258

(a) may be omitted, (b) : ātma-ātmya and grāhya-grāhaka apart from citta attending with samprayukta (=caitta) which are pursued into the outer world are niḥsvabhāvas, (c) : because the principle of cittamātra is not svayambhū, cittamātra is niḥsvabhāva (paratantra and niḥsvabhāva i. e. sarvadharma-niḥsvabhāvatā, in the MAP), (d) : cittamātra is the Middle Way, niḥsvabhāva beyond any monism and pluralism and avoids all the extremes (MAP: this concentration is reasonable because it accords with tattvapraśa). Referring to this phrase (d), Kamalaśīla scribes in his BhK (xviii, p. 217) : cittamātra is vijñaptimātra (≠ tattva) and nirvikalpa-jñāna is vijñaptimātratā (=tattva) to a Vijñānavādin, while his own standpoint is cittamātra=advayajñāna=madhyamamārga=tattva.

III. from Kamalaśīla's interpretations on the three gāthās in the Laṅk, x—Abandonment of cittamātra and Cittamātra-paramārtha-vāda. Kamalaśīla interpretes the 256th gāthā and preaches to abandon the idea of cit-

tamātra (MAP & BhK). In the 257th, to “be beyond cittamātra” is to abandon cittamātra, grāhakākāra (MAP), to rest on jñāna of no dual of grāhya-grāhaka and is to deny adhyāropa (a rule increasing wrongly). To “be beyond nirābhāsa” is to be beyond adhesion to non-existence of the duality of grāhya and grāhaka (MAP), to be beyond jñāna in nirābhāsa of the duality (BhK) and is to deny apavāda (a rule denying wrongly). He did not adopt the creed of paratantra-svabhāva admitting non-nothingness but asserted cittamātra-niḥsvabhāva i. e. cittamātra-madhyamamārga (see MAV, 92, d). To “dwell in nirābhāsa” means nirābhāsa, not to adhere to the non-duality of grāhya-grāhaka, niḥsvabhāva delivered from the idea of monism and pluralism (MAP), and nirvikalpasamādhi implying pratipatti of sarvadharmā-niḥsvabhāvatā (BhK). He adopted here paratantra-niḥsvabhāvatā (see MAP of MAV, 92, c). A yogin resting in such a degree “perceives the mahāyāna”; he does look at nothing in the first principle but experiences īdṛśa (or tādṛś, such in ordinary) in the world (niḥsvabhāva and yet “īdṛśa” as a yogin’s sphere of pṛṣṭhalabha-jñāna, in MAP). This is paramatattva-darśana (BhK). Regarding this, he preaches the necessity of śamathavipaśyanānvāhīmārga to enter to paramatattvadarśana (BhK, xvii, p. 213). But also to him, it is one of the work-degrees, nirvedhabhāgiya (BhK). Further, he gave an important description as to the word of “svasaṃvid” and the Two Truths: having experienced non-existence of the duality or nirābhāsa by svasaṃvid (raṇ rig-pa), establishing it upon pṛṣṭhalabha-jñāna, the world is niḥsvabhāva and yet īdṛśa to a yogin. It is not reasonable that svasaṃvid is censure because it (svasaṃvid-bhāga) is additioned upon a keeper of cattle (gnag rdsi. MAP, p. 36, 1- 4). As for Kamalaśīla, to self-cognize non-existence of the duality or nirābhāsa is to be beyond cittamātra (Lañk, 257), and therefore “svasaṃvid” implies abhisamaya. This differs from svasaṃvid-bhāga, the theory of Dignāga, in the sense of the synthesis of grāhya and grāhaka. Next, “this world is niḥsvabhāva and yet īdṛśa” means paramārtha-sāṃvṛta. He says in the explanation of the last 258th; “gati” signifying īdṛśa as the character of the degree of Yogins is “anābhoga”, activities originating yogin’s inner postulate beyond his will, because there is no other visibility (dr̥ṣ-

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ṭavya) than it (idrśa) (MAP). A sentence entirely accordant with this can be found in the BhK (xvii, p. 214).

IV. Cittamātra-paramārtha-vāda and "Cittamātra-saṃvṛti-vāda".

a) Kamalaśīla comments the following two gāthās of Laṅk quoted in the MAV, 92.

⁽⁵⁾
To turn away hetu and pratyaya, to deny kāraṇa/

to rest upon cittamātra, I call it anutpāda// (x, 592, p. 338)

He says: the theory of Śāntarakṣita of turning away "hetu and pratyatya" i. e. ⁽⁶⁾five kinds of hetu and adhipati-hetu ("kāraṇa"), and to "rest upon cittamātra"; this is an interpretation of anutpāda so called in the thought of the Mādhyamika and also in the principle of vijñaptimātratā. From above to him, cittamātra=vijñaptimātratā (Vijñānavāda)=anutpāda (Mādhyamika).

⁽⁷⁾
There is no existence in the outer phenomena, and nothing caught in mind.

It is characteristic of anutpāda to give up all visions. (x. 595, p. 339)

He comments: it is anutpāda of phenomena that give up all visions to be niḥsvabhāva either in the outer world or mind itself. He interprets the significance of "anutpāda" in the first chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā based upon Cittamātra-paramārtha. If we apply the method of the classification of the Two Truths of his contemporaneous preceding scholars, ⁽⁸⁾the former verse is paryāya-paramārtha and the latter is aparyāya-paramārtha.

b) Further he comments the two verses quoted in the MAV, 92:

⁽⁹⁾
(in the meaning of Truth) here (anything) does never rise or disappear,

(in the meaning of the world) that which rises and disappears is, to say, absolute cognition.

He says: this is the Cittamātra-saṃvṛti-vāda. jñāna-kevala (absolute cognition) is original knowledge ⁽¹⁰⁾"yoni-jñāna i. e. vijñāna". In correspondence with the terms of "Cittamātra-saṃvṛti-vāda", we may presume that his own doctrine was the Cittamātra-paramārtha-vāda. This means cittamātra-madhyamamārga, cittamātra-niḥsvabhāva, and this view was supported most earnestly by him.

⁽¹¹⁾
The mahābhūtas and the like preached (by Bhagavan) come together into vijñāna.

If it (jñāna) is apart from jñāna (śreṣṭha-jñāna), is it not false image?

Kamalaśīla comments: this second verse was expressed by Ārya Nā-gārjuna. All the things, the four mahābhūtas and the like (containing bhautikas) preached by Bhagavan come together into vijñāna, for the four mahābhūtas etc. are situated upon ābhāsa of vijñānas each of each. If so, it is reasonable that (the mahābhūtas etc.) exist either on vijñāna itself (=grāhaka) or in the exterior-within-mind itself (=grāhya). If one thinks the mahābhūtas to be the outer existence in Truth, the worldly cognition (=vijñāna) regarding the outer world to be the actual existence in Truth is false-image, because there is no ābhāsa of it in śreṣṭha-jñāna. Applying the words of his preceeding scholars, the first verse refers to bhūta-saṃvṛti (the real world) and the second is concerning mithyā (or abhūta)-saṃvṛti (the false-world).

CONCLUSIONS: So as Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla was a Mādhyamika scholar, but he developed his worldly theory on the classical and orthodox Vijñāna-vāda. For this purpose, he criticized Bhāvaviveka and Sthiramati. Śāntarakṣita standing against the Jñeya-adhyātma-vāda of Dignāga (Ālam-banaparīkṣā in his Pañjikā of SDV, 38, Kamalaśīla justified the meaning of "svasaṃvid" from Dignāga's doctrine of Salakṣaṇa-vijñaptimātra. These two scholars constructed Yogācāra-Mādhyamika upon the idea of cittamātra-madhyamamārga or cittamātra-niḥsvabhāva, namely Cittamātra-paramārtha-vāda which united the highest ideals of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Although Jñānagarbha, a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika who had influenced on them preached the vijñaptimātra-doctrine upon bhūta-saṃvṛti in his SDV (5. 8. 22. etc.), they sublimated the thought of Yogācāra-Mādhyamika upto par-yāya-paramārtha. Bu-ston says that the Mādhyamika branched into three lineages after the argument between Kamalaśīla and a Chinese Hva-śān (794. A. D.) at Bsam-yas (Sato, Historical Study of Ancient Tibet, II. Kyoto, 1959, p. 862), and Kamalaśīla was a great scholar who established the third way, i. e. Yogācāra-Mādhyamika against the two lineages of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, the founder of Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika.

- (1) Bhavya (650—700) is different from Bhāvaviveka (490—470), see my “Jñānagarbha no Bukkyō-gaku”, 福井博士頌壽記念「東洋思想論集」, Tokyo, 1960, p. 431 (35). (37). This phrase is of the *Madhyamakahr̥daya*, V. 28, c, d. (Yamaguchi, “佛教に於ける無と有との對論”, the Tibetan text, p. 12). But it is in the V. 48, c, d that Bhāvaviveka gives weight to *caitta*, and regards *citta* as an unity of *caittas* as various psychological processes (Yamaguchi, do. p. 382).
- (2) The meaning of *pratyakṣa* in Śāntarakṣita is *sarvajña*, i. e. perfect knowledge intuiting essential substance in the real world in its originality. It is *nyāya*, i. e. knowledge in *paryāya-paramārtha*.
- (3) Sthiramati was not a *Cittamātra-vādin* who disregards *caitta* (his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā*, Yamaguchi, do. p. 367). Here is criticized his opinions on the substantiality of *citta* (= *jñāna*) and self-existence of *jñānākāra*, modification within cognition. He says: although there exists no *ātman* nor *dharma* in the outer world, *ātman* and *dharma*s are adhered to *viñjāna* in itself (his *Triṃśikāviñaptibhāṣya*, p. 16), and, without *grāhya* (“apart from effect”), the two appearances as *ātman* (*kliṣṭamanas*) and *viñapti* (6 *viñjānas*) present themselves in *grāhakākāra* (“*jñānākāra*”), therefore they are only false appearances (“*sva-siddha*”) (MVṬ, p. 19; Yamaguchi's tr. p. 26), though (appearances) take the form of *grāhyagrāhaka*, it is not because they are coloured blue or in any other hue, as it were, by reflecting the colour of the cushion on which they lie as a crystal ball is coloured (see “*pratijñā*”) (MVṬ, p. 218; tr., p. 344). Bhāvaviveka argued against Sthiramati: “it is true that crystal abandons transparency of its nature affected by the particularity of cushion (blue or any other hue), and transforms its nature to blue etc. (against MVṬ)because *jñānākāra* can not be self-existing in *jñāna* apart from *jñeyākāra* (against *Triṃśikāviñaptibhāṣya*).” (Yamaguchi, do. pp. 244—245). It means that Śāntarakṣita perhaps call Sthiramati in question through Bhāvaviveka. Śāntarakṣita, elsewhere criticized his ontology of *viñjāna* referring to “Sthiramati” in the *Pañjikā* of SDV, 23.
- (4) *bahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ / svacittaṃ dṛśyati bahiḥ /* (Lañk, x, 489, a, b, p. 326)
- (5) *hetupratyayaivyāvṛttiṃ kāraṇasya niśedhanam / cittamātravyavasthānam anutpādaṃ vadāmy aham //* (Lañk, x, 592, p. 338)
- (6) Lañk, ii (pp. 83—84): *Mahāmāti!* there are six *hetus*, *bhaviṣyahu*, *saṃbandha-h.*, *lakṣaṇa-h.*, *vyāñjana-h.*, and *upekṣā-h.* Among these, it is thought that *saṃbandha-h.* is correspond with “*pratya*”, *kāraṇa-h.*, with “*kāraṇa*” and the rest four, with “*hetu*”.
- (7) *na bāhyabhāvaṃ bhāvānāṃ na ca cittaparigrahaṃ / sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇaṃ yattadanutpādalakṣaṇam //* (Lañk, x, 595, p. 339)
- (8) Bhavya, *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*, 4. 5. *Jñānagarbha*, SDV, 4. 5. In the

colophon of the former we see the terms: "written by Legs ldan ḥbyed (Bhāvaviveka)", but according to my inquiry the name should be Bhavya (above, Note(1)).

- (9) na hy atropadyate kiṃcitpratayayair na nirudhyate / utpadyante nirudhyante pratayā eva kalpitāḥ // (Lañk, II, 140. p. 84)
- (10) I have not seen this word all through the volume of Lañk, but there is a phrase "cittaṃ hi traidhātuka-yoniḥ" in X, 36 (p. 269). Citta-yoni seems to have been understood "yoni-jñāna" by Kamalaśīla.
- (11) Mr. D. Ueyama appointed the 34th verse in the Yuktiṣaṣṭhikākārikā (龍樹造, 六十頌如理論, 宋施護譯, Taisho. 1575), 「大種等及識. 所說皆平等. 彼智現證時. 無妄無分別.」(vol. 30, p. 255, b)

Philosophy East And West

A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought

volume x, numbers 3 and 4 • October 1960 and January 1961

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University of Hawaii Press,

Honolulu 14, Hawaii

\$ 4.00 a year; single copy, \$ 1.25